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The centenary of the First World War (2014-2018) proffered new interpretations of the 
conflict as a global war that stretched far beyond the Western Front. Historians of the Great War, 
however, have continued to characterize the African theatres of the war as ‘sideshows.’ 
Similarly, Africa has been largely absent from studies of the commemoration and memory of the 
First World War. While memory studies have contributed to an understanding of the long-term 
legacy of the conflagration for contemporary nation-states, Africa remains a regrettable 
exclusion. This study addresses a particular case study – Kenya Colony – as a locus of memory 
and meaning-making in the wake of the Great War. I argue that Imperial organizations, colonial 
administrators, and settlers all fashioned the First World War as a validation of the colonial 
project in East Africa, and the trajectory of the British Empire more generally. In the process, 
settlers, administrators, and the Imperial War Graves Commission pulled on Empire-wide 
threads of First World War memory, creating knots of memory that denied Kenyans a 
meaningful place in the public commemoration of the conflagration. Through their 
commemorative infrastructure, white settlers in Kenya Colony bolstered their political and social 
power by referencing the First World War. The memory of the First World War, however, was 
not homogenous within Kenya’s white community. The culture of commemoration that emerged 
during the 1920s in Kenya was multifaceted and politically charged. What resulted was a debate 
on the nature of colonialism in East Africa, where different interest groups posited different 
interpretations of 1914-1918. Ultimately, even though at least 45,000 Kenyans died in the First 
World War, on the eve of decolonization the First World War was no longer nationally 
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 Historians of the First World War have almost invariably described the African theatre as 
a ‘forgotten front.’ Although there have been numerous published academic accounts since the 
early-2000s, some important dedicated journal issues and edited volumes since the late-1970s, 
and plentiful fictional and popular portrayals since the 1940s, the continent of Africa remains on 
the periphery of First World War studies. Although it may have appeared a ‘sideshow’ from the 
perspective of the metropoles of Europe, fighting from 1914-1918 left no part of Africa 
untouched, whether by direct involvement in the fighting, supplying the troops on the continent, 
or through personnel and resource demands. As recent scholarship has shown, the African 
theatre is essential to the story of the Great War. The continent, however, rarely appears in 
instructional materials on the conflict, contributing to the erasure of the million Africans who 
enlisted from 1914-1918 and the countless other casualties who became fodder in the war. 
Although this neglect may be driven by a lack of interest and relevance to the Western Front 
rather than a dearth of source material, Africa’s First World War is a history that we forget at our 
peril. Recent historians of the First World War have pressed the issue with more vigour, 
especially during the years of the centenary, but the publications pale in comparison to those for 
the Western Front, the Eastern Front, the Middle East, and Asia.  
 While historians dedicated to the study of the First World War in Africa have kept the 
story alive in academic circles, the Great War in Africa left a commemorative footprint beyond 
1918 that is almost completely forgotten. Settler and African communities grappled with the 
consequences of battle, diseases, injury, and economic loss, remembering those fateful years – as 
colonies, as communities, and as individuals – in distinct ways. The Imperial War Graves 
 
1 This thesis draws on research supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.  
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Commission (IWGC) left concrete evidence of the war in their cemeteries, memorials, and 
monuments, adding to an extant settler commemorative landscape and speaking to fundamental 
changes to the colonial encounter in the wake of the Great War. This was the foundation upon 
which settlers, administrators, Indians, Asians, and Africans participated in remembrance 
practices throughout the interwar period. Although only a part of their struggles to negotiate the 
texture of their societies, these activities helped animate everyday life in newly constituted 
African colonies. 
 The penetrating effects of the First World War on nationhood and social organization in 
Europe and its offshoots has been the object of study and mythologization since the Armistice. 
Unfortunately, this same analysis has not been extended to Africa, although it stands to reason 
that if communities in Europe and its offshoots grappled with the shock and loss of the First 
World War, communities in Africa did so as well.2 Though most official records reflect the 
experiences of settler communities, the sheer numbers of Africans who lost their lives and 
livelihoods from service, famine, and disease leave little doubt that it must have been just as 
fundamental to post-war life for these casualties of war as well. Though the traces are fewer, the 
oral histories of many African communities spoke to the reckoning of the First World War in 
Africa, offering lasting evidence of the extensive material and emotional ramifications that it had 
for the continent.  
 The memory of the First World War in Africa thus remains an area for further 
exploration to more fully understand the effects that conflict wrought upon the continent and, 
relatedly, the role that it played in constituting the world we inhabit today. The preoccupation 
with memory in the 20th and early-21st Centuries – what Jay Winter has termed the “memory 
 
2 Please see Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of the literature on the memory and commemoration of the 
First World War.  
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boom” in Western culture3 – has scarcely extended beyond Europe and North America. The First 
World War, which has been at the centre of “memory studies” since Paul Fussell’s seminal The 
Great War in Modern Memory,4 has been party to this erasure of non-European memory studies 
within the historical discipline. I hope that this dissertation contributes to the recapturing of an 
African memory of the First World War, which in turn might help historians rediscover its 
importance and end its undeserved marginalization as a mere ‘sideshow’ from the main 
conflagration in Europe.  
 Nevertheless, the memory of the First World War in African communities is not the 
subject of my study. While historians of the war in Africa should aim to reconstitute the traces of 
First World War memory into a fuller understanding of how it affected Africans, my expertise is 
not suited to the oral histories that would be necessary to do so. Further, I believe that it is not 
my story to tell, and I hope that dedicated Africanists – from the continent itself – will fill this 
void. What my experience and expertise do allow me to pursue, however, is an analysis of settler 
memories of the First World War. As a settler historian from Canada, I believe it is imperative to 
turn the lens of analysis inwards to understand how those with power manipulated the memory 
of the First World War, often unwittingly, in ways that extended their control over Indigenous 
populations. Self-reflection and analysis is why this study concerns the settler population of 
Kenya and the meaning of the First World War for the colonization of Kenya throughout the 
interwar period. This dissertation could have taken many forms, but it is with this perspective, 
and through a re-evaluation of my own relationship to Africa, that I turned to a history of state-
driven and settler-initiated commemoration in Kenya.  
 
3 Jay Winter has written widely about the ‘memory boom’ in Western academia. See: Jay Winter, 
Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), especially Chapter 1.  
4 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
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 My journey to studying the First World War in Africa has been a roundabout one. My 
fascination with the continent has persisted throughout my academic career and has driven most 
of my projects. Part of this fascination stems from my upbringing: my ‘Uncle’ Sam, who 
immigrated to Canada from Ghana after the fall of Kwame Nkrumah’s government, remains a 
close family friend who always engaged in my childhood hijinks and inspired me from a young 
age. As a wonderful traditional drummer, a translator in Toronto courtrooms, and a man with 
deep connections to his home in Kumasi, Ghana, he opened my eyes to a range of experiences 
that were indispensable to a child growing up in a small town of 6,500 people. I could not 
imagine writing this dissertation without his influence and perspective over the years.  
 This healthy relationship to the continent changed with my own political awakening in 
the wake of the 9/11 attacks and subsequent US actions abroad. Driven by that familiar 
imperative to ‘help’ Africa, I dove headfirst into the literature on contemporary Central and East 
African conflicts, especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo, neighbouring Rwanda, and 
the genocide in Darfur. I lectured friends and family about the catastrophic loss of life in those 
regions, self-assured that just my knowledge of the conflicts removed my complicity in the 
machinations of neo-colonial policies and economics that drove the unrest in the first place. It 
was selflessness through selfishness that drove my pursuit of knowledge, replete with the 
altruistic – yet often demeaning – narratives that so often mark aid discourses, environmental 
activism, and, at its worst, Western intervention in African, Asian, and Latin American affairs. I 
was convinced that, eventually, I could do my part in rectifying the underdevelopment of Africa 
– if only I could find a foothold.  
 My opportunity to grab hold of a future in aid and international development seemingly 
materialized in the Spring of 2009, just before I entered studies at the University of Ottawa, 
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when I decided to participate in a Habitat for Humanity Global Village build in Zambia. I 
relished the opportunity to both see the continent that I had studied so intently and to help 
contribute to a struggling community just outside of Lusaka, the capital of the country. After 
completing the build portion of the trip, however, we proceeded to Livingstone, the tourism 
capital of the country, to see Victoria Falls or Mosi O’ Tuna, one of Africa’s greatest natural 
wonders. Known to many as the ‘Disneyland of Africa,’ the town that bears the name of the most 
famous European explorer of Africa – David Livingstone – severed my connection to the 
families that I had met just days earlier. I was riveted by Victoria Falls and the wildlife in many 
of the ways that have become symbolic of the European presence in Africa since the 19th 
Century. Unironically, I mimicked the pose of a statue of David Livingstone that had recently 
been erected leading into the main trails with access to the Falls.  
 Another monument at the Falls took on more considerable significance during my 
graduate studies in military history. A cenotaph, adorned with a bronze sword, sits in a wooded 
area just beyond the parking lot. I had been unaware that the First World War had stretched to 
Africa, and I was curious to see such a familiar cenotaph in Zambia. After some guesswork and 
research, I realized that this monument was erected to remember settlers who had fought in the 
various theatres of the First World War. But this memory of the Falls faded quickly, only 
resurfacing when I returned to Zambia in 2016. 
 I had, however, come to encounter other remnants of Africa’s First World War on other 
travels to the continent. In 2011, when I travelled to Ghana with my Uncle Sam to meet my 
extended family, I visited the military museum in Kumasi – the traditional seat of power for the 
Ashanti Kingdom – that sat upon the ground where the Akan peoples mounted their last 
offensive against British rule in the War of the Golden Stool. Therein I encountered objects that 
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seemed out of place in my mind: a German flag captured in 1915, military medals from African 
soldiers who had fought in the West African Frontier Force, and even a captured Nazi flag. 
Though I remained focused on contemporary politics in Africa, my archive of evidence that the 
First World War had featured an African theatre continued to grow. 
 To draw a straight line between these visits and this project, however, would be 
dishonest. At the outset of my doctoral studies, I intended to write a transnational history of 
Indigenous participation in the British First World War effort, of which only part would have 
concerned Africa. It was only in my return to Zambia in 2016, while I was completing the 
qualifying year, that I saw the potential for this project, spurred again by the seemingly out-of-
place cenotaph at Victoria Falls. I was inspired by the wave of literature on commemoration 
driven by the centenary of the First World War. Once again, I had hoped that I could undertake a 
more transnational project, which would have focused on the Imperial War Graves 
Commission’s (IWGC) work throughout the African continent. Ultimately, I opted for a case 
study approach, homing in on Kenya, where two of the organization’s most prominent African 
projects remain today: the African Monuments in Nairobi and Mombasa. In seeking to 
understand the IWGC’s endeavours in Kenya, I have also unearthed some of the deeper 
connections between the First World War and Kenya’s settler society, which has helped give the 
project scope and specificity. Ultimately, this is a project that I could not have imagined when I 
decided to pursue graduate studies, but it is one that I am happy to have found.
 1 
Introduction: Conflict, Colonialism, and the Politics of Memory 
  In 1964, as the Kenyan Legislative Assembly prepared to declare itself an independent 
Republic, Mr. Kamau Munchunu rose to address his fellow politicians concerning the 
importance of acknowledging Kenya’s history in public spaces. “In other countries,” he 
lamented, “the monuments of the people who fought for freedom are displayed where the public 
can see them, remember them. But here nobody is bothering to even put up one statue.”1 He 
recommended erecting a statue of Dedan Kimathi in Nairobi’s city centre to honour the sacrifice 
of those who had fought for Kenya’s freedom from colonial rule. The representative made clear 
that acknowledging the freedom fighter’s sacrifices went hand-in-glove with ensuring the new 
government of Kenya would care for “the heroes who freed this country from the imperialist 
yoke.”2 The importance of public memorialization for Kenya’s future, he argued, was in 
providing cues for state action on important issues. From his perspective, public consciousness 
ought not to forget the fighters who earned Kenya its freedom. If Kenyans and their government 
did forget them, the country would not reward their deeds or acknowledge their needs. If Jomo 
Kenyatta believed that “Mau Mau was a thing best forgotten,”3 as David Anderson argues, then 
the antidote to forgetting was not only compensating those who had lost life and limb during the 
crisis but memorializing their sacrifices for posterity.  
 Munchunu’s call would remain unanswered by Jomo Kenyatta’s inaugural government. 
Kenyatta was deliberately conservative in his approach4 and did not share in the admiration of 
Mau Mau, especially its militant leanings. He saw himself as the scion of a peaceful transition to 
 
1 Kenya. The National Assembly (henceforth NA), Hansard, 5th August 1964, 1335-1336. 
2 Ibid., 1336. 
3 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (New York: 
WW Norton and Company, 2005), 1006, iBooks. 
4Ibid., 1001. 
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statehood in direct contradistinction to the ‘hooligans’ who drove the rebellion.5 Kenyatta had a 
particularly complex relationship with Mau Mau, only selectively acknowledging their role in 
achieving Independence and “[fearing] their dissenting voices.”6 While Kenyatta was careful to 
acknowledge Mau Mau, he remained wary of centring their experiences. If Mau Mau remained 
the ascendant force in the Independence narrative, it would have been difficult for Kenyatta to 
maintain his legitimacy as the leader of the new Kenyan Republic. For if the route to 
Independence was paved by a movement in which he had no part, a Mau Mau veteran explained 
to historian Lotte Hughes, “‘Who could have become the first president of Kenya? Is it Kenyatta 
or Kimathi?... Kenyatta was there to say [to the British], ‘Kill Kimathi! Let him die!’ Because he 
knew that he would [otherwise] have no chance of being President.’”7 Certainly, Kenyatta’s 
narrative of Mau Mau did not echo the British narrative of a “subversive, superstitious, tribalist, 
racist, anti-Christian, intimidating, brutal, criminal, committed to winning personal power for a 
few individuals and to establishing an ethnic tyranny.” However, he did view it as “a pariah 
movement.”8 Public veneration of Mau Mau thus posed a threat to the very legitimacy of his 
government. 
In 1979, just eleven months after Kenyatta’s death, the Legislative Assembly considered 
the Kimathi statue again. The stakes of public memorialization were different than they had been 
15 years earlier. Responding to a motion by Kenyan historian Dr. Godfrey Muriuki, the Minister 
for Co-operative Development Paul Ngei drew a direct comparison to the Imperial War Graves 
Commission’s (IWGC) First World War African Monument in place on Kenyatta Avenue, where 
 
5 Ibid., 1007.  
6 Ibid., 1006 
7 Lotte Hughes, “Memorialization and Mau Mau: A Critical Review,” in Dedan Kimathi on Trial: Colonial 
Justice and Popular Memory in Kenya’s Mau Mau Rebellion, ed. Julie MacArthur (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2017), 347.  
8 Marshall S. Clough, Mau Mau Memoirs: History, Memory, and Politics (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998), 34.  
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it had sat since the colonial government unveiled it in 1928. “When I saw this Motion,” he 
recalled, “I thought of the monuments which are in one of our main streets in Nairobi where you 
have the statues of the soldiers who were recruited to fight for the continuation of imperialism 
and colonialism.”9 For Ngei, the cityscape was a meaningful space where the fledgling nation 
could define itself against its pre-Independence self. The time was ripe for remembering “the 
fighters who really did it… [, who fought] to free ourselves from the colonialists; to gain our 
national integrity, and to retain once again our national sovereignty.” Unlike the struggle for 
Independence, worthy of recognition and remembrance, “the 1914-1918 monument 
portrayed…an African who fought without knowing what he was fighting for. We know the 
British and the Germans were fighting for an extension of their imperialistic outlook and 
colonialism in Africa.” 10 In post-colonial Kenya, the urban landscape was a political 
battleground where historical memory came to bear upon the spirit of the Kenyan nation-state. 
Despite Ngei’s impassioned entreaty, the call to erect a Kimathi statue again went unheeded.  
 In making his plea to commemorate Kimathi and other freedom fighters, however, Ngei 
mustered a compelling juxtaposition between the Kenyan mentality under colonialism and its 
rebirthed version after the long struggle for freedom from Britain. In a roundabout fashion, Ngei 
was erasing the lived experiences of soldiers and porters who, whether they enlisted voluntarily 
or were compelled to do so, were cognizant that they were part of a transformational moment in 
history, even if they only recognized it through changes to their lives and their families lives.11 
 
9 NA. 27th July 1979. 911.  
10 Ibid., 912.  
11 Michelle Moyd’s recent call to action amongst historians of the First World War to eschew the idea of 
the Great War in Africa as a ‘sideshow’ simply because it did not figure prominently in strategic planning, 
highlights the ways in which the end goals of the war should not necessarily determine our conception of its effects 
upon particular regions. That is, the First World War in Africa might be easily dismissed as a war without 
consequence for the liberation of sub-Saharan Africa from colonial rule, but that must not obscure the deep and 
lasting impact the course of fighting inflicted upon African communities (and their prospects for self-rule). Michelle 
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Nonetheless, to commemorate those sacrifices was to vindicate the Imperial underpinnings of the 
First World War, according to Ngei, in turn vilifying the memory of Mau Mau. The passage of 
time and the frustration of over two decades of repressing the memory of Mau Mau created a 
competition between Mau Mau and the First World War for space in the collective storytelling of 
the nation. The Kenyatta government pushed the fighters who had fought for freedom in the 
forests of Mount Kenya to the margins of the Independence story,12 even if the second half of his 
tenure saw an increased sensitivity to Mau Mau.13 For its supporters, finding a central role for 
Mau Mau in the Kenya’s national storytelling thus meant decentring the First World War.  
When the debate came to the Legislative Assembly again in 1984, political elites and the 
media reacted with more fanfare than with previous motions. High-profile politicians, including 
President Daniel arap Moi, attacked the suggestion of replacing the First World War memorial as 
an erasure of history, tantamount to casting aspersions upon the memory of Kenyans who 
participated in the Great War. As a concerned citizen opined, “Those soldiers died for us. Those 
who survived came back with the idea of getting our Independence. We should remember them. 
The statue should remain where it is.”14 Even though the public conceptualized the First World 
War memorial as “a living testimony to our people’s forcible participation in that ugly war,” the 
vast majority of commentators in the mainstream media resented “the possibility of distorting 
 
Moyd, “Centring a Sideshow: Local Experiences of the First World War in Africa,” First World War Studies 7 (2) 
2016: 111-130. I will return to this argument in more depth in a subsequent portion of this introduction.  
12 Anais Angelo has recently argued that this was much more than just a nationalist retelling of Mau Mau. 
Indeed, Angelo argues that Kenyatta’s presidency actively repressed remaining Mau Mau fighters through the use of 
its intelligence and military services. While Kenyatta sought to posit himself as the natural leader of Mau Mau, 
dismissing the leadership of its more militant members, while integrating agreeable Mau Mau leaders into the new 
government. Referencing an early thrust in the historiography of Mau Mau, Angelo links the repressive politics of 
Kenyatta’s presidency – including its secrecy – to the “politics of ‘orderly amnesia’ that held together contradictory 
narratives: Kenyatta was both the ‘friend of the Mau Mau’ and the president who never verbally acknowledged the 
Mau Mau’s struggle for independence, while also filling his government with those who ‘reneged’ on a movement 
he continuously denounced as a ‘disease’.” Anais Angelo, “Jomo Kenyatta and the repression of the ‘last’ Mau Mau 
leaders, 1961-1965,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 11 (3) 2017: 442-459.  
13 Clough, Mau Mau Memoirs, 250. 
14 Sunday Nation, 1 April 1984. As quoted in Laragh Larsen, 107.  
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history at the expense of praising our freedom fighters – and our political achievements.”15 A 
distinct post-colonial memory of the First World War emerged in Kenya, where the significance 
of 1914-1918 was wholly ambivalent. Kenyan politicians, echoed by the media, construed the 
conflict as a symbolic reminder of the brutality inherent in colonial rule and warfare while also 
patching its memory into the fabric of its Independence story. The Askari soldiers and hapless 
porters had gifted the spirit that drove the Independence movement, according to this 
interpretation, without having had any choice in the matter. They were passive victims of 
colonialism despite their status as the forbearers of heroes.16  
 Yet the debate over Kimathi’s statue was much more than a competition between First 
World War memory and the memory of Mau Mau. Despite a popular understanding of the latter 
conflict as part of the united struggle for Kenyan liberation, the Gikuyu dominated the political 
and economic life of Kenya proffering uneven rewards for different regions and socio-political 
groups within the newly formed nation-state.17 Gikuyu dominance had roots in colonial rule, 
wherein elements of the community effectively mimicked British culture by converting to 
Christianity and achieving high levels of education, in turn galvanizing political activity – and 
 
15 Ibid.  
16 Dipesh Chakrabarty’s powerful discussion of historicism is essential to understanding the ways that post-
Independence identity-creation depended on familiar rhetorical devices that drove colonialism. The collision of Mau 
Mau and First World War memory, in Ngei’s proposal, assigned to porters and Askari a specific place in the natural 
progression to Kenyan independence, which pre-dated the political mobilizations of the 1920s through to the 1960s. 
In doing so, he relegated porters and Askari to an eternal “waiting room of history.” Their status as victims of 
colonial rule stripped their agency and humanity. In the 1984 debate, however, their victimhood was turned on its 
head, now representing an inspiration for the progression towards Independence, yet still paling in comparison to the 
measuring stick of Independent Kenya. They were, in essence, pre-political actors, who could not be conceived in 
the same way as the educated political activists who had ostensibly gained Kenya its freedom. Strikingly this 
mimicked the ways the Kenyatta government approached Mau Mau, albeit with a substantially different tone. 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 8-12. 
17 The literature on early political formations in pre-Independent and post-Independent Kenya is plentiful. 
The most instructive inclusion here is John Lonsdale, “The Moral Economy of Mau Mau: Wealth, Poverty & Civic 
Virtue in Kikuyu Political Thought,” in Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa: Book II: Violence and 
Ethnicity, Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale eds. (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), 315-467.  
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internal divides – within Gikuyu communities.18 However, it was the governments of Jomo 
Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi – themselves dominated by Gikuyu politicians – who denied the 
memory of those they saw as the radicals who had participated in violence against fellow 
Kenyans during the Emergency.19 Much like the Askari and porters who the IWGC had 
commemorated over half a century earlier, Mau Mau, and Kimathi specifically, occupied a space 
of ambivalence20 in Kenya’s collective memory. The same political divisions that had cast their 
shadow upon the Kenyan Republic also clouded the construction of a useable memory of its 
Independence, or at the very least, Mau Mau’s role in achieving it. 
 Some clarity might have been achieved in February 2007, however, when the Kibaki 
government took its first step towards its commitment to immortalize Mau Mau fighters and 
leaders in stone and metal.21 On the 50th anniversary of Kimathi’s execution, President Kibaki 
unveiled a statue in his honour at a juncture in the city centre that bore the rebel leader’s name. 
 
18 See, for example, Marshall Clough, Fighting Two Sides: Kenyan Chiefs and Politicians, 1918-1940 
(Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1990); John Spencer, The Kenyan African Union (Boston: KPI, 1985); Robert 
Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).  
19 There is a great debate in Kenyan historiography about the nature of Mau Mau, especially whether it 
should be understood as a liberation movement, a Gikuyu civil war, a terrorist group, or a decentralized anti-
Colonial movement. For an overview of the debate from the 1960s through the 1990s, especially the heated debates 
of the late-1970s and 1980s, see David William Cohen, The Combing of History (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), Chapter 3.  
20 Drawing on Homi Bhabha’s conception of ambivalence as the phenomenon of colonized subjects 
mimicking and mocking the colonizer, I see post-Independence Kenya inhering this hybridized identity. On the one 
hand, Kenyatta and Moi needed to acknowledge the role of Mau Mau in achieving Independence as part of their 
governing identity, while also repulsing the elements that mocked their non-combatant status. This manifested 
materially, as Angelo has noted, by the selective inclusion of certain Mau Mau leaders and the exclusion of others. 
The formation of a unified post-Independence ‘nation’ demanded an “ironic compromise” wherein Mau Mau was 
“almost the same” as the conservative anticolonial movement but “not quite.” The failure of Mau Mau, that is, 
ensured the necessity of Kenyatta. See Homi Bhabba, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial 
Discourse,” October 28: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis (Spring, 1984): 125-133; Angelo, “Jomo Kenyatta and 
the repression of the ‘last’ Mau Mau leaders.” 
21 See Annie E. Coombes, “Monumental Histories: Commemorating Mau Mau with the Statue of Dedan 
Kimathi,” African Studies 70 (2) (2011): 202-223. More recently, in 2015 the UK Government and the Kenyan 
government collaborated on a memorial to Mau Mau in the wake of a court decision that allowed survivors of 
British atrocities the right to pursue legal action. See Wangui Kimari, “A Monument for the Mau Mau at last, but no 
land,” Africa is A Country, 9 September, 2015, https://africasacountry.com/2015/09/a-monument-for-the-mau-mau-
at-last-but-no-land. 
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Supporters had won their victory in what was then a four-decades-long struggle to have 
Kimathi’s likeness etched into Nairobi’s landscape. But the inequitable division of political 
power that had relegated Kimathi to the space of ambivalence in Kenya’s collective memory had 
violent consequences after the 2007 Kenyan election. Just over a year after Kibaki unveiled 
Kimathi’s statue, Kenya began its recovery from two months of post-election violence that saw 
as many as 1500 people killed and over half a million displaced from the violence. While there 
was no direct correlation between the Kimathi statue and the crisis, the latter is a reminder that 
the socio-political effects of collective memory are often matters of life and death. The power to 
construct and mould historical memory tells us much about the locations of political power and 
social control that drove resentment and violent confrontation after the 2007 election. 
 Indeed, the placement of the two statues prompts associations that cut to the core of the 
Kenyan nation. The First World War memorial, a colonial imposition, remains on Kenyatta 
Avenue, a name that Kenya’s most prominent commentator – Ngugi wa Thiong’o – associated 
with the continuation of colonial rule.22 The street itself is dotted with buildings with colonial 
ancestry, even if they have been repurposed since 1964. The old City Hall, the settler Memorial 
Obelisk, the Bank of India building, and the Stanley Hotel, remain as reminders that Nairobi 
once served as the hub of white rule in Kenya. Fittingly, Kimathi Street cuts through Kenyatta 
Avenue, just as his legacy interrupts Kenyatta’s. Nonetheless, the corner upon which his statue 
stands is isolated by the two main thoroughfares that frame the city centre, named for Kenyatta 
and Moi. Fittingly, the Kimathi statue’s location in Nairobi’s cityscape is only navigable through 
reference to the heads of state who attempted to curate his absence/presence in Kenya’s official 
history. Kimathi is relegated to a side street, both literally and figuratively. 
 
22 Carol M. Sicherman, “Ngugi wa Thiong’o and the Writing of Kenyan History,” Research in African 
Literatures 20 (3) (Autumn, 1989): 347-370. 
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Kimathi, Kenyatta, and Moi are not the only anti-colonialists emblazoned on Nairobi’s 
street signs – a necessary reminder that public consciousness and collective memory are not 
orderly avenues but instead they are individual channels that criss-cross like city streets. It is 
only from the benefit of distance, or cartographic representation, that we can see those individual 
pathways as parts of integrated wholes. Individually, each of the streets may be, in Pierre Nora’s 
powerful terms, lieux de memoire – sites of memory – where Kenyans remember figures from 
their histories in their own ways through unified languages of remembrance.23 Collectively, 
however, as part of a larger memorial landscape, their conflicts and contradictions gesture 
towards what Michael Rothberg has termed noeuds de memoire – knots of memory – that belie 
attempts at “territorialisation (whether at the local or national level) and identitarian reduction.”24 
As the debate over Mau Mau (and especially its clash with the memorialization of the First 
World War) indicates, the sites of memory of Kenya’s Independence “are rhizomatic networks of 
temporality and cultural reference…[that are] contingent and open to resignification.”25 Even 
with disproportionate power to determine the grand narrative of Independence, the political elite 
in Kenya’s first decades of Independence could not straighten out the knotted interpretations of 
its past.  
 
 This story, however, is not about Mau Mau or Dedan Kimathi. Those topics have been 
the subject of an impressive body of work, which has delineated the implications of the rebellion 
 
23 This is not to suggest that Kenyans all remember the same, regardless of their community identification. 
Contrarily, as I have outlined in my discussion of the contested nature of the Independence narrative, the 
interpretation of these sites of memory are as varying as the communities that make-up post-Independence Kenya. 
24 Michael Rothberg, “Between Memory and Memory: From Lieux de memorire to Noeuds de memoire,” 
Yale French Studies 118/119 (2010): 7.  
25 Ibid.  
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for Kenyan politics since the 1960s,26 although work on the collective memorialization of Mau 
Mau is much more recent.27 The critical role of Mau Mau in determining the trajectory of 
Kenyan history in the latter half of the 20th Century notwithstanding, it was the First World War 
that stood as the defining event in Kenyan history prior to Independence. Its material effects 
were far-reaching and left no community in Kenya untouched. Further, as the Imperial powers in 
Europe divvied up former German, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian colonies, the British 
Empire, in particular, reached its apex. The First World War was the backdrop upon which the 
fledgling Colony came into being and began to define itself as a distinct entity within the British 
Empire.  
Just as Mau Mau’s malleability was a historical construct, so to was Kenya’s First World 
War. The memory of the conflict was a palimpsest28 upon which settlers, colonial administrators, 
and Imperial organizations etched their marks. It was no coincidence that the collective memory 
of the First World War became ‘knotted’ with Mau Mau in the post-colonial era. European 
control extended further into Africa through the former event, while Kenyans had ostensibly 
expelled Imperial power in the wake of the latter. In other words, conceptualizing Independence 
 
26 See, for recent examples, David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the 
End of Empire (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2005); Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story 
of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005); Julie MacArthur ed., Dedan Kimathi on 
Trial: Colonial Justice and Popular Memory in Kenya’s Mau Mau (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 2017).  
27 Lotte Hughes, “Memorialization and Mau Mau: A Critical Review,” in Dedan Kimathi on Trial: 
Colonial Justice and Popular Memory in Kenya’s Mau Mau, Julie MacArthur ed., (Athens: University of Ohio 
Press, 2017): 339-374. 
28 Jay Winter has used the word palimpsest in the context of commemoration to highlight the malleability 
of war memory. He uses the term to highlight the diachronic aspects of memory and the multivocality of memory 
creation. Describing collective memory as a palimpsest is particularly useful because so often memorialization is 
enshrined in stone, strengthening the analogy. See Jay Winter, “In Conclusion: Palimpsests,” in Memory, History, 
and Colonialism: Engaging with Pierre Nora in Colonial and Postcolonial Contexts, Indra Sengupta ed. (London: 
German Historical Institute, 2009), 167-174. Santanu Das has more recently expounded upon this concept in the 
context of the Sepoy experience and memory of the First World War. He uses the term throughout his analysis, 
though he discusses the stakes of colonial memory most pointedly in his Afterword. See Santanu Das, India, 
Empire, and First World War Culture: Writings, Images, and Songs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018), especially 406-417.  
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and nationhood meant not only untangling the present but also wrestling with the historicity of 
Imperialism, intrinsically linked to the wartime mobilization of Metropolitan control. The growth 
of the Kenyan state from 1914-1918 galvanized and extended Imperial control of what was up 
until then largely a commercial colony, which Europeans had only sparsely settled.  
Centralized control over colonies during the Great War, however, did not portend 
straightforward political arrangements devoid of conflict over the nature of local control in its 
wake. In Kenya, settlers – many of whom came to the Colony as part of the 1919 Soldier 
Settlement Scheme – clamoured for political power, social dominance, and relative autonomy 
from London and the Colonial Office (CO). Thus it was not only in the cauldron of war but in 
the post-war narration of it that the implications of 1914-1918 would help to shape the trajectory 
of Kenya Colony. The politics of memorialization followed from the ‘struggle for Kenya’29 
wherein the CO, the central colonial state, and the settler population were knotted together in a 
struggle for control of the colony. Ultimately, none of the factions could win the day, owing to 
their own internal diversity as social groups and the structure of white supremacy that they held 
in common. Commemoration of the First World War thus responded to the political dynamics of 
the Colony.30 While the state was able to achieve some level of hegemony over the official 
narrative of memorialization, settlers consistently re-signified those narratives to meet their own 
social needs.  
Politics was not the only social arena wherein First World War memorialization mattered. 
The white community of Kenya, broadly defined to include administrators and colonial 
politicians, was concurrently building its culture, at once derived from British institutions, 
 
29 Robert M. Maxon, Struggle for Kenya: The Loss and Reassertion of Imperial Initiative, 1912-1923 
(Missasauga: Associated University Presses, 1993). 
30 Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination (Athens: James 
Currey, 1990), 66-68.  
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traditions, and leisure habits, yet distinctly shaped by the Kenyan context.31 The collective 
remembrance of the First World War featured prominently in settler culture and, as such, was a 
touchstone for defining what it meant to be a settler in Kenya throughout the interwar period. 
The negotiation of distinct settler practices of commemoration in interwar Kenya was not just 
about the outward spread of British commemorative practices to the colonies then, but something 
that evolved internally as well. Kenya’s settlers were part of an international surge in 
memorialization and commemoration in the wake of the First World War, but their 
commemorative culture was as responsive to its internal social and political needs.  
 This study thus stands at the intersection of several fields of inquiry that have, to varying 
extents, touched upon the effects of the First World War in Africa. On the one hand, it is an 
analysis of the myriad of strategies that colonial administrations used in Kenya as they attempted 
to establish their legitimacy, with historicism paramount among them. On the other, it attempts 
to expand upon the dynamics of identity creation in a Colony that straddled the boundaries 
between being a commercial colony, a settler colonial state, and an interregnum before African 
self-rule. Binding these fields of inquiry is the massive rupture that was the First World War. 
While the material effects of the conflict remain secondary to my analysis, its status as the 
defining event of the early 20th Century requires careful description and dissection. It is my 
 
31 Dane Kennedy’s seminal work on the establishment of white settler cultures in Rhodesia and Kenya 
remains essential to any study of settler culture in Southeastern Africa. Brett Shadle has more recently analyzed the 
development of a distinct culture of Whiteness in interwar Kenya. CJD Duder, Chris Youé, and Will Jackson have 
also detailed the cultural development of Kenya’s settler community, focussing especially on soldier settlers in the 
interwar period. These works stand out as examples of studies that look beyond state formation, colonial control, 
and Imperial policy, which has been the standard approach to Imperial history in Kenya. Dane Kennedy, Islands of 
White: Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939 (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1987); Brett Shadle, The Souls of White Folk: White Settlers in Kenya, 1900s-1920s (Manchester: Manchester 
Universtiy Press, 2015); CJD Duder, “The Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919 in Kenya,” (PhD diss., University of 
Aberdeen, 1978); CJD Duder and Chris Youé, “Paice’s Place: Race and Politics in Nanyuki District, Kenya, in 
the1920s,” African Affairs 93 (371) (Apr. 1994): 253-278; Will Jackson, “White Man’s Country: Kenya Colony and 
the Making of a Myth,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 5 (2) (2011): 344-368. 
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claim, however, that in remembering and memorializing the First World War – in finding 
meaning for that conflict in the Kenyan context – that we find evidence of the use of its memory 
as a fillip in the governance of Kenya colony, and a consistent referent in the creation of a 
distinct settler society in the East African territory.  
 While this is a case study of Kenya, the Colony was not in isolation throughout the inter-
war period. As such, the analysis follows a careful path, integrating Empire-wide, cross-cultural, 
and regional dynamics. The first section of the study interrogates the impact of the First World 
War in Africa more generally, moving to a discussion of the particular effects of the conflict on 
Kenya from 1914 to the early 1920s. With this foundation, I move to a discussion of First World 
War remembrance and commemoration in the second chapter, buttressed by an analysis of the 
manifold intersections of First World War memory and Imperial, national, and, to a lesser extent, 
individual identity. Taken together, these two fundamental historiographical analyses form the 
basis for conceptualizing the global phenomenon of reckoning with the First World War. The 
overriding goal of the project is to bring Africa into the fold as a site of complex, contested, and 
substantive memorializations of the Great War. 
  The case study consists of seven chapters, focusing on three distinct, yet often 
overlapping, threads of memory in inter-war Kenya. From the first instant, soldier settlers and 
those who experienced the First World War from East Africa forged their commemorative 
traditions and permanent memorials in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. The settler thread 
of memory, itself diverse and multifaceted, spans the entirety of the period under consideration. 
Complimenting the settler thread of memory was an Empire-wide drive to commemorate the 
First World War in unprecedented fashion, driven by the IWGC and its founder Sir Fabian Ware. 
The IWGC’s memorials and cemeteries outlived formal Imperialism in Kenya, remaining today 
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as the lasting remnants of the British Empire’s drive to remember those who lost their lives from 
1914-1918. The permanence of its material culture notwithstanding, the IWGC was active in 
Kenya for but a short period, from the early-1920s until 1928. Finally, the administrative 
memory thread – as encapsulated by state memorialization, ritual, and remembrance – structured 
the official face of First World War memory in Kenya. My focus is on the governorship of Sir 
Edward Grigg, from 1925-1930, who oversaw the vast majority of the IWGC’s unveilings and 
the establishment of formal rituals of remembrance in Kenya. The standards set during the Grigg 
administration remained in place and mostly unchanged up until the Second World War. While 
each of the threads of memory competed for ascendency, it was only through entanglement that 
they could be articulated in any meaningful fashion. At each instant of remembrance and site of 
memory, the threads referenced and amplified one another.  
This dissertation is structured around two introductory chapters detailing the First World 
War in Africa and the implications of First World War remembrance and commemoration for 
settler-colonial societies. Five chapters, each interrogating specific forms of commemoration in 
inter-war Kenya follow from these introductory chapters, constituting the bulk of my analysis. I 
have divided this study into two sections: the first focuses on the historiographical and 
theoretical underpinnings of the case studies that follow in the second section. 
 In the third chapter, which opens the case study section of the dissertation, I define the 
IWGC’s work throughout the Empire, with its particular projects in Kenya as the main object of 
analysis. Here, I challenge recent work on the IWGC’s projects, specifically whether race is the 
best lens through which historians should evaluate the organization’s work in the Kenyan 
context. The literature on the IWGC’s work is expanding as a result of the Centenary of the First 
World War, highlighting the importance of its work in both uniting the British Empire in 
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remembering the dead, while also being open to interpretation by its constituent parts. 
Ultimately, Kenya Colony remains an understudied aspect of the IWGC’s work, a lacunae that 
this study addresses in part.  
In the fourth chapter, I turn to the major settler and state-driven memorial sites of 
memory, which established the memorial infrastructure of the Colony. I situate settler 
memorialization within the context of early post-war politics in Kenya Colony, emphasizing the 
shared goals of self-governing status amongst both settler and official cadres of society. By 
comparing memorial projects borne of private initiative with those established through official 
avenues, I read a counter-memory to the IWGC’s version of memorialization, which ostensibly 
included Kenyan contributions to the First World War. While the IWGC may have failed to live 
up to its egalitarian principles when it came to colonial subjects, it was settlers and 
administrators who forged a white-washed version of First World War history up until 1924, 
albeit with different forms and constraints upon memorialization messaging. Set in the context of 
Kenya Colony’s political history, First World War memorialization was a convenient reference 
in settler agitation for political independence.  
Meanwhile, as I detail in the fifth chapter, elements of civil society beyond the political 
elite tugged at the threads of memory in post-war Kenya. Specifically, missionaries and women – 
occupying liminal roles in Kenya Colony’s public sphere – crafted memorialization projects that 
went beyond monuments and ceremonies. While missionaries and settler women had differing 
goals, they shared in their political difference. Yet their memorialization schemes contributed to 
the alienation of a Kenyan memory of the First World War in civil society, thus fashioning the 
First World War in white settler terms. I analyze the work of the East African Women’s League 
and the British Legion in preparing for Poppy Day and organizing events for settlers on 
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Armistice Day. Through the Poppy Appeal, Legion Balls, and other social events, the settler 
community gave itself an exclusive space for performing First World War memory, animating 
their own collective identity and whiteness in the process. Social functions worked against the 
colonial administration’s script by eroding the artifice of inclusion and racial collaboration 
essential to Armistice Day ceremonies. I argue that it was not only in official rituals of 
commemoration – moderated exclusively by men – but in the woman-centred and often non-
official performances of commemoration where settlers constructed a colonial memory of the 
First World War. In taking care of the settler community, from a maternal perspective, women in 
Kenya also shaped the memory of the First World War and the collective identity of settlers in 
the Colony. 
Finally, in the sixth and seventh chapters, I interrogate the colonial administration’s use 
of these sites, alongside the language of First World War memory, in several critical political 
battles in inter-war Kenya. I read the settler counter-memory of the First World War against the 
colonial administration’s political uses of war memory. In the process of articulating the memory 
of the First World War, I argue that the imperial thread of memory morphed into a colonial 
memory thread, itself split – though still entwined – into administrative and settler forms. While 
white supremacy tethered administrative and settler threads of memory together, differing 
interpretations of Empire defined the unique character of each. 
The sixth chapter follows the administrative uses of First World War memory in the 
debate over Closer Union with Tanganyika and Uganda. Under the leadership of Governor Sir 
Edward Grigg, settlers envisioned greater autonomy from London through the policy, which 
required establishing the means for the colony’s defence through the Defence Force Ordinance, 
and a greater role for settlers in taking on the ‘civilizing mission’ through the Dual Policy of 
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Development. In the debate over Closer Union, I argue, Grigg referenced the First World War 
carefully, presenting a particular vision of Empire that, over the course of his tenure, set out a 
distinct vision of colonization in Kenya Colony.   
In the seventh and final chapter, I trace the emergence of Armistice Day in its distinct 
colonial form. Therein, I argue that the colonial administration’s script for Armistice Day was an 
‘invented tradition’32 meant to maintain the appearance of a unified white society in Kenya. This 
administration designed the script to conform to Empire-wide traditions, but the colonial context 
consistently undermined it. More specifically, the consistent presence of African, Arab, and 
Indian bodies at the ceremonies reiterated the frailty of the settler community, requiring 
disciplinary forms of suppression, primarily through adherence to the norms associated with 
rituals of remembrance. Further, the Kenyan environment created challenges to rituals specific to 
the colonial context. Bodily contact with colonized subjects and the environment thus reminded 
settlers and administrators of their uneasy position in the Colony. This was the un-script of 
Armistice Day, which undermined the illusion of uniformity in rituals of commemoration.  
 Despite my contributions to the study of commemoration and Kenyan settler culture, this 
dissertation suffers from many silences. Africans, Indians, and Asians are mostly absent, as 
speakers, from the documentary evidence that drives my analysis and argumentation. The 
archives from which I drew my primary evidence document white settlers and administrators, 
either based in London or Nairobi. I have drawn from the Commonwealth War Graves 
Commission’s archives in Maidenhead, UK, the National Archives in London, as well as the 
collection of colonial-era newspapers and Colonial Office documents in the East African 
Collection at the Bird Library, Syracuse University, New York. The bulk of the evidence I have 
 
32 Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” in The Invention of Tradition, Terrence 
Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 211; 229. 
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compiled here, however, comes from the Kenya National Archives in Nairobi, Kenya, alongside 
associated fieldwork to locate war memorials in situ.   
Similarly, because my focus is commemoration, memorialization, and remembrance 
practices, rather than a more diffuse study of memory, my analysis centres on the elite cadres of 
Kenya’s European population, both among administrators and settlers, rather than smaller 
communities and individuals. As the more recent developments within Kenya’s historiography 
have made clear, the central government cannot stand-in for the colonial administrative structure 
writ large nor can the urban elite and ‘Happy Valley’ set amply represent settler society.33 
Admittedly, the elision of these complexities within Kenyan society stems from my focus as a 
historian of commemoration and the First World War. Historians of colonialism in Kenya might 
draw a different set of conclusions. However, in arguing that there was not one commemorative 
culture but many that co-existed, amplified, and structured one another, I hope to avoid 
homogenizing the collective memory of the First World War in Kenya, instead gesturing towards 
heterogeneity open to breaking the silences I have helped author. 
 Ultimately, this dissertation is a snapshot of how settlers and colonial administrators in 
Kenya collectively remembered the First World War. The overriding goal is to extend the global 
dimensions of the literature on commemoration and remembrance while giving further leverage 
to the argument that Africa was not a ‘forgotten front’ of the First World War, especially when 
viewed from the continent itself. The First World War was a formative moment in the history of 
colonization in Kenya, and the way it was narrated, conceived, and mobilized in the inter-war era 
helped shape the socio-political life of the Colony. Settlers and administrators in East Africa 
 
33 Will Jackson, “Settler Colonialism in Kenya, 1880-1863,” in The Routledge Handbook of the History of 
Settler Colonialism, eds. Lorenzo Veracini and Edward Cavanagh (New York: Routledge, 2017), 231-245. See 
Chapter 4 for a brief discussion of the ‘Happy Valley’ and its relevance for understanding settlers in Kenya Colony.  
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responded to the Empire-wide program of commemoration in their distinct ways, not only by 
mourning and celebrating the dead but by creating connections with one another, in turn shaping 
their ‘islands of white’34 through reference to the First World War.
 
34 Kennedy, Islands of White. 
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1 – Britain’s First World War in Africa: Between the Myth and the Reality 
 As the camera pans down through the African jungle, accompanied by a haunting 
soundtrack of jungle creatures bellowing out from the deep, the audience is brought to the 1st 
Methodist Church in the Kingdom of Kungdu. The Hollywood version of C.S Forester’s The 
African Queen starts in a familiar setting for colonial Africa, with a beleaguered missionary 
leading a parish of half-naked Africans in religious hymn. A truculent Katherine Hepburn bangs 
at the piano when the rugged, cigar-smoking, liquor-chugging Humphrey Bogart blows a whistle 
from his steamer, the African Queen, with news and mail for the remote outpost of the British 
Empire. Playing the Canadian, Charlie Allnut, Bogart delivers the news to the only two 
Europeans of the village that “I probably won’t be comin’ around this way for a couple of 
months.” The surprised pastor, Samuel Sayer, prompts Allnut, “Oh really, what about our mail?” 
Quietly, the disinterested mailman responds, “I don’t think there will be any mail for a 
while…the Germans will hold it up…on account of the War.” “Where? Between Whom?” Sayer 
retorts. But the reality of a world war, continents away, was lost on Allnut, with details he could 
not keep straight.1 
 Just after his departure, as Sayer and his sister kneel to pray to God to bless “the arms of 
England,” a frantic and unintelligible local comes to alert the Europeans of the approaching 
German officers and their African askari. Before they can resist or flee, the Germans burn the 
village to the ground, sending Sayer into a spiral of despair that leads to his illness and death. 
(The fates of the African residents appears immaterial to the story.) Thus was one of the first 
entries into the popular history of the Ice Cream War, as it would come to be called a half-
century later.2 Where, as the story goes, British settlers were caught unprepared by German 
 
1 The African Queen, DVD, directed by John Huston (1951; Twentieth Century Fox, 2004).  
2 William Boyd, An Ice-Cream War (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1983).  
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aggression while they completed their God-given task to civilize the African continent. Since 
Forester penned his famous novel in the 1930s, refashioned for the silver screen in the 1950s, the 
popular conception of the Great War in Africa has taken the form of “a boy’s patina of derring-
do and adventure,”3 at odds with the carnage and blood-soaked terrain that has characterized the 
Western European front.4 
 That the image of the First World War in Africa was much rosier than the Western Front 
remains a cruel irony that belies the carnage and loss of life on the African continent. As 
Akinjide Osuntokun calculates, the First World War touched tens of millions of Africans under 
colonial rule, most of whom would not be part of the military apparatuses in Africa, but were 
instead collateral victims from famine, disease, and warfare.5 The disparity between civilian and 
military casualties notwithstanding, Africans bore the brunt of the fighting in East Africa and  
shouldered the majority of support roles and resource demands as well. For Africans, veteran 
Chikani Mkali described to historian Melvin Page, the war as “unlike any war that they had 
known before…[and] they strained to understand why they should suffer so for a cause which 
seemed not to be their own.”6 The disproportionate burden Africans bore from 1914-1918, and 
the smaller number of white casualties in the African campaigns, undoubtedly influenced Anglo-
European assessments of the African theatre as a field of adventure rather than a no-man’s land. 
This is an impression of the Great War in Africa that, if it is remembered at all outside of 
academia, remains to this day.7 
 
3 Anthony Barker, “African Queens and Ice-Cream Wars: Fictional and Filmic Versions of the East African 
Conflict of 1914-1918,” in Personal Narratives, Peripheral Theatres: Essays on the Great War (1914-1918), 
Anthony Barker et al. eds. (Cham: Springer, 2018), 225. 
4 See Daniel Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory (New York: Hambledon and London, 2005).  
5 Akinjide Ostunokun, Nigeria in the First World War (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1979), 5-9. 
6 Mevlin E. Page, “The War of Thangata: Nyasaland and the East African Campaign, 1914-1918,” The 
Journal of African History 19 (1) (1979): 87.  
7 Bill Nasson, “More than Just von Lettow-Vorbeck: Sub-Saharan Africa in the First World War,” 
Geschicte und Gesselschaft 40 (3) (April-June 2014): 160-183; Barker, “African Queens and Ice-Cream Wars.” 
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 This chapter offers a brief summary of the First World War in Africa. I focus on the 
broader effects of the war upon British colonialism rather than the intricate details of the 
fighting. In the process, I establish the key themes that have driven the legacy of the First World 
War on the continent, while I also consider the historiographical trends that have informed our 
understanding of the socio-political effects of the war in Africa. This general overview is 
essential to undertake any analysis of how British colonies commemorated the conflict in the 
interwar period. With this in mind, the chapter first details the major concerns within colonies 
stemming from the course of the First World War on the continent, followed by a focused 
analysis on the events during the war and in its immediate aftermath that determined the 
trajectory of what would become Kenya Colony. This offers a sketch for detailing how and why 
the First World War and its memory were a preoccupation of settlers and administrators in 
interwar Kenya.  
 
The Opening Salvos: The First World War Begins in West Africa 
While Germany and Britain may have temporarily agreed to a truce on the continent in 
July and early-August 1914, hoping to avoid embroiling nascent commercial colonies in a costly 
conflict, or exposing Africans to their white rulers fighting one another,8 the loss of life and 
suffering in African communities laid waste to much of the continent throughout the war. 
Settlers on the spot may have also wished to stay out of the conflict to maintain and extend their 
 
Nasson highlights the historiographical trend to focus on individual exploits, especially Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, 
rather than engaging with the wider impact of the First World War, especially in East Africa. Barker, on the other 
hand, analyzes popular portrayals of the East African Campaign, which remain the lasting image of the conflict in 
popular culture.  
8 Hew Strachan, The First World War in Africa (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2004), 2. Edward Paice 
argues that neutrality was simply a ‘cynical ruse’, meant to remove any post-war culpability for the hostilities in 
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control over subject populations and colonial economies, but the realities of global war meant 
their connections to the metropole would embroil them in the fight and expose their dependence 
on the African population. Once the fighting began, it was clear that the conflict offered the 
opportunity for the extension of colonial possessions at the expense of other colonial powers. 
While, as Bill Nasson notes, the African continent was always more important for the British and 
French than it was for Germany,9 the ‘second partition of Africa’ from 1914 on required the 
warring nations to factor Africa into its overall strategies. Fundamentally, however, the First 
World War in Africa cannot be conceived of through a European lens. It was not transposed into 
the African context, but a distinct theatre of war, the contours of which responded to the varying 
circumstances in which it was fought.10 It is thus only from the continent itself that the myth of 
Africa in the First World War might give way to a better understanding of its legacy there. 
As the name implies, the First World War was much more than “a civil war within the 
European community of nations.”11 Alhaji Grunshi of the Gold Coast Regiment certainly 
understood this as the first soldier of the British Empire to fire a shot in 1914, a full two weeks 
before British troops saw their first action at the Battle of Mons.12 Though the July Crisis might 
have been contained within the echelons of high politics in European capitals,13 it was clear that 
the “Guns of August,” in Barbara Tuchman’s famous refrain, would bellow out beyond the 
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confines of France and Belgium.14 Grunshi was part of a colonial force targeting German 
colonial possessions in Togoland, where the strategic radio outpost at Kamina connected German 
African colonial possessions to each other and allowed communication with its Atlantic shipping 
routes.15 This was a local initiative rather than result of strategy in London, lending credence to 
the unique African contours of the campaign.16 The Togoland campaign lasted just over two 
weeks, with the Germans surrendering the entirety of the territory, mostly without bloodshed, by 
24 August 1914. The rout of German positions, however, did not signal the end of the war in 
West Africa, which would continue well into 1916. 
Following the Togoland successes, the British and French armies moved into the 
Kameroons, which represented key positions for the Germans on the West African coast. While 
the British took the port of Duala on 27 September and the French secured their objectives by 6 
October, the Kameroon campaign underlined what would become a common tactic in German 
warfare in Africa: strategic retreat.17 German forces fell back to the interior of the colony, 
keeping a supply line open through the port at Muni and thus ensuring well-supplied defences on 
its frontier outposts.18 The war in the Kameroons, unlike the swift advance in Togoland, did not 
see similar success despite the British hold on Duala. The Germans would remain in the fight 
there until the spring of 1916, when German forces retreated into neutral territories. The defence 
of the colony persisted longer than any German planners had expected but the Germans saw it as 
an overall failure. Post-war comparisons to the East African Campaign sullied the West African 
theatre’s successes.  
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For West Africans under British rule, however, the prolonged campaign in the 
Kameroons caused uncertainty, chaos, and disorder. While French West African troops 
numbered around 200,000, the British did not view colonial troops as viable options in a white 
man’s war until circumstance dictated a reversal in policy in 1916.19 As such, the British sent 
approximately 25,000 West African troops to the Togoland and Kameroon Campaigns,20 
alongside just over 41,000 carriers throughout the period from 1914-1918, including to the East 
African Campaign.21 But the German flight from the Kameroons left an administrative vacuum 
that was never fully filled by the British or the French. The British Army secured Ghana and 
Nigeria, at least meeting the limited strategic goals for the campaign.22 Allied, and especially 
British, grand strategy, however, focused more on the South West Africa Campaign through 
1915, and the East African Campaign thereafter. 
The internal dynamics of the colonies underwent significant change from 1914-1918. In 
Nigeria, revolts and overt rebellion weakened an already tenuous British grasp, exacerbated by 
the lack of military personnel left in the colony due to the war.23 While Osuntokun concludes 
that the First World War represented a place in between the initial resistances to colonialism and 
organized nationalist movements in the interwar period, the economic and human toll of the First 
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World War exposed the ‘thin white line’ in Nigeria and brought the entire colonial enterprise 
into question, providing fertile ground for revolt.24 James K. Matthews, however, argues that the 
First World War “accelerated political change in Nigeria.”25 Manpower demands, largely met 
through cooperation with local leaders, undermined traditional rule in Nigeria, with a young, 
educated elite pressing for political change. Ultimately, “by discrediting the traditional rulers, the 
British undermined the foundation of their own rule.”26 Matthews’ African-centric approach 
highlights the need to view the legacy of the First World War through careful attention to both 
local and global developments.  
In Ghana, historians also have generally seen the conflict as a stepping stone to 
anticolonial resistance but with the corollary of short-term gains for the colonial administration. 
The explanation for the lack of political disturbance after the war lay in what Kwabena Akurang-
Parry has identified as increased power for colonially sanctioned chiefs and the African 
intelligentsia.27 David Killingray, however, sees the First World War as an event that brought 
global sensibilities into the Gold Coast. Although he does not couch it in the terms of global or 
transnational historiographical trends – nascent fields in the 1970s – the seeds of anticolonial 
politics were planted from 1914-1918. According to Killingray, “Wilsonian ideas of self-
determination and liberal democracy, an enhanced race consciousness, pan-African idealism, and 
a belief in post-war reconstruction” undergirded the belief that “they might be consulted over the 
peace settlement, gain greater equality of civil opportunity, and a representative voice in the 
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government.”28 Unfortunately, the legacy of the First World War in West Africa remains 
underdeveloped as a subject of historical study. Nonetheless, several broad themes help structure 
our understanding of the impact of the First World War on African communities as well as the 
colonial administration and economics. 
First, Africans bore the brunt of military and resource demands in the African theatre, 
owing in equal parts to the difficulty of prosecuting an offensive campaign on the continent29 and 
the paucity of available white troops. The environment, difficulties in transport and 
communication, and the consistent threat of disease impeded the British, French, and German 
forces, especially in the Kameroon Campaign.30 Roger Thomas explains that the lasting effect of 
the disproportionate burden upon African communities, alongside “the colonial administrations 
[being] weakened by wartime calls on their own personnel, made opposition to colonial rule, or 
to its African agents…practicable.”31 This was accompanied by substantial economic 
disruptions, increased prices on imports upon which African depended, and labour shortages 
driven by military demands.32 Linking these two aspects together, it follows that while colonial 
politics and economic policy originated in global phenomenon, the African reaction was often 
locally circumscribed. Michael Adas argues, however, that this also meant that educated 
Africans made strong connections with intellectuals on other continents under the colonial yoke. 
In his words, “the circle in which the postwar discourse unfolded was initially small, in the 
following decades it contributed much to the counterhegemonic ideas of the Western educated 
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intellectuals of Asia and Africa, ideas that were taken up by the peasants and urban labourers 
who joined them in revolt against the European colonial order.”33 Indeed, as the studies of West 
Africa mentioned herein have highlighted, perhaps the greatest legacy of the First World War 
was the interactions that combatants and carriers had with other Africans, European soldiers, and 
colonial troops. While the legacy of the First World War speculative and open to interpretation, 
the West African colonies clearly underwent significant change from 1914-1918. 
 
Shifting Foci and Imperial Politics: Tanga, German South West Africa, and South Africa 
The end of hostilities in West Africa, however, did not signal the end of West African 
combatants’ and labourers’ service in the African theatre. By 1917, the war in East Africa 
demanded increased labour and military manpower from the British colonies as the massively 
outnumbered German commander Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck’s pesky campaign continued to 
derail Britain’s goals in Africa. East Africa was the defining campaign of the African theatre, not 
only in its protracted length but in its long-term legacy in the annals of First World War history. 
Britain’s colonies stood mostly alone in their pursuit of the German army in East Africa, with 
British East Africa, Uganda, Nyasaland, the Rhodesias, and South Africa all contributing 
personnel and resources. Lettow-Vorbeck was responsible for putting German East Africa on a 
war footing, to the ostensible chagrin of Governor Heinrich Schnee.34 In the field, he depended 
heavily on white-officered but African-manned Schutztruppe, a force of well-trained askari who 
would force the British to use its own colonial troops in East Africa, most of whom had been in 
the employ of colonial administration’s seeking to maintain internal control.35 On 25 November 
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1918, South African forces accepted the last German surrender of the war on the shores of Lake 
Tanganyika, which finally brought an end to the campaign, constituting the last hostilities of the 
First World War even after the Armistice in Europe.36 
 But the East African Campaign had begun in earnest in November 1914, not with African 
troops but with Indian forces who were assigned to East African defence as defined by the 
Committee on Imperial Defence.37 For Britain, it was the coastal ports of German East Africa 
that took precedent in the early months of the war. With its eyes firmly set on the port of Tanga 
in German East Africa, and South African troops indisposed with internal disruptions, the British 
called upon a rejuvenated Indian Expeditionary Force ‘B’ to secure the coast, with the assistance 
of Indian Expeditionary Force ‘C’, mostly responsible for defence and under the control of the 
Colonial Office.38 What followed was a dual attack at the port of Tanga in German East Africa 
and a simultaneous assault on the hills of Mount Kilimanjaro. IEF ‘C’ formed the main British 
forces for the attack on Mount Kilimanjaro, while IEF ‘B’ would land at Tanga, which von 
Lettow-Vorbeck defended with a much thinner force of askari.39  
 The British Admiralty authorized the landing to take place between the 2nd and 5th of 
November 1914. In what became one of the better known stories of the East African campaign, 
the outnumbered Germans defended the port city against malnourished, undertrained, and travel-
weary Indian forces.40 The German askari, who had prepared their defences based on Lettow-
Vorbeck’s reconnaissance on bicycle, used thick bush buffering the town from the beaches and 
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heavy machine gun fire from close range to repel the Indian forces.41 In what must have seemed 
to the British an omen that the landing was to fail, a “seemingly trivial incident, bees [played] a 
significant role at Tanga as they attacked without discrimination.”42 In one particularly important 
case of bee fury, an entire infantry battalion “was attacked by a swarm of enraged bees. This 
disrupted the battalions advance and it took some time to gather the scattered troops.”43 In 
Anderson’s evaluation of the attack, “The African bee was not to be underestimated.”44 As 
fantastical as this episode in the landing at Tanga might be, the natural conditions in Africa 
continually affected the conduct of warfare throughout the African theatre.  
 Despite the impediments, however, Lettow-Vorbeck’s situation was untenable by 5 
November but the British had already decided to evacuate Tanga.45 IEF ‘C’ had failed in its 
objective to secure the towns of Longido and Moshi at the base of Mount Kilimanjaro and, in 
Hew Strachan’s assessment, the British commander Arthur Aitken “had handed his adversary a 
major victory”46 (which ultimately led to Aitken’s dismissal from command in East Africa). 
While both attacks were failures, Tanga struck the hardest blow. As Charles Miller surmises, the 
victory at Kilimanjaro may have “assured the security of German East Africa for a long time to 
come. But this fight went all but unnoticed alongside the humiliation of the British at Tanga, 
which was to have an immeasurable effect on the conduct of the ensuing four-year campaign.”47 
Surely Tanga shook British confidence in Aitken and the Indian forces on the continent, boosting 
German morale and enthusiasm in the process. As Edward Paice recounts, had the British 
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followed the War Office’s advice to attack Dar es Salaam and Tanga rather than Kilimanjaro, 
“Lettow-Vorbeck’s name may have been forgotten.”48 From planning to execution, Tanga was 
an embarrassing loss.  
 The failure precipitated another fateful decision for the war in East Africa as command 
was transferred from the India Office, in tandem with the Colonial Office, to the War Office. 
While the East African Campaign was a major preoccupation for the latter, the War Office 
insisted on the defence of its colonies in 1915 rather than mounting another offensive against 
Lettow-Vorbeck.49 But in order to fully define British strategy in East Africa until 1916, it is 
essential to turn to another front of the African theatre: South West Africa. For if British plans in 
1914 hinged on local initiative in West Africa and Indian responsibility in the East, each 
depended on the status of South Africa. The bulk of  British military power, and indeed the 
strength of British colonialism South of the Sahara more generally, rested in that most 
tumultuous and antipathetic colony on the Southern coast of the continent.50 
 Imperial politics proved to be the biggest obstacle to South African involvement in East 
Africa. Just 15 years earlier, Britain and the Afrikaner population of South Africa fought for 
control of southern Africa, the culmination of tensions that defined the 19th Century on the cape. 
The complex relationship between Britain and the Union of South Africa at the outbreak of war 
was driven by this history, which highlighted the fiercely independent streak within the young 
British colony. Indeed, it remained uncertain if South African loyalties would remain British, 
lean towards neutrality, or if its Afrikaner population would side with its German neighbours 
who shared closer ancestry and culture. Nonetheless, South African leadership, personnel, and 
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resources were essential to British hopes on the African continent, even if Lord Kitchener greatly 
desired their help on the Western Front.51 By the end of the war, Jan Smuts emerged as the 
strongest force in South African politics, stemming from his leadership during the war.  
 At the outbreak of war in 1914 the Union of South Africa was already walking on thin 
political ice.52 The idea of moving into South West Africa stirred anti-British sentiment, 
fracturing the Union in October 1914 through political and military rebellion. British and South 
African plans for South West Africa were on the backburner until Prime Minister Louis Botha 
and Jan Smuts could establish control over the political and military disorder. Internally, the 
problems were mostly sorted by the end of November 1914, with Botha and Smuts carefully 
conceding to rebellious factions, while ensuring that the most problematic figures would be 
punished accordingly.53 But one particularly thorny officer, Colonel Marnie Maritz, continued 
the military rebellion into 1915. Maritz and his men fled across the border into German territory, 
stoking fears that his forces might meet up with Lettow-Vorbeck’s, strengthening his 
outnumbered force. Maritz’s rebellion continued in exile until February 1915, when South 
African forces mounted an attack against South West Africa, quashing rebel factions. The rest of 
Southern Africa, however, had to wait for South Africa to establish some stability, giving 
Lettow-Vorbeck breathing room in what had now become a raiding expedition.54 
 In the meantime, the South West Africa Campaign was a sweeping success for the young 
Union of South Africa after it had dispensed with the Maritz rebellion. The opening that the 
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simmering tensions between Britain and its Afrikaner subjects55 had provided to Germany 
proved transient. Germany possessed neither the personnel nor the supplies to seize the initiative 
from a temporarily paralyzed South African military.56 By July 1915, Jan Smuts and Louis Botha 
launched a dual pronged attack meant to envelope German forces with overwhelming cavalry.57 
The Union of South Africa achieved its own strategic goal in the process, fulfilling its long-time 
desire to unify the Cape coast of Africa;58 German South West Africa, now Namibia, remained 
under South Africa’s control until 1989. As such, the Great War in Africa took on a uniquely 
African character. South Africa, for its part, had “laid the foundation for South Africa’s own 
brand of colonialism in 1918,” ensuring that “it was the South Africans who would be relied 
upon to assist in various theatres of war…[reinforcing] the white South African prejudice that 
[they] were of superior quality.”59 South African successes in South West Africa helped 
maneuver the colony into a position of post-war influence. Under the leadership of Smuts and 
Botha, South Africa sought to capitalize on its leverage by contributing the decisive forces in the 
East African Campaign. 
 For Northern Rhodesia, the South West African Campaign also signalled their increased 
involvement in the First World War. While the East African Campaign consisted mostly of 
border raids and naval activity in 1915, with both British East Africa and Northern Rhodesia 
squarely in Lettow-Vorbeck’s sights, the 1st Northern Rhodesia Regiment formed the north side 
of the South West African pincer, with a force of 67,000 soldiers and 33,000 labourers.60 During 
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this phase of the war, officials in Northern Rhodesia were wary of African troops serving 
alongside white soldiers (as was the case throughout the Empire),61 and Northern Rhodesians 
insisted that white supremacy must be safeguarded before they could draw upon black troops or 
labourers.62 Indeed, the joint pressures of German raids and tenuous imperial control meant that 
if Northern Rhodesia decided to defend its borders with African personnel, it might risk internal 
disorder.63 Nonetheless, it was clear that African personnel were essential and demands on their 
communities stoked anticolonial sentiment and worsened the state of a colony already in crisis. 
 Administrators’ fears stemmed from troubles in another British colony that bordered 
German East Africa: Nyasaland. There, the administration dispatched African troops to defend 
its norther frontier against German raids with some early successes. After those early 
engagements, however, it became clear that without consistently defending the border Lettow-
Vorbeck might be able to move into the interior.64 Through local leaders, the military recruited 
askari and carriers from across the territory. In some cases this was a welcomed opportunity for 
financial gain, reclaiming traditional warrior heritage, or, as British propaganda put it, defending 
against the threat of far worse German overlords.65 John Chilembwe, an American-educated 
pastor, led a rebellion against colonial rule in 1915, not exclusively in response to recruitment for 
the war, but accelerated by its effects.66 Although the rebellion was short-lived and unsuccessful, 
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it spread fears across British colonies that educated Africans might present a future challenge, 
especially as increased numbers of Africans were learning to fight in a ‘white man’s war.’67 
Much like West Africa, the colonial administration balanced collaborating with local leaders and 
managing dissent from within their colonies. In either case, the First World War laid bare the 
artifice of white control. 
 Despite the uneasiness in most of Britain’s southern African colonies and an 
unwillingness to allow any French assistance as a means of pursuing their own aspirations of 
extending colonial possessions,68 the need to move against Lettow-Vorbeck broke British 
procrastination in East Africa. A complete reorganization of command in the wake of Tanga, 
alongside a conquered German South West Africa, meant that South Africa could take the lead 
against the German commander. Further, the entirety of British Africa was on a total war footing, 
meaning there was exponentially more personnel and resources that it could throw at East Africa 
in the hopes of expelling Germany from the continent for good.69 South Africa’s confidence was 
at an all-time high given the rout of German forces in South West Africa and the ‘proof’ that 
only their military was capable of taking the fight to Lettow-Vorbeck with the failure of Indian 
forces in 1914. What had been the “leading opposition…to British Imperialism,”70 was now the 
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Jan Smuts Takes the Lead: The Long Road to November 1918 
In London, the potential for an East African offensive caused great consternation within 
the Coalition Government, with Lord Kitchener wanting East Africa to remain on the defensive, 
while Andrew Bonar Law “wanted a sufficiently large force to conquer German East Africa once 
and for all.”71 When the War Office sent Kitchener to the Dardanelles to observe, the path was 
clear for a wider offensive with expected reinforcements from South Africa, alongside new 
troops from India. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was given charge of the offensive, although he had 
worries about the preparedness of the troops sent to complete it, but he fell ill on route to East 
Africa. With that turn of events, Bonar Law’s original choice, Jan Smuts, replaced Smith-
Dorrien on 5 February 1916, moving quickly towards and offensive by the end of the month. For 
the balance of 1916 Smuts attempted to pin Lettow-Vorbeck in German East Africa, himself 
advancing from British East Africa in the North, with fellow South African Jacob Van Deventer 
and Sir Edward Northey advancing from Northern Rhodesia in the South, and the Belgians and 
Portuguese pitching in from the West and the South respectively. Despite advances deep into 
German East Africa, the heavy rains of late-spring and other environmental factors, disease, lack 
of supplies, and inadequate personnel prevented Smuts from defeating Lettow-Vorbeck. The 
Imperial War Cabinet called Smuts to service in London, transferring his command in East 
Africa to Sir Reginald Hoskins in January. Hoskins promptly lost support in London, despite 
improvements to supply and communication, and by May 1917 van Deventer was in charge.72  
 Lettow-Vorbeck, for his part, realized that he could not hope to win decisive battles 
against the numerically superior British forces, even if he wished to do so.73 East Africa, from 
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1916, was a hit-and-run campaign, meant to “preserve lives and ammunitions.”74 But driven by 
the experience in South West Africa, wherein movement had ensured the minimum number of 
casualties, Lettow-Vorbeck lured Smuts into his trap, drawing British resources and manpower 
away from the European conflict. Strachan argues that “the lessons of South-West Africa were 
being applied in circumstances that were totally different,”75 and by the end of 1916 the South 
Africans had been battered by disease, the environment, and a strategy that played into the hand 
of Lettow-Vorbeck.76 At that point, even the most reluctant colonies such as South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia recognized that the East African Campaign precluded any illusions of a white 
man’s war. While “Africans were not considered to have a major role to play in the war” prior to 
1916, “the enormous manpower drain on the European community threatened to bleed the 
colony dry.”77 The East African Campaign was thus further Africanized by 1916,78 marked by 
the increased use of African labour and military personnel.   
 As van Deventer planned his renewed offensive for June 1917, the urgency to end the 
campaign and accompanied resource demands was strong in London. The War Cabinet resolved 
to throw everything they could at Lettow-Vorbeck, reinforcing van Deventer with as much as 
they could spare.79 Deventer’s advance was successful; German plans to draw resources from 
Britain’s Western Front had been thwarted by the Africanization of the conflict, and the British 
had halved Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces by November.80 But Lettow-Vorbeck’s strategy evolved 
alongside Britain’s, as he took a reduced force with more mobility across the border into 
Portuguese East Africa, ensuring that the campaign would continue into 1918 and, so the strategy 
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assumed, strengthen Germany’s claim to a presence in Africa at the end of the war.81 Smuts’ 
decisions earlier in the war to maneuver rather than to confront Lettow-Vorbeck in the field gave 
the Germans the advantage. Contrary to popular belief, it was British bungling and Lettow-
Vorbeck’s supply deficiencies that brought about what resembled guerrilla warfare, not (as myth 
has it) that Lettow-Vorbeck had divined the strategy himself.82 In any event, British inability to 
effectively pursue the German commander, in tandem with weak Portuguese resistance, 
prolonged the war in East Africa.  
 By November 1918, the British pursuit was in a panic. Northern Rhodesia’s war effort 
was grinding to a halt, with “the Colonial Office…[banning] compulsory recruitment in Norther 
Rhodesia” in response to the pleas of a heavily indebted British South Africa Company.83 
Lettow-Vorbeck crossed into the territory from Portuguese East Africa and General Northey 
could not muster the manpower to transport his forces and stop the movement. Strachan surmises 
that if the war would have continued into 1919, Lettow-Vorbeck would have been in a good 
position to continue his campaign.84 Nonetheless, desertion, exhaustion, and illness dogged all 
sides in 1918. Lettow-Vorbeck’s movements traversed Northern Rhodesia, which had seen little 
action within its borders in the first three years of the war. The last engagement of the East 
African Campaign occurred on 12 November at Kasama.85 Thirteen days later, the German 
forces formally surrendered. The War Office, apparently lauding Lettow-Vorbeck’s fight, re-
issued his sword in a ceremonial parade.  
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 For those on the ground in Africa, the war was much more than a hard-fought battle 
against a worthy opponent. Almost all of the territories in Southern Africa – British, German, 
Portuguese, and Belgian – had seen protests and rebellions against forced labour, increased 
taxation, and personnel and resource demands. In the British colonies, Northern Rhodesia had 
been brought to a standstill, with the administering BSAC left in a precarious position. By 1923, 
the British declared Northern Rhodesia a protectorate, with limited governing powers to white 
settlers there, along the same lines as Nyasaland. To the south, Southern Rhodesia evolved much 
differently as a result of the war. Settlers there demanded representative government and, 
consequently, it remained a self-governing British territory until 1965. By contrast, South Africa 
had earned its seat at the post-war table. By 1926 – although it was a self-governing colony after 
1910 – South Africa had gained its status as a Dominion of the British Empire with the Balfour 
Declaration, joining Canada, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Each of the territories’ African 
populations suffered disproportionately to their white rulers. To varying degrees, Yorke notes, 
returning askari and porters “played a distinctive, if not leading role…within [a] framework of a 
new social and economic awareness.”86 Most of all, it was the death, sacrifice, and injuries 
African communities sustained that drove their resentment and mourning after 1918.87 
 
Kenya’s First World War: Labour, Trade, and the Question of Settler Ascendency  
At the risk of trivializing the histories of other British African possessions, the First 
World War most affected Kenya’s fate as a colony. South Africa certainly gained the most out of 
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the conflict, stemming from its leadership in South West Africa and East Africa, alongside its 
contributions on the Western Front. Its internal dynamics and long-standing independence from 
London, however, make it a better comparison with its fellow Dominions, a topic to which I 
return in the succeeding chapter. Kenya, on the other hand, was neither a commercial colony 
akin to Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia, nor a full-fledged self-governing territory as Southern 
Rhodesia emerged after the war. Will Jackson observes that “Kenya was alone amongst Britain’s 
colonies in Africa, administered from Whitehall, in which there existed a significant settler 
population.”88 These dynamics proffered wartime and post-war crises of control pitting the 
Colonial Office (CO) against the settler population.89 From 1914-1923 the ensuing debates over 
where power lay in the young colony are inextricable from Kenya’s First World War. In the 
process, the African population was caught in the crossfire. 
 Any retelling of Kenya’s First World War must begin with the Carrier Corps. Variously 
known throughout the war as the Military Labour Bureau or the Military Labour Corps,90 the 
plight of carriers remains the unspoken tragedy of the First World War’s African theatre. Until 
the centenary, when several public-facing scholarly and artistic projects shone light on the trials 
of carrier life, popular memories of the First World War in Africa rarely focused on African 
labourers in East and West Africa.91 Far more likely to appear was the sinking of the vessel SS 
Mendi after it collided with another vessel, carrying 615 members of the South African Native 
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Labour Contingent to their deaths.92 Remembrance of the SS Mendi disaster saw somewhat of a 
revival during the centenary, but it remained a hallmark of African participation in the First 
World War in South Africa until after the Second World War in both white and black 
communities.93 This event occurred off the coast of France rather than on the remote terrain of 
Africa, which partially explains why the episode was more visible. The fact that it was accidental 
rather than the result of brutal conditions like those of the porters in East Africa made it an event 
that could be remembered without the associated guilt and culpability of white supremacist 
policymaking. 
In East Africa, however, the change in British strategy towards Africanization 
precipitated demands upon the African population of British East Africa that brought the colony 
to a breaking point.94 By the end of the war, military and carrier deaths amounted to at least 
100,000, of a total of more than one million African participants. The actual number of Africans 
who served was certainly much higher.95 45,000 of those deaths alone came from British East 
Africa.96 The associated drain on available labour for settler farms instigated demands for 
compulsory enlistment. Labour procurement had long been a difficult issue for colonial 
administrations in Africa, especially when “there was often insufficient incent to induce local 
populations to enter the labour market freely.”97 As allied military strategy shifted from the 
defensive to the offensive, the War Office demanded more of British colonies already stretched 
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thin by the first two years of the war. The war may not have brought novel challenges to the East 
African state but it certainly exacerbated existing tensions.  
The system for carrier recruitment in British East Africa from 1914-1915 presented great 
difficulty and variability; District Officers were responsible for recruiting a proportion of the 
available population for service through the appointed headmen or chiefs.98 In response to 
growing concerns, the administration announced the Native Followers Recruitment Ordinance in 
August 1915 which, in tandem with the Native Registration Ordinance, made compulsory 
recruitment and registration of available labour a paramount priority. While the administration 
drafted the former Ordinance specifically to meet the demands of the Carrier Corps, settlers 
pushed for it to apply to acquiring labour for their farms as well. The administration did not 
extend the Followers Ordinance, but it did make leaving employment rather difficult for Africans 
considering they would be enlisted in the Carrier Corps should they do so.99 As a result, the 
colonial administration, and by extension the settler population, gained greater control over the 
labour supply in Kenya. Indeed, Robert Maxon’s study of CO-settler jockeying during the war 
identifies the Native Followers Recruitment Ordinance as the first step in wartime governor 
Belfield’s greater interest in the war in East Africa, when he also fell “literally prostrate before 
almost every economic and political demand made by the settlers. While this would be done to in 
the name of patriotism and maximizing the war effort, some also served to meet long-standing 
demands of the settler community.”100 Until 1914 the colonial state may have been able to ride 
the line between “the conflicting requirements of peasant and settler political economy,”101 but 
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the mounting pressure of the wartime economy and demands upon the settler population 
accelerated policies favourable to the ‘big men’ who drove settler production in the White 
Highlands. For his War Council, for example, Belfield drew his advisors equally from the 
official cadres of the state and from settler society. In the process, Belfield “opened the door for 
the council to involve itself in all aspects of both civil and military affairs in EAP [East Africa 
Protectorate].”102  
In short, the military structures and civil authorities in East Africa were ill-prepared to 
capture the necessary labour to meet the needs of the East Africa campaign in 1914. The four-
year military campaign in East Africa galvanized African agitation.103 Despite military aversion 
to using carriers on a large scale early in the war (driven partially by the India Office’s control of 
operations), the Ordinances of 1915 helped spark general enthusiasm amongst settlers for the war 
effort. Labour could now be tracked with the issuance of kipendes, the equivalent to identity 
discs on the Western Front, that were required for labourers to receive pay – even when working 
outside of the military.104 Settlers believed that military service roused African out of their 
naturally idle states and were now induced to contribute to the settler economy.105 Beyond their 
perceived necessity for the war effort, the self-serving benefits of the ordinances are confirmed 
in the decision of the settler contingent of the War Council to reduce carrier pay by half. This 
reduction only applied to labourers not serving on the front-lines or already in service, meaning 
the Ordnance affected primarily non-military labour, induced into settler farm labour or 
infrastructure building.106 Further, due to fear of punishment, labourers lost bargaining power 
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because they could either join the Carrier Corps at rates far below the market rate or could 
continue work for settlers at marginally better rates.107 Although carrier recruitment was 
localized in the early parts of the war, “the early days of the Carrier Corps can already be seen as 
a constant struggle by the staff to establish and maintain standards, before the 1916 offensive 
sent numbers soaring almost out of control.”108  
Aside from settler political gains, the long-term strain of carrier recruitment could not be 
avoided. Citing the official tabulations, Geoffrey Hodges puts the number of carriers, porters, 
and casual labourers at 190,150.109 Though conditions in the Carrier Corps improved over the 
course of the war, the death rate was officially recorded as 15 percent, with Hodges estimating it 
as high as 22 percent.110 Settlers may have gained temporarily through favourable policy, but the 
long-standing labour issue continued into the post-war years. Based on Hodges’ estimates, more 
than 41,000 Kenyans lost their lives in the Carrier Corps alone from 1914-1918. Edward Paice’s 
revised estimate indicates that this number was unquestionably higher, with his ‘butcher’s bill’ 
setting a floor of 45,000.111 The progression of the war into German East Africa in 1917 and 
1918, for which British East Africa shouldered the burden, brought on the highest death rates for 
carriers.  
Adding to this harrowing context, rains failed in 1917, leading to widespread famine. 
These conditions compounded the drain of labour for war service.112 By 1918, when the famine 
conditions receded, the Spanish influenza hit Kenya, with the pandemic spreading more quickly 
as carriers and soldiers returned to their villages.113 In some areas of Gikuyuland officials 
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estimated that the flu killed 20 percent of the adult population.114 The official death toll for the 
entire colony was at least 200,000 people, constituting “almost a tenth of the total population.”115 
African modes of production in the post-war period were thus at a distinct disadvantage when 
compared to settler production, leaving the colonial state and imperial directives as the primary 
means of curbing settler ascendency.  
If we look at the  First World War in Africa through local lenses, Kenyan communities 
experienced the effects of the war with great variability. The Nandi, for example, had long 
resisted colonial authority thus gaining the status of a ‘martial race.’116 Nandi men were recruited 
mostly for the King’s African Rifles, rather than the Carrier Corps, meaning that death rates were 
lower.117 The Taita, who had been granted exemptions from the Carrier Corps until 1917, 
worked closer to their homelands and sent fewer men to support the East African campaigns than 
the Luo in Nyanza province.118 This was especially true in the first three years of the war, before 
the push into German East Africa required a greater dependence upon African labour – meaning 
those who had avoided the jurisdiction of the Military Labour Bureau to work on local projects 
were now sent into much worse conditions.119 Across British East Africa, however, the First 
World War solidified settler control of the colony at the expense of the CO. Nonetheless, such 
advances were underwritten by policies that drove a massive demographic shift in Kenyan 
communities.  
After the war, as suffering in Kenyan communities continued, the battle between the 
settler population and the CO intensified. Settlers weathered the storm brought on by wartime 
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economic lags, but the threat of continued slow downs meant ensuring that labour market and 
land alienation programs continued unabated.120 Carrier Corps service brought likely half of the 
400,000 Kenyan adult males into wage labour during the war, killing upwards of an eighth of 
them while in service. Many more died from complications of service, and many more were left 
seriously disabled.121 While those who survived the war entered the wage labour system with 
increased monetary wealth and some communities with developed cattle and grain industries 
made gains in the wartime market,122 the Belfield-Bowring (1912-1919) and Northey (1919-
1923) administrations remained focused on settler production.123 In conjunction with the Native 
Registration and Followers Recruitment Ordinances of 1915, the Crown Lands Ordinance of that 
same year put Kenyan and Indian communities at further disadvantage. The decree made the 
‘White Highlands’ – the most fertile area of the Colony – effectively segregated to the benefit of 
white settlement. Leases were extended to 999 years and sales of lands to Indians were subject to 
veto.124 This completed the gradual seizure of land from the Masai and effected a massive influx 
of predominantly Gikuyu ‘squatters’ who worked white farms in exchange for subsistence 
agricultural rights. The combined effect was that the ‘big men’ who ruled Kenya continued to 
dominate the economy, while Kenyan producers’ migrated away from the reserves, which 
continued to erode the authority of the colonial state and its appointed chiefs and headmen.125 
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The year 1915 had also produced another decision that bolstered settler confidence and 
drove their temporary dominance. With growing concerns over Kenyan and Indian grievances, 
alongside the need for an increased white presence should British East Africa remain a viable 
outpost of Empire, the War Council – following South Africa and New Zealand – proposed the 
framework for a Soldier Settlement Scheme.126 The idea behind the scheme was to firmly settle 
the highlands and adjacent areas in Nyanza, bring in revenue to support the settler economy, and 
populate the Colony with white-skinned settlers of the officer class.127 From a strategic 
standpoint (in which settlers had little interest), London saw soldier settlement as a 
counterweight to growing Kenyan political activity associated with Carrier Corps recruitment 
and King’s African Rifles service, as well as Indian settlement and commerce.128 In this latter 
respect, the Soldier Settlement Scheme once again bolstered settler interests through policies 
cloaked by the exigencies of the East African campaign. The Scheme began in earnest in 1919, 
re-configuring the demographics of the Colony and expanding the settler base to its extreme.129 
British East Africa became more British, with a distinct aristocratic “social flavour.”130 The 
settler population grew by 210 percent between 1911-1921, almost quadruple the rate of the 
following decade.131 
It may have appeared in 1919 as if British East Africa was heading towards self-
governing status. However, a series of crises and Imperial policies in the early-1920s stoked 
settler antagonism as the CO re-established its ‘initiative.’132 What settlers had gained during the 
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war – including representation on the Legislative Council – the CO sought to temper through the 
early-1920s. Settlers still wielded considerable influence, retaining their hopes of securing Kenya 
as a ‘white man’s country,’133 but their demand for cheap labour, their attempt at the 
monopolization of production, and their ambivalent relationship with the colonial state prompted 
responses from London that put the brakes on their political ascendency. Although the colonial 
state was still pro-settler, it sought to control the contours of settler society. 
In this political context, Kenyans, settlers, the colonial state, and the Empire as a whole 
began to grapple with human tragedy that was the First World War. The 1920s produced an 
outpouring of commemorative activities virtually unprecedented in the history of warfare. The 
British Empire collectively remembered the casualties of war through an organized program of 
memorialization administered by the Imperial War Graves Commission and, incrementally, 
through ritualized traditions of remembrance. The Empire’s constituent parts, likewise, created 
their own networks of commemoration. Often going beyond the constraints of a universalizing 
organization like the IWGC, the colonial contexts within which Britons articulated their identity 
disrupted imperial designs. Thus, colonial societies are just as essential to understanding the 
legacy of the Great War as the context in Britain itself. What, how, and, who the colonies chose 
to remember went beyond grappling with the material and political implications of the First 
World War. It required defining what the war meant, reflecting and refracting social identities in 
the present but also projecting them into the future. 
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2 – Memorialization and Remembrance of the First World War in the British Empire: 
How the Settler Colony Forgets 
Forgotten: the word often foregrounds studies of the First World War in Africa. Implied 
in the use of the word ‘forgotten’ is that not only is there something tangible to remember, but 
that it is worth remembering. Whether it is the strategic importance of the campaigns, the 
Africans who perished, or the short and long-term effects upon specific colonies, the 
remembering being done is in service of recovering the ‘what’ of the Great War in Africa. The 
process of providing greater clarity of what happened and who was involved fails to ask the 
question of why and how it was forgotten in the first place. The ‘additive’ approach to First 
World War studies,1 wherein historians judge African experiences based on their relative 
importance to what happened in Europe, brings our focus back and forth between 1914-1918 
(and its immediate aftermath) and the present-day, seldom looking at the spaces in between. 
Filling gaps in knowledge, important as this is to a fuller picture of the First World War in 
Africa, should not be the end point.2  
To a certain extent, the Great War in Africa was not forgotten; that is if we choose to 
centre African experiences rather than placing emphasis on “the ostensible ‘center’ of the war, 
Europe,”3 entirely new avenues for understanding the legacy of the conflict emerge. Contrarily, 
by seeking to reclaim a place for Africa in the general history of the First World War, Michelle 
Moyd argues that the “formulation centres European desires for mastery over Africa in the 
narrative.”4 Indeed, colony and community-specific histories of the conflict, often based in oral 
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history, have done a great deal to re-centre African experiences on their own terms.5 But it is my 
claim here that, by focusing on the act of centring Europe and Europeans in post-war 
commemorations in settler societies, we might better understand the ways that remembering the 
war was made meaningful – at the institutional level – for some members of colonial societies 
and decidedly not for others. Further, we might elucidate why Britain and independent Kenya 
have largely severed the African front from their own collective memories. 
To clarify this line of argumentation, it is helpful to trace the development of the 
academic concept variously named ‘collective,’ ‘collected,’ or ‘cultural’ memory, with a 
particular focus on the memorialization of the First World War. Emanating from philosophical 
debates on the character of memory – from the personal to the societal – historians, among other 
practitioners across the academe, took a particular interest in memory from the 1970s onwards. 
Naturally, the study of collective memory has tended towards analyses of national identity-
making, and in certain cases transnational and imperial identities as well. In either case, as with 
any social phenomenon, the politics of such endeavours come to bear on the practice of social 
remembrance. As governments struggle to monopolize the uses of memory, its constituents’ 
diversity pushes back against homogenization. In colonial contexts, however, the drive to 
foreclose histories of violence inherent in conquest and subjugation is essential to the 
legitimation of the colonial project. Thus, the particularities of colonial memory are exceedingly 
important for understanding the uses and practices of remembrance in postwar Kenya. In this 
respect, this chapter charts the general zeitgeist in memory studies as it relates to the First World 
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War while also the defining the limits of European analyses for studying settler colonial 
societies. 
 
Memory: The Individual, Collective Memory, and Cultural Heritage 
The concept of collective memory, in its modern iteration, owes a debt to Maurice 
Halbwachs’ pioneering work. Working from the assumption that the individual can never be 
detached from “our fellows, and [from] the great frameworks of the memory of society”6 (except 
in their dreams or in states of aphasia),  Halbwachs moves beyond conceiving of memory as an 
personal and introspective phenomenon; we are always cognizant of social frameworks that 
animate our otherwise fragmentary recollections of the past.7 Society pressures the individual 
‘rememberer’ “not just to reproduce in thought previous events of their lives, but also to touch 
them up, to shorten them, or to complete them…so that we give them a prestige that reality did 
not possess.” 8 Thus, in reconstructing our personal histories, we rely upon social and familial 
norms and values, linguistic conventions, and rituals to cover-up the flaws in psychological 
memory and give meaning to our experiences. Halbwachs fully theorized what historians now 
take for granted: that individual remembrance can be a powerful referent for understanding a 
given society at a given time or its change over time. Halbwachs’ observations may prompt 
questions of how societies remember but he is still primarily concerned with how social 
frameworks shape individual memory.  
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Jan and Aleida Assmann extend Halbwachs’ conceptualization of ‘collective memory’ by 
further dividing the concept into ‘communicative’ and ‘cultural’ memory.9 For the Assmanns, 
Halbwachs focused on dispersed, non-institutional memory, rather than the physical 
representations of shared pasts.10 The Assmanns trace the evolution of group memory from the 
building blocks of orality and quotidian interactions, referencing the recent past, to a longer-term 
institutional memory, “living in monuments, museums, libraries, archives, and other mnemonic 
institutions.”11 Drawing on the work of Jan Vansina in African oral history,12 Jan Assmann 
stresses the formalization of memory as ‘ours’ in cultural memory, implying a great deal of 
forgetting, whereas communicative memory is about preserving connections to contemporaries.13 
All communities have both communicative and cultural memories, but the means of articulating 
each is different. What this division suggests is that collective memory’s formal modes of 
memory transmission – for instance memory carried at the level of the nation-state – must be 
considered as a wholly different framework of memory, even if that framework is open to 
reinterpretation and inscription.  
Pierre Nora attempted to delineate this process by studying the creation of a French 
national identity through representational reconstructions of their shared past. Nora coined the 
now ubiquitous term lieux de memoire, or sites of memory, in studies of memory, cultural 
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heritage, and remembrance or commemoration. Sites of memory are those quotidian objects that 
refer to aspects of a nation’s history, acting as mnemonic devices for national identity.14 Sites of 
memory, however, were not the subject of Nora’s appreciation; he lamented the disappearance of 
“environments” of memory – what Nora called milieux de memoire – where ‘authentic’ memory 
proliferated through oral transmission and daily interactions.15 Environments of memory, for 
Nora, drive “perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present,” while sites 
of memory are simply traces of memory, meagre signposts fighting back against historicism that 
renders the past dead.16 Memory is “collective, plural, and yet individual. History, on the other 
hand, belongs to everyone and to no one, whence its claim to universal authority.”17 For Nora, 
sites of memory are the productions of modern societies yearning for living memory, yet unable 
to reclaim it from an acceleration of time in the modern world that relegates the present to 
history. 
The implications of Nora’s study are manifold, despite critiques of his binary distinctions 
between history and memory,18 the sacred and the secular, and, more relevant to this study, a 
Gallocentrism that deemphasizes of provincial diversity, minority groups, or colonial histories.19 
For the study of the First World War specifically, Nora’s contention that the shift away from 
environments of memory to sites of memory is a modern advent delimits the time-period within 
which cultural memory is of the greatest importance. With the First World War often 
 
14 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,” Representations 26 (Spring, 
1989): 7-24.  
15 Ibid., 7. This is what Assmann defined as communicative memory.  
16 Ibid., 8-9.  
17 Ibid., 9.  
18 Paul Connerton, for example, delineates the myriad connections and mutual dependence between social 
memory and history. Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 14-
15. 
19 See, for example, Rothberg, “Between Memory and Memory”; Guy Beiner, Forgetful Remembrance: 
Social Forgetting and Vernacular Historiography of a Rebellion in Ulster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 
6-17. 
 53 
characterized as an accelerant of modernity, the stakes of Great War commemoration are 
necessarily entwined with the emergence of sites of memory.20 The shift to understanding 
cultural memory through material sources spawned an entire field, expanding the source-base 
historians employ to understand collective memory. Further, the tendency of nation-states to 
favour elite, institutional, and historicist interpretations of the past makes explicit the link 
between cultural memory and the legitimation of the nation-state as an ‘imagined community.’ 
Nora may have exaggerated the ways that states dominate sites of memory and the rituals that 
take place at them, but the implications of the political uses of memory are essential to detailing 
its manifestations. Whether competing narratives disrupt, interrupt, and explicitly challenge 
dominant ones does not preclude memory’s potential for exploitation.  
The argument that sites of memory should be interpreted through the lens of state 
exigencies links with Benedict Anderson’s pioneering work on the development of national 
identities. Modern nation-states deploy shared representations of unity because they are 
dispersed geographically so that “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image 
of their communion.”21 Sites of memory are powerful referents in this process of identification 
(with the nation), and Anderson conjoins these two ideas by offering the example of the Tomb of 
the Unknown Soldier.22 For Anderson, where emergent nations discarded religious explanations 
for death and suffering, they substituted the “ghostly national imaginings.”23 Anderson’s choice 
 
20 For characterizations of the First World War as a break with the past, or an accelerant of modernity, see, 
for example, Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); 
Christopher Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004). 
21 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New 
York: Verso, 1991), 6. 
22 Ibid., 9. 
23 Ibid. 
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to focus upon the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier augurs at the intersection of the First World 
War and collective national imaginations. Fittingly, over the next two decades, historical 
analyses of the cultural legacy of the First World War proliferated at an astounding pace that, if 
they had slowed at all, only accelerated again at the Great War’s centenary. 
The memory of the First World War as a field traces its origins to Paul Fussell’s The 
Great War and Modern Memory. A decidedly elitist analysis of British war memory, Fussell 
presents the war poets of the interwar period as the carriers of a ‘modern’ interpretation of war 
marked by irony. It was the last war to be conceived in terms of continuity, progress, and stasis.24 
The war interrupted a blissful Summer of 1914 with unexpected melancholy of the Autumn. The 
irony was laid bare in a Great War for Civilization that terrorized civil society. For Fussell, the 
great war poets – such as Siegfried Sassoon and Robert Graves – ushered in a new era of 
interpretation, only possible in the wake of cataclysmic violence. They established the baseline 
for the cultural memory of the Great War, highlighted by what Daniel Todman exposed as the 
myths of the First World War: the Lions led by Donkeys to the slaughter, their traces represented 
by the reds and browns of blood-tainted soil.25 The limits of literary analysis for understanding 
cultural memory notwithstanding, Fussell laid the groundwork for interrogating the legacy of the 
Great War in Britain. 
George Mosse, for example, saw national unity as the modus operandi in cemetery and 
monument design in the wake of the First World War. It was not the ironic, disjointed, modern 
memory of the war that dominated postwar Europe but the “attempt to direct human memory 
from the horrors to the meaningfulness and glory of the war.”26 This engaged the tension 
 
24 Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, 21. 
25 Daniel Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory (New York: Hambledon and London, 2005). 
26 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 50.  
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between modern warfare and the need to maintain a sense of continuity with the nation. The 
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Anderson’s starting point, was a sacred place “dedicated to the 
civic religion of nationalism.”27 Here as well, Nora’s influence shaped the research agenda, 
moving beyond the literary to the political symbols of postwar Europe. 
The definitive blow against Fussell’s characterization of a clear break with the modern, 
however, came from Jay Winter. Taking up Fussell’s characterization28 of the First World War 
as the birth of modern memory in Britain, Winter took the idea of sites of memory and applied it 
not only to Britain but a transnational assessment of Great War memory in Europe. Rather than 
representing a clean break with the past, Europeans used ‘traditional’ languages to mourn, 
grieve, and move on, given the tendency of the ‘modern’ languages to suspend those processes in 
a state of anger. ‘Modern’ language itself was less a departure from the ‘traditional,’ as much as 
it was a stretching of the boundaries of its usage.29 Beyond Fussell’s literary analysis or Mosse’s 
political analysis, Winter’s shift to sites of mourning and memory captures the diffuse, 
multivocal nature of commemoration. The memory of the First World War is democratic, 
“constructed through the action of groups and individuals in the light of day.”30 Though Winter 
acknowledges that the politics of the nation were a necessary part of the commemorative 
traditions of combatant nations, his greatest achievement is that he opened up the field of 
commemoration studies to innumerable interpretations from the individual, to the community, to 
the nation, to the Empire, and even entire continents.  
 
27 Ibid., 101.  
28 Winter notes that although he is primarily dealing with Fussell’s interpretation, the work of Samuel 
Hynes expanded upon The Great War and Modern Memory, although with similar appeals to ‘modernist’ language. 
Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 230.  
29 Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning,  
30 Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 10.  
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This brief overview of how collective memory became a standard theory in the toolkit of 
First World War historians is cursory by necessity. However, the advent of material history as an 
access point into collective memory hinges on the use of cultural heritage as a source for 
historical analysis. This study also uses aspects of settler cultural heritage – monuments, 
community service groups, and public rituals – as access points into the legacy and meaning of 
the Great War in Kenya’s settler community. Nora’s claim that sites of memory are powerful 
spaces of reference for the nation, alongside Winter’s focus on continuity over a break from the 
past, form the theoretical basis for my analysis. Settlers ritualized traditional motifs of imperial 
association, racial superiority, and their distinctiveness as the frontiersman of colonialism to 
bring meaning to the Great War in their particular context. The colonial state used the language 
of imperial unity and the civilizing mission to different political ends. Following Alex King, my 
analysis focuses not just on the interpretation of commemorative sites but “the exercise of formal 
and informal political power,”31 bringing the projects into being. That is, by analyzing the means 
by which memorials and rituals came into being, we better understand the contexts within which 
they were interpreted. Commemorative sites, as such, were arenas of political discourse, subject 
to manipulation, identification, and inscription. 
 
Colonialism and Memory: Articulating National Identity in the British Empire 
 My theoretical approach to commemoration, rooted in sites of memory and the politics of 
memory, has drawn reference to work mostly conducted in European contexts. Importantly, the 
colonial context deserves elucidation as a distinct field of analysis, at once linked with the 
metropole but separated both geographically and socially. Can we transplant methodology and 
 
31 Alex King, Memorials of the Great War in Britain: The Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance (New 
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 1998), 14.  
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theory from Europe to its colonies? My answer to this question is yes, but only if done in a 
careful fashion. As I have detailed, the First World War looked much different on the African 
continent, employed a demographically different set of combatants, and responded to local 
politics to a greater extent than grand strategy; meaning that its remembrance and 
commemorative frameworks were, if derived from the metropolitan structure, inherently 
different in practice. The dominant questions of postwar commemoration – who was to be 
commemorated? for what communities was commemoration designed? what entities would fund 
and initiate commemorative projects? – were dictated by local circumstances.  
 Historians have recognized similar problems in Europe. Mark Connelly, for example, 
adopts a micro-history approach to analyzing commemoration, seeing individual communities as 
essential to the form and content of commemorations. By taking a ‘fine toothcomb’ to the 
subject, Connelly suggests that he was able to “‘get under the skin’ of particular communities to 
show that the nuances of the local atmosphere often influenced the form of the war memorial and 
the style of the Armistice Day commemorations.”32 I make no such claims to achieving such 
local specificity within Kenya, but Connelly’s contention that the needs of a community, no 
matter the size, necessarily influence the manifestation of memory is essential. Looking for 
similarities across cultures is an important aspect of a comparative approach, but in comparing 
colonial societies with their metropoles, historians run the risk of reproducing metropolitan 
experiences in the periphery.  
 The manifest differences between colonial and metropolitan memory are set in relief 
against two material realities: first, that of physical distance from Europe, and second, that of 
depth of historicity. Distance from Europe might be measured in an objective measure, like 
 
32 Mark Connelly, The Great War, Memory and Ritual: Commemoration in the City and East London, 
1916-1939 (Rochester: Boydell and Brewer Ltd., 2002), 1-2.  
 58 
kilometres, while time is measured by calendrical dating. However, beyond the material 
measurements, when it comes to the memory of the First World War, both time and distance are 
also subjective and variable.33 In other words, the ways that settlers interpreted time and space 
was just as important as the material reality. Distance from Europe might be overcome by a 
powerful referent to ‘home’ or one’s imperial identity. Time, on the other hand, might be just as 
much a product of a community’s or individual’s aspirations or founding mythos as it was based 
on rigid adherence to historical time. Commemoration in the colonies, thus, was related and, at 
times, derivative of the metropole, but subject to reformulation through social discourse. The 
British Dominions are particularly instructive in this regard. 
 In the Canadian example, Jonathan Vance argues that the myth of the First World War 
was articulated through “a vision of the war as a nation-building experience of signal 
importance. Canada’s progress from colony to nation by way of Flanders…has become the 
standard method of judging the impact of 1914-18.”34 This was not simply a post-hoc assessment 
ascribed to the war in the interwar years, but a sentiment “deeply rooted in the Canadian 
consciousness by the time of the Armistice, the idea that the war meant nothing less than the 
birth of a nation flourished afterwards.”35 The aspirations of a collective re-birth in nationhood 
disrupted historical time in favour of memory time; it was not an inching forward toward 
nationhood, replete with colonial dispossessions and internal conflicts, but “the Great War had 
given it life.”36 The myth of the First World War, however, also drew upon British connections,37 
 
33 See for example Bill Schwarz, “‘Already the Past’: Memory and Historical Time,” in Regimes of 
Memory, Susannah Radstone and Katharine Hodgkin eds. (New York: Routledge, 2003), 135-151.  
34 Jonathan Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
1997), 10. 
35 Ibid., 228. 
36 Ibid., 229.  
37 Hanna Smyth, “The Material Culture of Remembrance and Identity: South Africa, India, Canada & 
Australia’s Imperial War Graves Commission Sites on the First World War’s Western Front,” (PhD diss., University 
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harkening back to the importance of origins in collective memory. Ultimately, to the extent there 
was a unified national identity in the colonial context it intersected with imperial identity, thus 
hybridizing the memory of the Great War.  
 Historians of New Zealand and Australia have delineated similar complexities in 
memory-making in those contexts. Stephen Garton draws our attention to the mobilization of 
nationalist narratives in Australia as “both nationalist and Empire loyalist, a strange phenomenon 
that might be best conceptualized as Empire nationalism.”38 Similar to Canada, Australia found 
its so-called “national birth” in its First World War experience. Charles Bean, Australia’s official 
First World War historian, set the out the concrete differences for identity-making in the 
colonies. Bean saw Australia as a superior field for defining ‘Britishness,’ Mark Sheftall 
observes: “The Dominions were producing a superior specimen of manhood than that which was 
being bred it the over-urbanized, class-ridden Motherland.”39 The comparison to Britain and the 
other Dominions was natural but distinct, replete with the mythos of Anzac, which rather than 
finding reference in objective historical fact-finding, instead projected back the timelessness of 
the Australian character.40 The knotted, at times conflicting, identification with imperial and 
 
38 Stephen Garton, “Demobilization and Empire: Empire Nationalism and Soldier Citizenship in Australia 
After the First World War – in Dominion Context,” Journal of Contemporary History 50 (1) (2015): 128-129.  
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“’Light and Shade’: The New Zealand Written Remembrance of the Great War, 1915-1939,” War & Society 22 (1) 
(2004): 19-40. 
40 See Bart Ziino, “‘We are talking about Gallipoli after all’: contested narratives, contented ownership and 
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The Labour of Loss: Mourning, Memory and Wartime Bereavement in Australia (New York: Cambridge University 
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national identities in New Zealand and Australia underlines the importance of seeing the 
Dominions as distinct fields of analysis.41 This is perhaps a banal point, but in defining the 
particular experience of settler colonies in their relationship to the process of colonization, the 
importance of the birth of the nation mythos is essential. 
Indigenous History and the First World War: What the Settler Colony Forgets 
Paul Connerton’s analysis of the ways that modern societies remember and forget 
collectively are particularly germane to the study of settler colonial societies. As he notes, the 
latter process is usually interpreted as some sort of failure of the latter, especially at the 
individual level.42 Forgetting and forgetfulness “imply an obligation on my part to remember 
something and my failure to discharge that obligation.”43 Indeed, if we look at the duty to 
remember in the context of the First World War – ‘lest we forget’ – the civic responsibility 
entailed in commemoration and remembrance of war dead becomes a powerful device for 
national unity, with those who do not actively participate in remembrance a pariah. Nevertheless, 
the history of violence, assimilation, and erasure that characterizes settler-Indigenous relations in 
colonial societies implicates two of Connerton’s seven types of forgetting: ‘forgetting that is 
constitutive in the formation of a new identity’ and ‘repressive erasure.’  
 For Connerton, ‘repressive erasure’ is often associated with totalitarian regimes but notes 
that in both Roman society and during the French Revolution those persons deemed enemies of 
the state were not only killed but made invisible by disappearing their traces.44 For Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia, the state was party to severing Indigenous links to the past through 
 
41 Kathryn Hunter, “National and Imperial Belonging in Wartime: The Tangled Knot of Australians and 
New Zealanders as British Subjects during the Great War,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 63 (1) (2017): 
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processes of assimilation. It was not complete disappearance, as such, but selective 
remembering. Duncan Campbell Scott, the Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Canada, 
noted that Indigenous soldiers might be remembered for their “unselfish loyalty, gallantry, 
intelligence, resourcefulness, and efficiency,”45 but only insofar as it undergirded the state’s 
“objective…to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed 
into the body politic and there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department.”46 The settler 
colonial example was not a single coup immediately erasing Indigenous memory, but the gradual 
repression of Indigenous identity in the service of a new era of Indigenous existence as 
assimilated subjects. 
 The attendant of such ‘repressive erasure’ was that in each case the state also invested in 
the constitution of a galvanized national identity. These national identities were long-gestating 
but the First World War gave impetus to their ‘birth.’ While imperial identity remained knotted 
with national identity, the history of colonialism needed to be discarded in favour of the myth of 
Vimy or Gallipoli. Charlotte Macdonald argues that “where the First World War projected 
remembrance into an eternal future – the promise to ‘never forget’ – colonial memory sealed 
remembrance into a past that close of time, relegating the events and their protagonist to a place 
distant and disconnected from the present.”47 Memory time once again superseded historical 
time, as the past, present, and future were collapsed into commemorative sites and rituals. To 
remember the nation properly meant erasing histories of violence and repression – of their 
imperial origin – and substituting a future-oriented national memory of the First World War in its 
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stead. This was not complete erasure but selective remembrance. In “the construction, 
articulation and deployment of national identity,” Smits writes, “the state deploys Maori cultural 
practices in commemoration – as they were deployed when strategically useful by colonial New 
Zealand for nation-building during the War.”48 While there might be selective inclusion, nation-
defining myths dominated and obscured “the uncomfortable memory of the dispossession of 
Indigenous peoples in the original invasion and colonization.”49 The history of colonization is 
forgotten at the moment the nation is born in Flanders or the Dardanelles. 
 While this discussion is selective, I draw several key conclusions with implications of 
First World War memory in the Dominion context. First, the intensity of forgetting that 
accompanies the birth of a nation differentiates the representation of the past in Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia. Second, the history of colonization intrinsic to settler colonial societies 
creates another impetus to forget, offering only selective inclusion of Indigenous experiences of 
the Great War. Overall, the Dominions must be considered in their own right, even if comparison 
to Britain may yield some overlap. As a logical extension of this reasoning, it is essential to 
delineate whether the Dominion model applies to colonies in Africa, with special attention to the 
memory of the war in South Africa and Kenya. 
 
First World War Memory in British Africa: Beyond the Dominion Model 
For the British Dominions, the question of whether they were ‘white men’s countries’ 
had been answered long before 1914. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand had completed their 
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conquests by the end of 19th Century, with residual conflicts largely internal to white 
communities. As the South African example demonstrates, dynamics in African colonies were 
altogether different. South Africa’s white population dominated but their labour sources and their 
ability to exploit the natural wealth of the territory depended upon the existence of large African 
communities rather than their assimilation and elimination. Further, South Africa’s large 
Afrikaner population, the coexistence of Afrikaner Republics and the colonial state, and its 
recent history of conflict with Britain marked significant differences with the other white 
Dominions.50 But if South Africa provides a general framework for delineating the unique 
features of commemoration in British Africa, it remains insufficient for colonies like Kenya. The 
balance of this chapter is dedicated to defining this methodological conundrum. 
 One of the key facets of South Africa’s First World War was that the majority of its 
fighting was in Africa rather than in Europe.51 Nonetheless, it was South African contributions to 
the latter that feature most often in South Africa’s commemoration of the war52 and in the 
historiography of South African commemoration more generally.53 Over a third of South 
Africa’s war-related combatant54 deaths occurred in Europe, with the vast majority at the Battle 
of Delville Wood during the Somme Offensive from July to September 1916. Jan Smuts ensured 
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that South Africa immortalized those ‘Springboks on the Somme,’ steeped in South African 
mythos,55 as the “spiky political commemoration of Dominion identity and achievement in war, 
a tracing in granite and marble of the colonial strengths of the South African character across 
French soil.”56 While Afrikaner nationalism was long established (one need not look further than 
the British-South African War a decade earlier), for English-speaking South Africans Delville 
Wood represented the moment of unity between the two communities, ‘birthing’ a contiguous 
South African nation along similar lines as the Empire nationalism elsewhere.57 In other words, 
Delville Wood, its memorial, and Delville Day were symbols of “the new post-1910 Union of 
South Africa as a British Dominion based upon a unified white nationalism.”58 In many ways, 
the commemoration of the Great War for English-speaking and loyalist Afrikaners played out 
similarly to other British Dominions; indeed, it did so by design. 
 The Afrikaner memory of the war, however, was much more complicated. The majority 
of non-English speakers fought in the African campaigns rather than in Europe and drew their 
unity far more from memories of anti-British mobilization than the Great War.59 As Nasson 
notes, the mainstream English press “[laid] it on a touch thicker than either blood or water. In 
reality, no more than about 12 per cent of the Springbok Brigade was of Afrikaner origin.”60 The 
fierce independence of South Africa’s Afrikaner population tempered the Birth of the Nation 
narrative. While one might be tempted to draw a comparison to the conflicted memory of the 
First World War in French Canada, for example, French Canadians did not hold the type of 
power that Afrikaners held. Nationalists toppled Smuts’ Union government in 1924, bringing to 
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power a contingent of South African society that was vehemently against involvement in the 
Great War. The demographic and political make-up of South Africa therefore define its 
exceptionalism.  
 Aspects of its exceptionality notwithstanding, South Africa is not an altogether different 
case from Southern Rhodesia or Kenya.61 The ‘triad,’ in Chris Youé’s terms, shared “the 
structural realties of everyday life – access to land, racial policy and racial etiquette – [that were] 
built on the same foundations.”62 Each colony was exceptional – “South Africa a dominion with 
a big D, Southern Rhodesia a dominion with a small d, and Kenya an ordinary colony”63 – but 
they shared modes of production that depended upon the exploitation of Indigenous land and 
labour. This differed from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, where the dispossession of land 
dictated policy. What South Africa shares with the other Dominions – relative independence 
from Britain, long histories of settlement and control of Indigenous populations, and defined, if 
contested, national identities – also produces an inadequate framework for understanding the 
context of commemoration in Kenya. South Africa’s exceptionality is particularly relevant when 
it comes to commemoration of the First World War, even if it might not be so exceptional in its 
structural processes.  
 In sum, the white men’s countries outlined herein may define the kind of commemoration 
in British colonies (albeit simplified), especially the Dominions, but the example of South Africa 
sets out a different type of commemoration there. Meanwhile, the specific settler-Indigenous and 
settler-administrative arrangements in Africa suggest a different kind of commemoration in the 
colonies not yet defined as white men’s countries. The idea of Kenya as a nation still gestating 
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created a tension within that colony that manifested in commemorative culture. Even if the 
nation as child (to continue the metaphor) never matured, the anticipation of its arrival pervaded 
Kenya’s commemoration of the First World War, signalling what was important to remember. 
 
Conclusion: the British Empire, the First World War, and Collective Forgetting 
Since Kenya’s Independence, British rituals of remembrance have had little purchase, 
and the history of the First World War itself remains largely hidden. The memory of the wars 
supporting Empire, it would seem, no longer held as nationally significant. Perhaps, as Geoffrey 
Hodges suggests, this was because many of the men who led Kenya’s anticolonial movement 
were more likely to serve in clerical and home positions than in the KAR or the Carrier Corps.64 
More likely, it had little to do with experience and more to do with the type of forgetting that 
Connerton outlined as useful in the creation of a new identity.65 In Jan Assmann’s framework, 
only the ‘ancient’ origins of Kenyan history and the more recent struggles against colonial rule 
animated Kenya’s secular history of Independence; it was in the living memories of the 
participants and their communities that First World War memory persisted. Sites of memory, 
particularly monuments, remained as the ‘imperial debris.’66 Absent of rituals to stimulate 
remembering, the monuments were tasked with doing the remembering. 
That the Great War has had little purchase in the historiography of Kenya, and less so its 
legacy, highlights the centrality of the nation and the state in the production of commemorative 
cultures and cultural heritage. What memory lives on beyond the first order of memory67 – 
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generated through direct experiences – depends heavily on what the state and historians choose 
to preserve (and discard). In the postcolonial context, details of the bitter years of colonial rule 
were best forgotten, with the aggregate injustice serving as a ballast for national unity. It is 
perhaps no surprise that when historians investigate the legacy of the Great War for Kenya they 
have come from beyond its borders; the emancipatory framework of Kenya’s historiography 
focuses on events that directly influenced decolonization. Historians detail the intricacies and 
specificities of colonial rule, but the looming shadow of the nation-state creates a teleology. The 
overriding question of how the nation came to be, or how it was suppressed, guides the analysis.  
This creates a second level of forgetting that exacerbates conceptualizations of the First 
World War in Africa as a sideshow. Because the Great War failed to bring about an independent 
settler colony, there was little impetus to bring Kenyans into the story upon Independence. There 
was no narrative of national birth to refashion as meaningful in the postcolonial context. That is, 
while the Great War tells us little about Kenya’s gradual ‘progress’ towards Independence, it 
reveals much about the failed trajectory of settler colonialism. Due to that failure, there remains a 
barrier to investigating the role of the First World War in that process. Consequently, the traces 
of Kenyan suffering and sacrifice persist mainly in sites of memory, living largely in perpetual 
silence. 
This is made all the more important in a time that Anne Whitehead observes as 
“[witnessing] an accelerated fashion for scenes of public repentance, forgiveness, apology, and 
confession.”68 As countries come to grips with often horrifying silences in their national 
histories, it is essential to reflect upon how those silences were authored. Furthermore, we must 
consider whether remembering is simply another way of forgetting, either through amnesty or 
 
68 Anne Whitehead, Memory: The New Critical Idiom (New York: Routledge, 2009), 153.  
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amnesia.69 Unlike Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and (for different reasons) South Africa, 
Kenya has never reached the point of confronting collective forgetting of the First World War. 
The proliferation of new meanings of the First World War for Indigenous communities of the 
former Dominions now struggle against established national myths, even if in vain.70 Even for 
India, one of the most enduring legacies of the centenary will be the reclamation of India’s role 
in defending Empire in the British consciousness.71 In Kenya there has been no reclamation 
project because there is no collective memory to disentangle. 
From this foundation, I investigate the ways in which the settler community in Kenya 
remembered and forgot the First World War. By piercing through the barrier that cordons off this 
aspect of settler history, I probe the surface of the legacy of the Great War in Kenya. I suggest 
that the Dominion model – the Birth of the Nation – explains much of the reason that the 
exponential growth in studying the commemoration of the First World War has not extended to 
British African colonies other than South Africa, and I hope that finding that history in one 
colony might stimulate study in other non-Dominion colonies as well. Overall, this study of 
collective memory helps to identify places that historians might look to recover a Kenyan 
memory of the First World War, reversing their erasure in the broader assessment of the global 
First World War. In order to do so, however, there must be a baseline against which we might 
 
69 Ibid., 156.  
70 This is particularly true in the Canadian and Australian examples, although New Zealand has reclaimed a 
much more meaningful space for Indigenous experiences in the world wars in its commemorative culture. South 
Africa, emerging as it has from Apartheid, belies comparison.  
71 See Lucy Buckerfield and Stever Ballinger, The People’s Centenary: Tracking Public Attitudes to the 
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fight alternatives. Thus we progress from the topic of ‘how the settler colony remembers’ to 
‘how Kenya colony remembered.’ 
  
 70 
Part II: Threads of Memory: The Knotted Legacy of the First World War in Kenya 
The Logic of Colonialism: Commemoration, Control, and Colonial Metaphysics 
    
Figure 1. Kenyan Carrier as depicted on the African Monument, Nairobi. 





In 1931, over a decade since the Armistice, the Mombasa Times and East African 
Standard ran a peculiar story that spoke to the logic of colonialism in Kenya. A bereaved 
Kenyan woman, the correspondent reported, “was seen hanging round the vicinity of the statue  
crying copiously and beating her breast.”72 According to the report, the woman “was under the 
firm belief that one of the images of the Memorial was a faithful reproduction of the features of a 
son she lost in the war…[transforming] her son into an iron man who could neither talk to her 
nor see her!”73 The conclusion lamented that this was a “sad commentary upon the deep 
superstition and suspicion in which the African down here is still steeped, despite his many years 
of contact with Western civilisation.”74 The monument, which the IWGC designed to speak to 
perceived African sensibilities that favoured the visual, represented the need for British presence 
in Kenya and the inhabitants’ inferiority in the face of Western Civilization. 
 Achille Mbembe argues that this was the product of colonial discourse. For him, “the 
African human experience appears in the discourse of our times as an experience that can only be 
understood through a negative interpretation…. It is this elementariness and primitiveness that 
makes Africa the world par excellence of all that is incomplete, mutilated, and unfinished, its 
history reduced to a series of setbacks of nature in its quest for humankind.”75 The 
correspondent’s assessment aligned with what Edward Said powerfully introduced as the process 
of ‘othering’ that “puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships…without ever 
losing him the relative upper hand.”76 It was a narrative that both affirmed the identity of the 
speaker – and prospective reader – by fixating on the essential features of the African. Said 
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observed the irony that, in denying the ‘other’ the possibility of ever achieving parity with the 
‘self,’ colonialism was in a state of perpetual failure; it never achieved its own goals of 
civilizing, as it were. In another ironic turn, the correspondent spoke of a site of memory meant 
to prompt remembrance in a way that denied the legitimacy of the bereaved woman’s memory. 
Fred Myers’ conceptualization that colonizers use material culture “to construct social identities 
and communicate cultural differences between individuals and groups,”77 manifested itself in this 
episode of cultural contact. 
 As Surakanthie Chetty and Ruth Ginio argue in their excellent summary of the Cult of the 
Fallen in Africa, “commemoration is basically a western notion. Commemoration as we know it 
– official ceremonies, graveyard headstones festooned with wreaths, and engraved stone 
memorials – was not part of African pre-colonial culture.”78 Europeans’ ‘invented traditions’79 
had little cultural purchase in African communities with long traditions of oral forms of cultural 
transmission and culturally specific traditions for interpreting and dealing with death. When, for 
instance, the Kenyan woman made “a sad reproach to the Sirikali [government] for having been 
so cruel as to transform her lost [son] into an iron man,”80 she was making a strong political 
statement against the colonial government, drawing on the memory of violence and death not 
only in the First World War but in the colonial endeavour more generally.81 (We also need to 
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take into account here whether the writer translated the woman’s words, either through 
knowledge of Swahili or through an interpreter. The possibility of omission, addition, and 
translation deficiencies is high. However, I would argue, this only augments the source as a 
means of understanding the ways settlers interpreted Kenyans).  
 Luise White, for example, traces the role of rumour and myth in African communities in 
communicating knowledge about colonial practices. The correspondent for the Mombasa Times 
– and by natural extension many of its readers82 - could not understand the ways that Kenyans 
dealt with death and understood the world around them. However, this story was not just a 
representation of anxieties about colonialism;83 it was a memory of warfare, of the state’s role in 
stealing away the young men from Kenyan communities. By leaving them to die in nature, 
detaching the dead from their communities and relatives forever, the invented tradition of 
memorializing the dead in iron and stone interrupted Kenyan modes of being-in-the-world.84 
That is, the bereaved woman expected that in death she would still be able to interact with her 
son, to have him as part of her worldly experiences. By etching his likeness in metal, making his 
presence static in the world, the colonial authorities who she held responsible stripped away her 
ability to mourn and grieve. It is a powerful example of the ways that colonial rule attempted to 
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substitute Western metaphysics for the Kenyan ‘cosmologies’ that animated daily life. The 
process was always incomplete and subject to challenge through “quotidian…adherence to 
beliefs, practices, and institutions,”85 fundamental to Kenyan ways of life.  
 We might find some irony again when we look to Britons’ own ways of dealing with 
death in the wake of the First World War. Mourning families turned to spiritualism as a way to 
access the afterlife and maintain connection with the dead who had paid the ultimate sacrifice in 
the Great War (although there was considerable opposition to the practice as well).86 Crucially, 
Edwardian Britain tied spiritualism with the scientific zeitgeist where the supernatural and the 
physical world were reconcilable.87 The mutability of Western worldviews in the colonial 
context highlights the importance of viewing colonies as distinct fields of analysis (without 
divorcing them from the metropole altogether), especially when considering the specificity of 
maintaining social order, civilizational superiority, and racial difference in situ. Colonizers 
mobilized ideas of white superiority, grounded in metaphysics, to undermine unsanctioned 
cultural authority.  
 This episode in Kenyan history suggests several guiding questions for the following 
chapters. First and foremost, I address the question for whom was commemoration? I argue that 
state-sanctioned commemoration was relevant to three particular communities in Kenya: elite 
settlers, broadly speaking, the colonial state, and, by extension of the latter, state imposed 
Kenyan elites. This is not to say that memories of the First World War did not continue living in 
the quotidian interactions of settler soldiers, Kenyan veterans, and Kenyan communities, but that 
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their peripheral role in designing, implementing, and unveiling monuments to the dead limited 
their involvement in commemorative practices. Further, even if settlers and the colonial 
administration decentred Kenyan experiences, the IWGC designed the monuments that I analyze 
to be meaningful for Kenyans.88 The biographies of these sites of memory tell a powerful story 
of colonial transformation. From an instrumentalist perspective, the evidence – including the 
story of the Mombasa woman – suggests that, despite intentions, the monuments failed to speak 
to Kenyans. Indeed, commemoration provided a framework for building upon the advancement 
of colonial control that the First World War accelerated. It was not just the years 1914-1918 that 
“advanced rather than retarded the cause of colonialism,”89 but its memorialization as well.  
 Following this instrumentalist approach, the question of what particular political 
developments contextualized commemoration in the interwar years is pressing. The colonial 
state’s confrontations with settlers, Kenyans, and the Indian community of Kenya constitute the 
crises of colonial control that weighed upon critical choices in the location of monuments, their 
design and representative qualities, as well as the language that officials used to signify their 
importance. With few exceptions, there are no ‘smoking guns’ to be found in the evidence I have 
gathered. Instead, this is a possible and plausible interpretation of the uses of commemorative 
sites as referents in the prominent political debates in interwar Kenya. From this top-down 
perspective I argue that the colonial state attempted to monopolize the narrative around 
commemoration, characterized by Empire loyalism and the responsibility to co-develop the 
colony for both Kenyans and settlers. All the while the colonial administration spoke to its role 
 
88 I remain wary of attributing to the IWGC a deus ex machina- like role in Kenya’s postwar 
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as the seat of power in Kenya. I track the continuation of what Maxon called the ‘struggle for 
Kenya’ through commemoration and memorialization by interrogating settler sites of memory 
and remembrance practices, the colonial state’s curation of sites of memory, and the East African 
Standard’s reporting on commemorative activities and projects.  
 Finally, one must ask how commemoration affected how settlers identified themselves as 
such through commemoration and memorialization, and how the state attempted to shift that 
identification. My main target is the salient question of how Imperial identification, settler 
identification, and identification within the colonial state intersected, entangled, and competed 
for ascendency. I use the term identification in line with Frederick Cooper’s critique of the word 
identity, which signifies a static, uniform state, or yet, one so multifarious as to sap its analytical 
power.90 Identification, as the verb form of identity, “invites us to specify the agents that do the 
identifying. And it does not presuppose that such identifying (even by powerful agents, such as 
the state) will necessarily result in the internal sameness, the distinctiveness, the bounded 
groupness that political entrepreneurs may seek to achieve.”91 I do not fully answer how settlers 
identified themselves through the lens of commemoration in this section of the dissertation. 
However, I argue that the political context during the different phases of commemoration and 
memorialization affected the form, intent, and meaning Kenya’s sites of memory, which 
correlated with political exigencies of the colonial state. 
 The significance of this analysis for answering our overall question – why and how has 
the Great War been forgotten in Kenya? – is that the IWGC, the settler community, and the 
colonial state all made choices that centred white, and mainly European, experiences of the First 
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World War, but with distinct differences. As a result, the tenor of commemorations either 
centred upon the grander narrative of Imperial cooperation, or, when it did centre the African 
experience in East Africa, the goal was to solidify the project of colonialism in Kenya, although 
whether that project was settler-driven or state-driven stimulated competing interpretations. 
Thus, in creating and interpreting sites of memory or by implementing commemorative 
traditions, the white community of Kenya – settlers, administrators, and the media – 
characterized the war in ways that did not find meaningful reference in the postcolonial context. 
Ultimately, by defining the foundations of their commemorative culture in exclusive and 
Eurocentric terms, settlers and the colonial state set the stage for collective forgetting.
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3 – Imperial Fibre: the IWGC, Race, and Memorialization in Kenya 
 
It is in the hope that the scheme here put forward will secure for all time the 
permanence of this tribute and its embodiment in a memorial worthy of the Empire 
and of the sons (and daughters also) who have given their lives for it…1  
- Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Fredrick Kenyon, The Kenyon Report, 1918 
 
 
Sir Fabian Ware, the main protagonist in the founding of the IWGC, had an affinity for 
rebuilding and reconciling in the face of war and death. At the turn of the century, as the British-
South African War (1899-1902) reached its end, Ware travelled to South Africa in 1901 to serve 
as the Assistant Director of Education in Transvaal, following which he quickly climbed the 
ladder amongst Lord Alfred Milner’s ‘kindergarten.’2 The Conservative-driven movement 
sought “social engineering on a grand scale, a process in which social relations both in the 
countryside and the city were transformed to serve the long-term interests of capital 
development.”3 First and foremost, they concerned themselves with how the “United Kingdom 
was to continue to play a leading role in world affairs.”4 The ‘kindergarten,’ which developed 
into the Round Table movement after 1909, argued “that it strengthen its position both in Europe 
and internationally by forming closer ties, perhaps an imperial union, with the white settlement 
colonies…. [U]ntil the dominions were treated as equals in these crucial matters they would 
never achieve full nationhood.”5 Fittingly, Ware, one of the most prominent names in postwar 
Britain, found his origins in imperial politics and warfare in Africa. 
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It was in South Africa that Ware crossed paths with Herbert Baker and Rudyard Kipling, 
his main architect and poet respectively at the IWGC.6 As Jeremy Foster argues with respect to 
the ‘kindergarten’ movement, “a loose association of educated, upper-middle-class activists 
promoted a number of ostensibly apolitical initiatives designed to help a broad assortment of 
citizens imagine themselves as a unified group, situated in the historical time and geographic 
space of the new nation.”7 Ware was an ardent imperialist, invested in facilitating the dominions 
and white settler colonies forging deeper ties to Britain through their independent will. This 
formulation of an “ostensibly apolitical” organization uniting the Empire in one cause and 
allowing the dominions freedom to determine their affairs culminated in the IWGC and its 
mandate.  
As the founding myth of the IWGC recounts, in 1914 Ware was too old to enlist and fight 
for the Empire he so admired. Instead, he joined the British Red Cross as a commander, tasking 
himself with the establishment and care of the war dead on the Western Front. On biographer 
David Crane’s account, it was in witnessing the battlefield burials and unattended graves in the 
Crimean War that drove Ware’s pursuit of a systemized account of each life lost from 1914-
1918.8 By 1915, the War Office gave Ware permission to formalize his work in the Graves 
Registration Commission, later renaming it the Imperial War Graves Commission by Royal 
Charter in 1917. The Prince of Wales headed the IWGC as President, and the Secretary of State 
served as chairman, with Ware as its vice-chairmen. Alfred Milner sat at the IWGC as Secretary 
of State for War, presiding over its earliest meetings. Soon after, the IWGC tasked Sir Fredrick 
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Kenyon, the director of the British Museum, with drafting its guiding document: The Kenyon 
Report. Through interviews, battlefield visits in France and Belgium, and participation in the 
IWGC’s meetings, Kenyon set out the founding principles and philosophy for the commission’s 
work.  
As quoted above, Kenyon’s report outlined a clear imperial framework for 
commemoration. The IWGC committed itself to the entire purview of the British Empire and all 
the soldiers who came to its defence. One principle, however, stood out amongst them all: 
Equality of Treatment. Historian Michael Heffernan observes that Ware considered Equality of 
Treatment a necessary element, reflecting his “strict nonconformist upbringing. His anger on 
discovering that influential families had circumvented the ban on repatriation was genuine and 
intense.”9 Ware’s insistence on Equality may have come just as much from his conviction that all 
the nations that made up the Empire were of equal value, and all of its – presumably white – 
constituents worthy of the Empire’s honour. The IWGC strove not only to strengthen the extant 
bounds of Empire but, in historian Andrew Prescott Keating’s analysis, to generate “an idealized 
vision of British imperial unity.”10 The fledgling nations within the Empire found themselves 
within the imperial framework. More precisely, Hannah Smyth has shown that “the interwar 
battlefield created a world stage for the interplay of identity in performance. With their mutual 
membership of the IWGC, [the dominions] jostled to define themselves not only in relation to 
the metropole but also to each other.”11 In at least one of his missions, Ware succeeded in 
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creating strong bonds between independent nodes of Empire, albeit without the same 
commitment to ‘closer union’ he might have wanted. 
The IWGC, however, was much more than one man. This reality is especially pertinent in 
its work beyond the Western Front. Kenya was one of those fibres with which the IWGC stitched 
together the Empire’s war dead into one memorial fabric, but the IWGC’s structural framework, 
expecting a great deal of input and contributions from dominions and white colonies, leant itself 
to decentralized control of its works and subsequent incongruity. In Kenya, as Michele Barrett 
argues convincingly, the IWGC failed to extend its principle of Equality of Treatment as it did 
on the Western Front (and continues to cover-up this reality). For the most part, carriers and 
askari were not recorded by name, let alone having their names etched into headstones, 
monuments, or even nominal rolls.12 While Barrett attributes the denigration of African soldiers 
and carriers as the product of an inherently racist organization – especially under Lord Arthur 
Browne, who controlled the East African file – I take a different tact herein.  
Rather than foregrounding race in the IWGC’s projects in Kenya, I suggest instead that it 
was but one (albeit particularly powerful) of several considerations to which the Committee 
appealed in East Africa. Equality of Treatment, I argue, was not conceived through a racial lens 
but through classist one. The meaning and implementation of Equality of Treatment must be 
viewed from the perspective of the Western Front and the elites who comprised the official 
mind13 of the IWGC. If, as Barrett readily admits, the organization defined Equality as much 
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through practice as it did through principle, its incompleteness and slipperiness must be fully 
accounted for.  
Furthermore, the political context of consistent opposition to its mandate – and 
particularly the endeavour’s cost and uniformity – raises questions about how much relatively 
small theatres of war with significant logistical difficulties factored into decision-making. A 
hierarchy of race certainly helped tip the scales against the IWGC fulfilling its mandate, but it is 
important, if speculative, to ask the counterfactual question of what the Commission might have 
done without opposition to its work. The importance of such questions is set into relief against 
the political leanings of its founding members; Ware and Kipling would have expected the 
Dominions and colonies to do their fair share and contribute local knowledge to aid in fulfilling 
the Commission’s mandate (even if general policy flowed from London).14  This was not the 
case, or at least not to the same degree, in Kenya. Indeed, its projects flowed through the 
Colonial Office, and the IWGC’s men-on-the-spot were significant impediments to its early 
work in East Africa. 
Above all, the IWGC’s commitment spoke to the desire for strong and self-governing 
colonies, guided by white men. But this ethos did not predetermine the exclusion of Kenyans 
from their commemorative plans. It was a combination of inputs into decision-making that 
produced differential treatment; applying a racial teleology to the IWGC’s projects in Kenya 
oversimplifies the historical causation. Importantly, much of the IWGC’s failure can be 
explained through the military structures in East Africa during the war and the explicit racism 
and callous treatment of Africans from 1914-1918. Accordingly, this chapter clarifies the 
IWGC’s role in the erasure of Kenyan contributions to the First World War, rather than reading 
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the failure to uphold Equality of Treatment backwards into the process that created it. Indeed, the 
IWGC was the only party in the early years of commemoration that directed their efforts for 
Africans, and their imprint was much more than ‘imperial debris’ as we have seen with the 
discussion of the Dedan Kimathi statue at the outset of this study. 
Finally, in bringing the analysis back to the collective memory of the First World War in 
Kenya, the IWGC’s projects constitute one of the strands of the colony’s knotted memory of the 
Great War. It emerged concurrently with settler-driven projects, albeit with a different purpose 
and content. The Commission’s work solidified the imperial foundations of the colony’s 
collective remembrance practices through an Empire-wide commemorative enterprise. 
Nevertheless, the IWGC’s intended meanings were open to signification. As the organization 
handed over greater responsibility for its monuments and cemeteries, settlers and administrators 
appropriated them for their socio-political uses, putting the monuments into conversation with 
their memorial landscape (Chapters 4 and 5). The presence of African iconography in Mombasa 
and Nairobi offered vivid images against which settlers identified their distinct character and 
administrators attempted to define the colony’s governance. 
 
Principled Beginnings: The Equality Principle and the Western Front 
 On 21 May 1917, the IWGC signed its Charter of Incorporation. It proclaimed proudly 
that it  
would, by honouring and perpetuating the memory of their [the Empire’s fallen] sacrifice, 
tend to keep alive the ideals for the maintenance and defence of which they have laid down 
their lives, to strengthen the bond of union between all classes and races in Our dominions, 
and to promote a feeling of common citizenship and of loyalty and devotion to Us and to 
the Empire which they are subjects.15 
 
15 Commonwealth War Graves Commission, “The Original IWGC Royal Charter,” The IWGC and its key 
figures, https://shapingoursorrow.cwgc.org/denial/key-figures/, 2. 
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Notably, the Commission’s structure also laid out the participatory roles for Dominions, each of 
which was granted a member to vouch for its affairs – although they were outnumbered by the 
five representatives from the British government (Secretary of State for War, Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, Secretary of State for India, and Commissioner of Works and Public 
Buildings).16 This arrangement gave the Dominions equitable partnership in the care of the 
Empire’s war dead, although in reality the representatives contributed little more than the content 
and form of their nation’s war graves.17 In addition, with concerns over the monetary burden of 
the IWGC, the Dominions contributed the funds proportional to their war dead and offered 
specified knowledge for identifying, cataloguing, and registering the dead as well.18 In essence, 
the Commission redistributed the burden from wartime operations to the Dominions, deferring 
the costs of commemorating the million dead soldiers of the Empire. 
 In November 1918 the IWGC clarified its mandate, stressing an equally important aspect 
of its mission: Equality of Treatment. Kenyon’s report acknowledged the principle as its highest 
priority, indicating from the outset  
that the provision of monuments could not be left to individual initiative. In a few cases, 
where money and good taste were not wanting, a satisfactory result would be obtained, in 
the sense that a fine individual monument would be erected. In the large majority of cases 
either no monument would be erected, or it would be poor in quality; and the total result 
would be one of inequality, haphazard and disorder.19 
 
16 Ibid., 4. 
17 See Landry, “Fall in Line.” Landry’s analysis, while useful, reads Canada’s burgeoning nationalism into 
its lack of influence in defining, or attempting to define, IWGC policy. However, as I demonstrate, this 
underestimates the considerable contributions of the IWGC’s previous iterations during wartime to its policies in its 
aftermath.  
18 See, for example, Jeremy P. Garrett, “Tribute to the Fallen: The Evolution of Canadian Battlefield 
Burials during the First World War,” (PhD diss., University of Western Ontario, 2018), especially Chapter 5: 
Exhumation, Consolidation and Repatriation: The Body After Death and Burial, 236-282. On the Australian Graves 
Registration Unit see William M. Taylor, “War remains: contributions of the Imperial War Graves Commission and 
the Australian War Records Section to material and national cultures of conflict and commemoration,” National 
Identities 17 (2) (2015): 217-240; Romain Fathi, “’We refused to work until we had better means for handling the 
bodies’: Discipline at the Australian Graves Detachment,” First World War Studies 9 (1) (2018): 35-56. 
19 Kenyon, Report to the IWGC, 7. 
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The idea of equality correlated to three mutually reinforcing policies: non-repatriation of bodies, 
the non-differentiation of the dead based on rank, and uniformity in burial and naming practice. 
The Commission’s members acknowledged non-repatriation universally, although the French 
Law of 1915 forbade the practice prior to the IWGC’s mandate, removing much choice with 
respect to many of the dead.20 Similarly, acknowledging universal sacrifices, rather than singling 
out officers and high-ranking military members, garnered little opposition.21 When it came to 
uniformity in burial practice, however, the Commission met considerable opposition, both by 
individual initiative throughout the Empire and official protest from the Dominions. 
 Lord Derby, the Secretary of War, warned against the publication of Equality of 
Treatment in the national presses. While “there was no intention of receding from the carefully 
considered decision that equal honour should be paid to the memory of all officers and men who 
had fallen and that the erection of memorials should not be left to public initiative,” he opined, 
“it was not desirable to press this view upon the public in a rigid and uncompromising way.”22 
Opposition materialized within the Commission when Dominion representatives insisted that 
their war dead should be honoured with symbols that represented their heritage.23 Commission 
officials ultimately determined what those symbols would be but the Dominion representatives 
argued for the differentiation.24 Families of the deceased, however, often wanted to personalize 
headstones and repatriate their loved ones. Ultimately, the IWGC ceded to the request that 
families could pay for an additional inscription, but they answered requests for repatriation with 
 
20 Garrett, “Tribute to the Fallen,” 236. Garrett also notes that many of the bodies those who perished in 
Britain were in fact repatriated to Canada.  
21 Hanna Smyth, “’There is Absolutely Nothing like the Carving of Names’: Imperial War Graves 
Commission Sites and World War I Memory,” in Monumental Conflicts: Twentieth-Century Wars and the Evolution 
of Public Memory (New York: Routledge, 2018), 15. Particularly, Smyth underscores that Prime Minister Asquith’s 
son was buried in the same plot as working-class soldiers.  
22 CWGC 2/2/1/2, “Commission Meeting No. 02 – Feb 1918,” 2. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Landry, “Fall in Line,” 87-90. 
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a formulaic response citing legal barriers.25 Clearly, moving from principal to practice was much 
more difficult than the Commission envisioned. 
 The IWGC defined its vision within the confines of the Western Front. Equality of 
Treatment, in particular, responded to the class dynamic of imperial Britain; war dead, the IWGC 
surmised, should not be subject to differential treatment based on their economic status, or 
familial lineage. On the Western Front, race and creed did not affect the individualization of 
commemoration either.26 While the IWGC certainly aspired to commemorate every individual 
who came to the defence of Empire, it was only through practice that it confronted far different 
circumstances in non-European theatres. Whereas graves registration in Europe was a known 
reality, oversight abroad was a different matter altogether. 
 The entirety of the IWGC’s mandate remains beyond the purview of this study, but the 
unstable concept of Equality of Treatment is essential to my analysis. As a statement of fact, 
regardless of particular national collective memories,27 most British and Dominion deaths during 
the war occurred on the Western Front. Thus, the Commission and its constituent parts, all of 
them white men, negotiated the concept of equality primarily in that context. Further, the greatest 
number of combatant deaths resulted from fighting in France and Belgium. Thus the project of 
commemoration in the wake of the First World War hinged upon the registration, identification, 
and burial of bodies on those battlefields.28 Nonetheless, the Commission’s broader agenda to 
 
25 See Dominiek Dendooven, “’Bringing the Dead Home’: Repatriation, illegal repatriation and expatriation 
of British bodies during and after the First World War,” in Bodies in Conflict: Corporeality, Materiality, and 
Transformation, Nicholas J. Saunders and Paul Cornish eds. (New York: Routledge, 2014), 66-79. 
26 Michele Barrett, “Subalterns at War: First World War Colonial Forces and the Politics of the Imperial 
War Graves Commission,” interventions 9 (3) (2007): 451. 
27 New Zealand and Australia emphasize the Anzac tradition, forged at Gallipoli, as their defining 
experience in the First World War. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the vast majority of New Zealand and 
Australia’s war dead rest on the Western Front.  
28 Discussions of the Equality principle focus intently upon fallen soldiers in Europe. See CWGC/2/2/1/1, 
“Commission Meeting No.01 – Nov 1917,” 4-6. 
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commemorate each and every military death in the Empire meant it quickly refocused its energy 
towards projects beyond the Western Front. Before it could do so, the thorny issue of non-white 
burials in Europe presented challenges to the organization.  
 From the outset of IWGC’s operations, the issue of non-Christian graves confounded its 
planners. India contributed over one million troops to the Empire’s defence, with close to 75,000 
deaths in the field. India’s ethno-religious make-up presented particularly difficult questions. 
Muslim burial rites forbade exhumation, the method by which the IWGC concentrated dispersed 
graves, while Hindu practices required cremation.29 The size and importance of the Indian 
community across the Empire brought public opinion to bear upon the Commission’s decisions. 
By its second meeting, the Commission decided that there should be a special committee on 
Indian graves, ensuring “that there should be nothing in the nature of disparity between 
cemeteries of Indians and those of Christians.”30 The breadth and cultural difference within the 
Empire challenged the IWGC’s lofty goals, setting into relief the myriad considerations intrinsic 
to the IWGC’s projects.  
 
Indian War Dead and Equality of Treatment: Memorials to the Missing at Basra and 
Neuve Chapelle 
Santanu Das, the leading figure in the rejuvenation of Indian war memory,31 argued 
poignantly in 2014 that “it is essential to challenge the colour of war memory.”32 Das readily 
 
29 CWGC 2/2/1/2, “Commission Meeting No. 02 – Feb 1918,” 3.  
30 Ibid. 
31 See Santanu Das, ed., Race, Empire, and First World War Writing (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011); Santanu Das, India, Empire, and First World War Culture: Writing, Images, and Songs (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), Kindle. David Omissi has also contributed to our understanding of the role of 
the Sepoy in the British Army, and Indian written testimony of the First World War. See, for example, David Omissi 
ed., Indian Voices of the Great War: Soldiers’ Letters, 1914-1918 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). 
32 Santanu Das, “The first world war and the colour of memory,” The Guardian, July 22nd, 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/22/first-world-war-whitewashed-eurocentric. It is necessary 
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admits that he grew up with the mythos of the Great War – trenches, poetry, resilient Tommies – 
only discovering much later that Indians, Africans, and Asians suffered significant losses in  
1914-1918. The recovery and exposure of Indian memories of the First World War treats their 
absence in the collective memory of the conflict as a given, however, rather than a process. 
Historians have written little that compares how Indians have been commemorated, primarily 
under the auspices of the IWGC, and why this has not resulted in a more inclusive memory of 
the First World War.  
The stakes of this research are high, as India has often driven colonial and postcolonial 
scholarship as the site of Britain’s longest encounter with subject peoples that has generated a 
preponderance of documentary evidence. Similarly, the Indian version of indirect rule (in stark 
contrast to settler colonial outposts of Empire) provides a structural framework for understanding 
its later deployment in Africa. In the context of the IWGC, the committee had one representative 
for India, whereas one representative advocated for the rest of Britain’s non-settler colonies. 
Thus, India provides useful guidance in trying to understand the IWGC’s work in East Africa. 
(As I elaborate in subsequent chapters, any history of Kenya and East Africa must be understood 
through entanglement with India.)  
Michele Barrett has published widely on the implications of the IWGC’s “aspiration… 
[of] equal treatment in terms of ‘race’ and ‘creed’, which the War Graves Commission and its 
historians persistently claim alongside equality irrespective of social class and military rank.”33 
Her work is indispensable to this project, representing the only in-depth academic studies of East 
 
to reproduce a fuller version of Das’ analysis to avoid misrepresenting his words. “There is an understandable 
impulse to retrospectively turn these men into heroes and martyrs…While it is essential to challenge the colour of 
war memory, it is also important to keep a watch on the way it is being done.” 
33 Michele Barrett, “Subalterns at War: First World War Colonial Forces and the Politics of the Imperial 
War Graves Commission,” interventions 9 (3) (2007): 451. 
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African commemoration. Barrett’s foregrounding of race as a determinant of IWGC policy, 
however, obscures the longer-term impediments to Equality of Treatment beyond the Western 
Front (itself haphazard and subject to change).34 While her analysis exposes the deep-seated 
racism and civilizational arrogance of key IWGC members, the evidence suggests that racism 
was a convenient and expedient justification for the inequalities rather than a principle 
considered thoroughly prior to the practice of its work.  
The crux of Barrett’s argument rests in unequal treatment within the context of 
Memorials to the Missing. Whereas the IWGC inscribed the names of every Indian soldier on the 
memorial at Neuve Chappelle, the Indian Memorial at Basra – a far more costly Indian 
engagement – named only officers amongst the Indian war dead.35 However, by focusing on how 
“the policy was explained,”36 she dismisses evidence that she presents in the same article 
indicating that a much more complex process led to the lack of naming. Specifically, Barrett 
acknowledges that “the subalternity at play was that of the Indian Army hierarchy, with its long 
tradition of a restricted cadre of white British officers.”37 Citing the briefing notes for the Basra 
unveiling, she argues that the Commission discarded its principles – including distinctions based 
on rank – in the Middle East based on racial hierarchies, which were confirmed by its practice in 
Africa. While the comparison between the two theatres is valid, Barrett fails to ask crucial 
questions about what differentiated the Indian experience on the Western Front and the Middle 
East, or what war looked like in East Africa.  
 
34 Garrett, “Tribute to the Fallen,” Chapter 2, especially 88-113.  
35 Barrett, “Subalterns at War,” 464. 
36 Ibid., 464. 
37 Ibid., 465. 
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Ultimately, Barrett makes a compelling (albeit limited) case that the IWGC “[enacted] 
the erasures and silencings…of the colonial subaltern,”38 rightly concluding the CWGC must do 
its part in acknowledging and rectifying its role in extending colonial logic to the realm of 
commemoration. Otherwise Barrett’s account tells us little about what the IWGC’s role – what 
share of responsibility it holds – is in authoring that silence. She reads that silence back into the 
IWGC’s work, rather than interrogating the historical processes and particular decisions that 
defined the scope of its projects beyond Europe. The analysis identifies only justifications and 
explanations for the silences, rather than identifying their genealogy.39 As I will show, Barrett 
commits the same type of limited historical reading when discussing the role of race and religion 
in the East African context. That Barrett moves from India to Africa without deep analysis of the 
process behind the Basra memorial is rather confounding. 
Roger Sims tackles this process by looking at the machinations of the IWGC and the 
different contexts within which Indians participated in the Great War. With respect to Indian 
graves, he argues that “the Indian Army in Mesopotamia was constantly on the move and forced 
to hastily record casualties and burials with no serious Graves Registration units devoted to the 
effort.”40 While it might be morbid to suggest that the Western Front was ideal by any standard, 
the relatively static lines in France and Belgium, alongside the concentration of British and 
Dominion forces in Western Europe, created a context wherein the precursors to the IWGC 
devised systematic practices for recording the dead, undergirded by meticulous record-keeping. 
As Sims observes, “the realities of war…created a marked divergence between commemoration 
 
38 Ibid. 
39 Without beleaguering the point, this is ironic considering Barrett’s dependence upon postcolonial and 
poststructuralist theory, itself heavily dependent upon genealogical analysis.  
40 Roger Sims, “To The Memory of Brave Men: The Imperial War Graves Commission and the India’s 
Missing Soldiers of the First World War,” (Master’s Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2018), 39. 
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[in the Middle East] and in Europe.”41 This relates only to established graves (and not the 
missing), but Sims makes the explicit connection between record-keeping and Memorials to the 
Missing as well.  
While Sims does not engage with Barrett’s work specifically, the documentary basis of 
his analysis lends itself to an analysis of process. In discussions about the Basra Memorial, Sims 
finds that the Commission had complete lists of British casualties by 1924 but Indian records 
were in a “fractured state.”42 The IWGC identified what it estimated to be sixty to seventy per 
cent of the total Indian missing, with the balance representing around 7500 names at minimum.43 
What Sims implies, but does not state explicitly, is that the IWGC intended to carry out the 
nominal memorialization of Indian troops at Basra; it was only in 1924 that the Commission 
decided to “forgo memorializing most of the Indian missing by name.”44 Furthermore,  this 
represented a collective decision, taken in consultation with the India Office and the Indian 
Army, rather than a unilateral IWGC policy. If record-keeping was the fundamental issue at 
hand, the IWGC certainly dismissed the problem with ease. The Commission explained and 
justified the decision by appealing to a hierarchy of racial importance, but race did not 
predetermine the trajectory of commemoration at Basra. It was a decision borne of a process 
which could have produced any number of outcomes. 
This discussion seeks to redefine the analytical framework through which historians 
might better understand the white-washed memory of the First World War – and the IWGC’s 
role in authoring it. Barrett’s theoretical reading lends itself to the over-determination of race as 
 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 93. 
43 Ibid. The Commission estimated that there were between 25,000 and 40,000 Indian missing. The range 
itself provides evidence that the record-keeping practices of the Indian Army were far from adequate.  
44 Ibid., 94.  
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an explanation for the IWGC’s failures; key decision-makers upheld vile indignities in the 
commemoration of non-White war dead, but evidence does not support the conclusion that race 
exclusively drove its policy outside of Europe. As Sims suggests, the machinations of IWGC 
decision-making, entwined with that of other bureaucracies, offers a clearer picture of how and 
why the IWGC’s projects often failed to live up to their lofty principles. I am interested in both 
the processes through which East African commemoration took shape (Sims) and how the IWGC 
justified its failure to uphold specific principles (Barrett). In moving beyond these limited 
characterizations of the IWGC, I propose that we must ask different questions. 
 
The IWGC in Kenya: Responsibility, Deference, and Indifference 
This is to the memory of the Native African Troops who fought; to the carriers who 
were the feet and hands of the army; and to all other men who served and died for their 
King and Country in Eastern Africa in the Great War, 1914-1918. If you fight for your 
country, even if you die, your sons will remember your name.  
– Rudyard Kipling 
 
Rudyard Kipling’s poetic inscription for the Nairobi and Mombasa45 African Monuments 
remains as the sole written trace of the commemoration of carriers and porters in Kenya. The 
carriers, askari, and scouts who supported the war in East Africa remain unnamed, with the 
figures of the monument there to prompt their memory, but their progeny responsible for 
preserving their names. J.A. Stevenson designed the sculptures, which the IWGC installed in 
1924 and 1925 respectively, using photos and equipment procured from Kenya and the War 
Office.46 The two monuments represent the most visible reminders of the IWGC’s work in 
 
45 The Mombasa Arab and African Monument bears a slightly different inscription, noting the contributions 
of Arab soldiers to the war in East Africa, whereas Nairobi mentions only Africans.  
46 CWGC, WG219/12 Pt. 1, “Memorials to Native Troops, East Africa,” January 14th, 1925. 
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Kenya. A third monument in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, completes the triad of memorials to the 
missing Africans in East Africa. 
The Commission also planned cemeteries, similar to those in other theatres of war, to 
bury predominantly white but also some Indian combatants who died in East Africa. IWGC 
operations in Kenya were minimal compared to those on the Western Front, Gallipoli, and the 
Middle East, with sixteen cemeteries, none of which contain more than 300 known graves.47 
There are several reasons why Kenya has a relative lack of cemeteries, paramount amongst them 
is that the East African campaign took place mostly in German and Portuguese territory. That 
tens of thousands of Kenyans lost their lives in the Great War through combat and support meant 
that the IWGC still faced the daunting question of how it would recognize their sacrifices.  
Barrett locates East African policy in the persona of Arthur Browne, whose record in the 
CWGC archives reflects the worst aspects of British arrogance and racism. Browne presided 
over the Commission’s decision in 1923 that “it will not be practicable to inscribe names on 
these [African] memorials as is done elsewhere.”48 He explained the decision unceremoniously, 
echoing his man-on-the-spot Major George Evans, who deemed it “a waste of public money.”49 
This statement, however damning as it is of Browne and Evans, does not represent 
incontrovertible evidence that race drove the policy. Instead, it indicates that financial 
considerations predominated.50 
 
47 CWGC, “Kenya,” Find Cemeteries, cwgc.org/find-cemeteries-and-
memorials/results?country=Kenya&firstwar=true. 
48 CWGC, “Annual Report, 1922-1923,” 12.  
49 CWGC, WG122 Pt.1, “Major George Evans: Summary of Remarks Under Various Headings Called for 
by the Director of Works, Imperial War Graves Commission,” January 31st, 1920, 2. 
50 Barrett, “Subalterns at War,” 470. 
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Barrett rightly observes that Major Evans “came back with many problems”51 in 
registering graves and amassing reliable information, but she does not specify those problems. 
Instead, her narrative skips quickly to defining ways that the IWGC, and specifically Evans, 
described Africans, rather than interrogating the processes through which the IWGC made its 
final decisions. The resultant analysis merely asserts that the IWGC considered race a reasonable 
basis through which to differentiate graves. Considering the bounty of evidence that racial 
ideology penetrated into nearly every aspect of British imperialism, this is hardly a surprising 
finding. Although it is disappointing that the CWGC continues to use Equality of Treatment in 
its literature without fully contextualizing its haphazard application of the principle, as Barrett 
rightly opines, the IWGC’s role in commemorating Africans demands a fuller accounting.  
An integral aspect of the IWGC’s operations is that in January 1920 Major Evans was not 
in the employ of the IWGC. He was the Officer Commanding the Graves Registration Unit 
(GRU) in East Africa. As his report implies, the GRU depended upon the individual units’ 
efforts to record and mark burials as a means of identifying the dead. “In the case of European 
burials, the units concerned have always endeavoured to place some mark over each grave, so 
that the majority of these have been located” the report read, but in the case of Indians and 
Africans “[the] methods adopted have proved unsatisfactory.”52 Clearly, inequality with regards 
to Africans and Indians in East Africa was a practice that the IWGC inherited from the military 
in East Africa, a reality Barrett acknowledges at the level of discourse rather than logistics.53  
 
51 Michele Barrett, “’White Graves’ and Natives: The Imperial War Graves Commission in East and West 
Africa, 1918-1939,” Bodies in Conflict: Corporeality, Materiality, and Transformation, Nicholas J. Saunders and 
Paul Cornish eds. (New York: Routledge, 2014), 82.  
52 CWGC, WG122 Pt.1, “Major George Evans: Summary of Remarks Under Various Headings Called for 
by the Director of Works, Imperial War Graves Commission,” January 31st, 1920, 2. 
53 Barrett, “Dehumanization and the War in East Africa.”  
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Even if graves were non-existent or unmarked, however, those deaths should have been 
recorded by name on one of the general memorials to the missing, as had come to pass in 
Europe. The Commission detailed its difficulties in obtaining any complete lists of those 
Africans in non-military roles, making the establishment of readily available registers practically 
impossible. Up to 1927, the Director of Records wrote to Browne that “as to the casualties, the 
position is that we have no record (i.e. names) of any of the casualties except European 
casualties. We do not think that nominal rolls of native casualties are available at all even in East 
Africa.” 54 Colonial Office documents indicate that this was an intentional policy of the East 
African Protectorate, concealing the extent of Carrier Corps recruitment. Precisely, “the number 
of enlisted as Carriers, to the 5th March, 1917, was approximately 100,000.”55 However,  
it is not considered desirable to give precise figures for the number of native troops 
actually enlisted. Allowing for the number of natives engaged in various capacities 
on services indirectly connected with the military operations, it is safe to say that the 
available male population has been drawn upon for war purposes to the utmost 
extent.56 
 
As Munro and Savage detail, “up to 31 March 1922, 13,748 men were still untraced.”57 Given 
the concerted effort to conceal the actual number of Carriers, the number was undoubtedly much 
higher. To imply that the IWGC might have poured more resources into East Africa to 
commemorate each individual58 belies the evidence that the East Africa Protectorate made this 
pursuit exceedingly difficult. The record-keeping that would have made this possible needed to 
be maintained from 1914-1918. The IWGC could not produce accurate records after the fact.  
 
54 CWGC, WG219/12 Pt. 1, “Director of Works to Arthur Browne,” July 12th, 1927, 1. 
55 CO533/201, “Lord Hindlip’s Question – April 10th – Further Notes,” April 10th, 1918, 372. Emphasis 
mine. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Munro and Savage, “Carrier Corps Recruitment in British East Africa,” 341. 
58 Barrett, “Subalterns at War,” 466. 
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 Further, its expenditure in tracing white war dead was far more than a genuine act of 
racial solidarity. The IWGC identified that approximately sixteen per cent of the total deaths for 
which they were responsible were those of white soldiers, meaning the rest were porters and 
local African forces, although predominantly the former category.59 Again, this percentage was 
likely on the higher end, considering the underreporting of African Carriers. Thus the relative 
cost of tracking down white war graves – of which 95% were easily identified – was 
exponentially lower than pursuing a similar policy with regards to African graves.60 Even in the 
case of white war graves, the IWGC’s work “was a very difficult question owing to the 
enormous area involved, the absence of communications and the sparse European population…. 
Many of the routes were no longer maintained and had probably revered to jungle.”61 For some 
white graves that “cannot be accepted as maintainable,” the Commission decided to “erect 
memorials in the larger cemeteries recording the names.”62 Thus even white graves were subject 
to loose interpretations of the IWGC’s standards, emphasizing the unstable and slippery meaning 
of Equality of Treatment. The cost of the project was an overriding concern as unlike the 
Dominion and Indian war dead, it was the British government that shouldered the majority of the 
cost of commemoration in the colonies. Finances dogged the Commission across all of its 
projects in East Africa. 
 For what it could control, the IWGC did little to bring the treatment of African war dead 
into line with practice on the Western Front. When it came to carriers, however, evidence from 
East Africa suggests that the IWGC could not do much, even if it had so desired. As Browne 
 
59 CWGC, WG122 Pt.1, “Major George Evans: Summary of Remarks Under Various Headings Called for 
by the Director of Works, Imperial War Graves Commission,” January 31st, 1920, 2. 
60 Ibid. 
61 CWGC, “Minutes of Proceedings, 41st Meeting,” Tuesday, January 17th, 1922, 9. 
62 Ibid., 10. 
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summarized with regards to Ware’s perspective “it has always been the view of the Vice-
Chairman that identical treatment should be accorded to British and native troops so far as 
circumstances permit.”63 Policy decisions for East Africa did not flow from London, however, 
but from East Africa itself. Browne’s dependence upon Major Evans consistently substituted 
local knowledge for IWGC principles. As early as February 1920, Evans “[pointed] out…that the 
Native has no sentiment as regards [to] burials at all…. Certainly, Major Evans proposal that 
some monuments should be put up to these dead is quite right, and would give the satisfaction 
the Native would look for.”64 Constrained between the views of its men-on-the-spot and the 
spotty record-keeping of the East Africa Protectorate, the IWGC may have perpetuated racial 
disparity, but it hardly devised it. 
 The practical dependence upon Evans had correlates in the IWGC’s structural design as 
well. The IWGC’s ability to fulfil its responsibility depended upon the concept of imperial 
cooperation, expressed through deference to decision-makers in its Dominions and colonies. 
When Evans suggested that “the erection of headstones [to African Natives who were not 
soldiers] would constitute a waste of public money,” the Director of Works scribbled in the 
margins that the East African Government should answer, stating “we cannot decide this on our 
own.”65 That colonial authorities did not object to Evans’ determination is both predictable and 
surprising. On the one hand, control over burial rites and the Christianization of African tribal 
life was one of the key tenets of colonial control.66 However, considering the cost of the project, 
the expenditure would have exceeded the impact, especially given the political climate in the 
 
63 Barrett, “Subalterns at War,” 466. 
64 CWGC, WG122 Pt. 1, “Major Evans’ Report,” February 19th, 1920. 
65 CWGC, WG122 Pt.1, “Major George Evans: Summary of Remarks Under Various Headings Called for 
by the Director of Works, Imperial War Graves Commission,” January 31st, 1920, 2. See also CWGC, WG122 Pt. 1, 
“Fabian Ware to Controller of Administration, Re: British East Africa,” February 22nd, 1920. 
66 See Rebekah Lee and Megan Vaughn, “Death and Dying in the History of Africa Since 1800,” Journal of 
African History 49 (2008): 341-359.  
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early-1920s.67 Nonetheless, it is clear that policy did not originate in the IWGC, even if it 
acceded and shared racist views rooted in civilizational superiority.  
 Meanwhile, just after Evans report defined the parameters of the IWGC’s work in East 
Africa, he was accused of mismanaging the East African file. Having been given a great deal of 
autonomy in executing their plans, an internal investigation identified “transactions of a most 
questionable nature. Irregularity proving Evans entirely unsuitable for position of Deputy 
Director.”68 Evans’ mismanagement and apparent lack of progress in East Africa created anxiety 
at the IWGC, with Ware tentative to pay out salaries and budgets to carry out the work.69 
Doctors recommended that Evans return to England for three months to recover from “malaria 
and alcoholism.”70 But all points were made moot when news reached London that Evans died of 
health complications on September 10th, 1921.71 Despite his failed tenure, Evans’ original report 
continued to inform IWGC practice in East Africa. 
 In light of Evans mismanagement and eventual passing, the Commission embarked on its 
search for a Deputy Directory of Works who could get its operation back on track. But in that 
search for a man with the required local knowledge, the Colonial Office’s nominees did not meet 
the Commission’s criteria. Ware deemed one of the first candidates, Captain Longdon, 
unqualified given “the position of the Commission’s work in that area [which required] greater 
technical qualifications.”72 Captain Rapley, the next Deputy Director of Works, apparently fell 
prey to the infamous Happy Valley lifestyle in Kenya, using Commission funds to employ a 
woman with whom he was engaging in an inappropriate relationship. The IWGC worried that in 
 
67 See Chapter 5. 
68 CWGC, 442 ADD 1/3/5, “Notley to Secretary of State for the Colonies,” July 27th, 1921.  
69 CWGC, 442 ADD 1/3/5, “Ware to Captain Rapley,” January 17th, 1922. 
70 CWGC, 442 ADD 1/3/5, “Medical Report on a Disabled Officer,” June 16th, 1921.  
71 Ibid. 
72 CWGC, WG442 ADD1/3/5, “Ware to the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies,” January 11th, 1922. 
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light of Rapley’s “former privilege of joy riding with her in the Commission’s cars…the public 
of Nairobi had formed an erroneous impression of our great operations in E. Africa.”73 Ware 
decided to “[deal] firmly” with Rapley, owing not only to the embarrassing incidents but also 
due to his drawing a high rate of pay without permission from the London office.74 The IWGC, 
by reacting to its operatives’ work in East Africa instead of imposing policy from abroad, 
exposed its organizational limitations. Fulfilling its responsibility through deference to the 
Dominions and colonies created a mess that, in turn, fostered indifference and frustration. 
 Analyzing the processes through which the IWGC defined its practice in Kenya prompts 
several important conclusions. The IWGC inherited deficiencies in record-keeping and graves 
registration that predetermined differential treatment of war dead prior to receiving its mandate. 
Relatedly, the East African landscape and infrastructure impeded its work, much like the 
prosecution of war in East Africa. Further, the Commission’s structure, including its dependence 
upon the financial contributions of its members, presupposed decentralized authority, the 
importance of local knowledge, and frugality, affected the trajectory of its work in East Africa. 
These practical considerations in the East African context underscore that practice and process 
are essential features of the IWGC’s work in Kenya. We cannot dismiss Barrett’s important 
conclusions concerning Browne’s role in perpetuating inequality as compared to the Western 
Front, especially in the case of graves; however, it is only part of a much more complex, 
multidirectional decision-making process. 
 Tony Ballantyne argues that “if nation-focused histories efface the porous nature of 
national boundaries and erase the complex global and regional currents that shape national 
development, older traditions of metropolitan-focused imperial history…identifies Britain…as 
 
73 CWGC, 442 ADD 1/3/5, “WC Bottomley to Colonel Oswald,” August 17th, 1922, 3. 
74 CWGC, 442 ADD 1/3/5, “Controller and Finance Advisor to Ware,” September 28th, 1922, 1-3. 
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the nexus of empire where capital, power, and ideas flowed out to the colonies.”75 Information 
flowed to and from London to the colonies, and realistically, more to it than from it in the case of 
Africa. The IWGC’s pre-cursor organizations may have been contiguous with the military 
establishment in Europe, but beyond the Western Front the connection was tenuous at best. 
Trying to locate the IWGC solely from within the organization without considering the 
interconnectedness of the colony and the metropole leads to comparative study between its work 
in Europe and Africa, rather than contextualized investigation of commemoration in Kenya.    
 
Equality Through Difference?: Colonialism, Anthropology, and Colonial Discourse 
Nonetheless, even if practical considerations help historicize Barrett’s argument, it is 
worth enquiring if that really mattered due to conceptions of racial difference that outweighed 
founding principles. In order to challenge or confirm Barrett’s thesis, we must answer the 
counterfactual question of whether the IWGC would have done differently under ideal 
circumstances. The answer to this question is that, while it may have published official registers 
of African names in some cases, it would not have granted equality in the same way it did on the 
Western Front. Indeed, Barrett’s findings on such a situation in Sierra Leone, where Browne had 
the records but did not publish nominal rolls, confirms this interpretation.76 From the perspective 
of First World War memory, however, I want to suggest that this poses the wrong question. If we 
accept that the Western Front model would have never applied in Africa in the first place,77 we 
 
75 Tony Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race: Aryanism and the British Empire (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 2.  
76 Barrett, “Subalterns at War,” 470. 
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“’White Graves’ and Natives,” 89. 
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need to ask whether the IWGC’s Kenyan model actually contravened its founding principle of 
Equality. 
The difference between these two questions is methodological. Specifically, reading 
backwards and comparatively, analyzing the IWGC’s failure to apply the same standards in 
Africa as it did on the Western Front, defines Kenya’s sites of memory through comparative lack 
and inadequacy. In other words, especially with regards to the memorials to the missing, Barrett 
defines sites of memory through what they are not, rather than what they are. In doing so, it is 
much easier to disregard the historicity of the sites, instead treating them as lifeless and 
meaningless impositions. As a result, historians risk avoiding the processes through which they 
were conceived, constructed, and presented in an effort to vilify their foundations in imperial 
ideology. But by defining equality differently, IWGC sites were intentional, meaningful, and 
geared for Kenyan consumption. Sites of memory did not only inscribe an extant colonial 
discourse of civilizational superiority; in fact, monuments became part of that discourse. 
Analyzing IWGC sites in this way implicates several theoretical and empirical 
considerations. Primarily, I am concerned with the concepts of ‘otherness,’ ‘difference,’ and 
‘exclusion’ as products of colonial discourse.78 Useful as the concepts can be, their 
implementation often tend towards an essentialism that glosses over historical context. 
(European/African, Civilized/Uncivilized, Included/Excluded). Part of this context relates to how 
the IWGC intended its sites to be places of mourning and healing, alongside sites of recognition 
and celebration. Naming and uniform burial were aspects of Equality of Treatment conceived 
through British sensitivities to mourning and healing (‘otherness’).79 To expect that the IWGC 
 
78 For the ‘familial’ nature of these terms see Etienne Balibar, “Difference, Otherness, Exclusion,” Parallax 
11 (1) (2005): 19-34.  
79 For the idea of sites of memory as sites of mourning see Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning; 
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would implement this version of equality elsewhere in the Empire mischaracterizes the aim of 
Equality of Treatment. The Commission genuinely believed that it could help the healing 
process, and there was no exception to this principle at Kenya’s memorials to the missing 
(‘exclusion’). It determined best practices in this regard by appealing to semi-factual 
observations about certain Kenyan communities, couched in pseudo-scientific civilizational 
arguments and essentialized conceptions of Kenyans (and Africans more generally) 
(‘otherness’). If the overriding question is ‘for whom was commemoration,’ the answer is for 
Empire and for Africans.  
The Kenyon Report outlined the basis for the Commission’s interpretation and 
implementation of its mandate abroad. Specifically, “it is essential that the Commission should 
be guided by the advice of those who are most conversant with our Indian and African 
Empires.”80 The IWGC’s considerations in East Africa followed Evans’ original report, with the 
Colonial Office in support. Evans advised that  
most of the Natives who have died are of a semi-savage nature, and do not attach any 
sentiment to marking the graves of their dead – some tribes do not even bury their 
dead – In cases with the more intelligent Natives, especially those converted to either 
Christianity or Mohammedanism, burials are observed and graves marked with some 
form of emblem or tomb.81 
 
How was the IWGC to interpret such information? Thomas Laqueur’s guiding question “how do 
we imagine our own or other’s people’s deaths and dead bodies doing something in our 
world?”82 is informative here. IWGC cemeteries and monuments were powerful statements about 
what work the dead could do in bringing about a stronger Empire, in reaffirming British cultural 
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superiority and the necessity of its advance, but also in facilitating mourning, healing, and 
meaning for those who lived with loss.83 The IWGC was, as an evolving entity, a rumination on 
this very question. The dead, it presumed, died for something and families could take solace by 
seeing the permanent place of the dead in the world. The war dead of the British Empire were 
not resigned to the past, however, as Kipling conveyed in his inscription “their name liveth 
evermore.” The ways this would be done for white and Christian soldiers was fairly 
straightforward in principle, but for colonized peoples fulfilling the Commission’s mission 
required trying to understand the lifeways of Indigenous peoples in the colonies. 
 Barrett (correctly) describes the IWGC’s interpretation as dehumanizing, indicating 
(incorrectly) that the IWGC decided which lives were worthy of commemoration based on racial 
hierarchy.84 In reality, the general memorials at Nairobi and Mombasa did commemorate Kenyan 
war dead, if at greatly reduced cost.85 An understanding of Kenyan racial ‘difference,’ qualified 
by their civilizational ‘otherness,’ dictated the terms of their inclusion, differentiating who was 
worthy of commemoration by burial.86 The IWGC’s dependence upon local knowledge meant 
that anthropological ‘facts’ guided the content and form of commemoration in Kenya. If, as I 
argue, the IWGC defined Equality of Treatment in terms of its audience, the anthropological 
basis through which the Commission assessed Kenyan civilizational ‘otherness’ verified the 
suitability87 of general, iconographic memorials. It is the context of colonial contact, and the 
practice of colonial science specifically, that explains much of the decision-making in London. 
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By assessing the IWGC’s work in the colony through relative inadequacy, the finer details of its 
thinking are lost in an essentialized binary of exclusion/inclusion. The binary comparison 
between Africa and Europe is thus more important for understanding the ways that colonial 
knowledge shaped how Britons’ understood themselves through their Empire.88  
 The type of evidence Evans relied upon accorded with colonial understandings of ‘tribes’ 
and their burial practices. As historians of Africa have noted, however, the notion of static 
‘tribes’ flattens Kenya’s socio-political landscape by melding linguistically linked social groups 
with one another. The desired effect was to bring Africans into a social structure that mimicked 
Britain’s.89 The Gikuyu, for example, were not a unified socio-political unit in the pre-colonial 
era, foreshadowing the considerable divides within Gikuyu society under colonial rule.90 In 
reality, very few of Kenya’s ‘tribes’ existed as such before colonial contact, only becoming 
legally defined groups when the colonial authorities imposed centralized control through 
appointed chiefs and headmen. The process made Kenyans legible through two powerful 
discourses: biologically-determined racial difference, and, broken down further on the basis of 
tribal culture, civilizational otherness.  
 The distinction was crucial for colonial legal regimes that needed to differentiate on the 
basis of race in defining which of its laws applied to whom, and with what desired outcome.91 
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While biological difference was primarily a legal distinction – treating all Africans in a similar 
manner – civilizational otherness was much more fluid and subject to scientific discourse.92 
Biological difference was relatively straightforward; a subject was either African, European, or 
Asian.93 Civilizational otherness, however, was much more slippery. In the context of 
commemoration, the IWGC made both distinctions. As Barrett rightly argues, there was a 
distinction between “white graves and natives,” defining who was worthy of burial based on a 
racial distinction (inherited from the military, to a degree). They also made civilizational 
distinctions when determining the content of commemoration through other means, which is 
equally important to interrogate.  
 Though Evans and the IWGC never mention specific ‘tribes’ by name, Evans does note 
that it was the ‘uncivilized tribes’ that enlisted in the Carrier Corps at the highest rates.94 The 
Gikuyu, who suffered heavily from Carrier Corps enlistment, did bury their dead in specific 
cases. In others there was a strict aversion to contact with dead bodies and, for particular age-
sets, the Gikuyu commonly left bodies to nature.95 Colonizers observed this practice and applied 
it more generally to the ‘uncivilized tribes’ in colonial Kenya, often speaking in the graphic 
imagery of ‘leaving the dead to the hyenas.’96 Importantly, the Gikuyu and the Maasai are the 
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most commonly studied ‘tribes’ in Kenya, both contemporarily and historically, as they lived in 
closest proximity to settlers, especially as the Gikuyu moved into the highlands and Rift Valley 
to ‘squat’ on settler land during and after the First World War.97 Thus anthropological study of 
the Gikuyu provided a compelling example of how ‘uncivilized’ Kenyans treated their dead.  
 The fact remains, however, that none of Kenya’s war dead – combatant or Carrier – were 
recognized by name in public sites of memory, ostensibly indicating that the IWGC did 
differentiate based on biological/racial difference rather than civilizational/tribal otherness. But 
Arthur Browne, trying to determine the state of records in East Africa, observed that “we are 
bound to record casualties of native African soldiers in registers [but…we] should make an 
attempt to obtain the Nominal Rolls, see what the result is, and then bring the matter up again.”98 
At least in the case of askari, Browne acknowledged that racial difference did not supersede the 
IWGC’s principles, where it was possible to uphold them. Those records did not exist, however, 
bringing Barrett’s conclusions about racially determined policy into question. Once the state of 
records absolved the Commission of its responsibility to provide Nominal Rolls, it needed to 
determine what form commemoration would take. To answer this question, the Commission 
appealed to civilizational otherness – predominantly religion – rather than racial difference. 
Indeed, the Commission was careful to ensure at least some form of written 
acknowledgement. Regarding published letters of appreciation for some of the more ‘civilized 
tribes’, the IWGC indicates that it believed that letters had been circulated already. The letter 
proposed that every effort should be made to ensure that the headmen and chiefs would receive 
such messages, although they considered funding for the proposal outside the purview of the 
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IWGC’s budgetary constraints.99 As such, perceived gradations of civilization determined forms 
of alternative commemoration. While the archives do not provide a clear answer on whether the 
IWGC or the colonial administration actually compiled and distributed written messages, that it 
factored into their practice in Kenya is a compelling example of why racial difference and 
civilizational otherness must be considered in concert. This reality does not lessen the IWGC’s 
culpability in differential practice with regards to burial practice, but it does bring their overall 
practice into greater focus.  
 The treatment of South African ‘half-bloods’ and Christianized Africans also suggests 
that otherness is a more useful analytical category than race. At the most general level, the 
IWGC considered that mixed race South Africans and Christianized Africans should have 
individualized headstones and be treated according to the same standards as their white and 
Indian counterparts.100 While in practice grave marking and registering inconsistencies presented 
considerable hurdles, the understanding that these categories were different and required a 
separate ruling reiterates the importance of its civilizational assessments. Christianized Africans 
could cross the biological divide. The binary of African/European, or White/Native, breaks down 
upon deeper analysis. This was a colonial discourse on death101 framed in civilizational 
(religious) terms rather than exclusively through essentialized notions of race. 
 Returning to IWGC-designed Indian monuments, the religious element in the 
Commission’s decision-making and design was a consistent topic of discussion. Herbert Baker 
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and Edwin Lutyens, two of the principle architects at the IWGC, alongside Kipling, the author of 
its inscriptions, framed commemoration of war dead in explicitly Christian terms.102 When it 
came to non-Christian graves, a great deal of discussion and debate led to changes in their 
designs. At Basra, Sims has detailed the disagreements amongst the architects as to how Hindu 
and Islamic faiths should be accounted for in the design of the memorial.103 His analysis 
underscores not only the cultural (as opposed to racial) determinations of what type of 
monuments and memorials were suitable when dealing with non-White war dead, but also that 
the IWGC’s forged its modus operandi in response to Christian sensibilities. Surely this 
responded to discourses on race, but it was entangled with other discourses as well. To properly 
commemorate Empire, meant confronting its hybridity, albeit from an explicitly British, and 
inherently racist, perspective.104 Guided by science, anthropology, and religion, the IWGC 
defined equality through otherness. In the words of James Heartfield, “The road to Empire was 
paved with good intentions.”105 In the organization’s estimation, they were fulfilling their 
mandate. 
 
The IWGC and the African Memorials to the Missing: Making Monuments Meaningful 
Moving beyond the binary of exclusion/inclusion to contextualized equality allows for 
examination of the content and form of IWGC monuments in Kenya. Far from excluding Kenyan 
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carriers, askari, and scouts from its Empire-wide commemorative vision, the IWGC 
commissioned two imposing monuments in Kenya that featured prominently in the urban 
landscapes of Mombasa and Nairobi. In both cases, the IWGC determined – in concert with local 
town councils – the location of the monuments based on their maximum exposure to Kenyan 
eyes. Realist visual representation, it determined, best suited a Kenyan population that was 
largely illiterate and non-Christian. For subjects of Empire who could not preserve nominal 
roles, or visit cemeteries, the IWGC believed the monuments achieved its goal of giving each 
part of the Empire a feeling of shared purpose in sacrifice on their terms. Thus, by conceiving of 
the Empire as greater than the sum of its parts, the IWGC stood alone in weaving Kenyan 





Figures 2 and 3. Pictures of Carrier and King’s African Rifles Rifleman used by JA                      
   Stevenson to design the African Memorial, Nairobi. 
   Courtesy of David McDonald, Technical Manager (Works), Africa and Asia     
   Pacific, CWGC. 
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The sculptor in charge of the project, J.A. Stevenson (aka Myrander), was a minor figure 
in Britain’s sculpting community. Much like the IWGC’s work more generally, the more well-
known sculptors plied their trade on the Western Front. Stevenson completed the figures for 
Nairobi and Mombasa over the course of 1924 and early 1925, completing the Nairobi 
monument by December 1924.106 The bronze figures depict a King’s African Rifles rifleman, an 
askari, and a carrier, with the addition of an Arab rifleman in Mombasa. Stevenson reproduced 
the figures from images he received from Kenya, as well as equipment he procured in Britain.107 
The decision to use sculpture emanated from Kenyon’s discussions with the Colonial Office, 
where they indicated that “a statue of an askari and/or carrier would be intelligible to the average 
East African native, whereas any other form of memorial would not.”108 The form of the 
monuments was thus an intentional decision borne of colonial discourse figuring an intellectually 
inferior African other. The IWGC did not exclude Kenyans from commemoration, it inserted 
itself into the colonial discourse by dictating their inclusion in civilizational terms. The 
monuments were conceived with equality in mind, but alternatively defined. 
 The difference between a binary of exclusion/inclusion and gradations of inclusion is 
essential when considering the IWGC’s choice, in consultation with the municipal councils, of 
location for the two sculptures. In Nairobi, the Commission opted for a site “South of Sixth 
Avenue…at present mainly devoted to playing fields for the African Native population.”109 The 
Commission clearly considered that the African Memorial should be a fitting representation of 
the Empire directed for Kenyan consumption. This was a vision that had deeper consequences as 
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Kenya Colony defined its commemorative rituals over the course of the 1920s, and, as the 
Commission feared,110 the pace of development in Nairobi accelerated.  
 
  
Figure 4. Blueprint of Nairobi Monument Location.111 
 
 
110 Ibid., 2. 





Figure 5. Blueprint of Mombasa Monument Location.112 
 
 
Similarly, in Mombasa the IWGC opted for a site just outside of Mwembe Tayari, a 
location that remains a busy market. Indeed, the unveiling of the monument was delayed because 
of a road extension that made the site even more accessible.113 The IWGC may have depended 
upon local knowledge to determine which sites were most appropriate, but it defined the type of 
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location it desired based on its intended goal of reaching Kenyan observers. Mombasa presented 
particular issues because the bulk of imperial monuments were located by the sea, close to Fort 
Jesus. Again, the implications of the IWGC’s choices responded to colonial dynamics as 
Kenya’s commemorative rituals took shape.  
 The point here is that we must understand the IWGC’s monuments for what they were, 
rather than what they failed to mimic. The Commission’s overriding mission of providing a 
tribute to all of the Empire, varying as it was in practice, necessitated the inclusion of Kenyan 
sacrifices in its commemorative fabric. In its view this furthered its mission of being an integral 
part of “the apotheosis of empire in the post-war world.”114 This meant acknowledging “the fibre 
of the races who have together built up the British Commonwealth of Nations, ideals which are 
shared by them in common, and in defence of which a million men laid down their lives.”115 
From a modern standard of equality, the IWGC failed on most accounts; reading that back into 
an analysis of its thread of memory, however, fails to penetrate deeper into the commemorative 
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Beyond Exclusion: Finding First World War Commemoration in Africa 
 To re-state what is now a widespread characterization, if not universally accepted, in 
studies of the British empire “after the imperial turn”117 the colonies and the metropole were 
mutually constitutive.118 In the context of the IWGC, this is what drives my interrogation of the 
ways that the Commission did commemorate Kenyans, inserting itself in colonial discourse. 
Equally important, however, is that local knowledge – experiencing Empire firsthand – was 
indispensable to the forms that IWGC commemoration took. It might be too much to claim that 
these were circulating ideas; in reality, local knowledge went one way to London, while IWGC 
commemorative work went the other, over a relatively brief period of time (1919-1922). The 
IWGC’s work in Kenya was simply too small an endeavour to allow for such circulation. If, as I 
argue in subsequent chapters, colonial discourses and practices of commemoration evolved over 
the inter-war period, it was largely at the “sharp end,”119 rather than in the IWGC’s headquarters. 
The IWGC weaved an Empire-wide fabric of commemoration that cast a shadow on practices 
across its domain, but the backside of that fabric exposed threads that could be tugged in 
different directions. 
 By looking at the ways that the prosecution of the war in East Africa laid the groundwork 
for its work, it is clear that the IWGC could not translate principle into practice with great ease. 
Further, colonial knowledge production in science, anthropology, and politics consistently 
informed IWGC practice, even if that knowledge excused expedient and cost-efficient solutions 
to difficult questions of principle beyond the Western Front. As I show in the next chapter, the 
 
117 Antoinette Burton, “Introduction: On the Inadequacy and Indispensability of the Nation,” in After the 
Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation, Antoinette Burton ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2003), 1-23. 
118 Ibid. On the widespread usage of the term see Richard Price, “One Big Thing: Britain, Its Empire, and 
Their Imperial Culture,” Journal of British Studies 45 (3) (2006): 602-603. 
119 Price, “One Big Thing,” 606. 
 117 
colonial administration, on behalf of settlers, produced this knowledge, and correlating policy 
advice, in response to specific political and economic debates within the colony. That the IWGC 
retained Kenyans as its primary audience, bringing colonial subjects into the celebration of 
Empire, confirms its status as exceptionally liberal for its time. Above that more limited 
assessment of the IWGC itself, the Commission became part of a colonial discourse that 
outlasted its stay in Kenya. The Commissions constitutive role in producing colonial discourses 
of commemoration – in fact seeing a discourse of commemoration at all – demands moving 
beyond restrictive frameworks of inclusion/exclusion.  
 Antoinette Burton has argued that histories of empire “rarely write as if trouble, rather 
than extension and hegemony, was the characteristic feature of imperial power on the ground.”120 
The story of commemoration in the wake of the First World War is one of contestation and 
difference in the face of the “troubled ground of Empire” in Kenya. Burton commits the error of 
seeing the legacy of the First World War in the mythos that emerged throughout the inter-war 
period,121 claiming that “the combination of unprecedented carnage and prolonged combat in the 
European trenches made a mockery of nineteenth-century western imperial claims to difference, 
let alone tutelage over, those indigenous peoples they sought to rule.”122 But was not the IWGC’s 
mission partially to restore this myth of British superiority and unity in the imperial cause? As 
much as Burton sees a history of fitful and halting imperial victory on the battlefield, we might 
also see the IWGC’s attempt to stitch the Empire back together in the wake of war as a striking 
continuity of discourses of civilizational superiority negotiated through war. To redeploy 
Robinson and Gallagher’s characterization of mid-18th Century imperialism, the IWGC was a 
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grain of “yeast meant to leaven the lump.”123 The presence of colonial soldiers in that effort, 
however, disrupted the narrative, auguring towards a history of contestation and knotted-ness. By 
restricting itself by the principle of equality, contextually defined, the IWGC ensured that the 
memory of the First World War entangled with Empire. 
 As I elucidate in the following chapters, the IWGC’s monuments intersected with settler 
memorial landscapes, creating a unique colonial form of commemoration. The colonial 
administration spoke about the IWGC’s monuments in their efforts to represent a distinct 
trajectory for Kenya colony. Thus, the biographies of the monuments are essential features of 
this analysis. The intersections and refraction of IWGC iconography, however, represented a 
departure from the Commission’s purpose in erecting them. The IWGC sought monuments that 
could be both testaments to Empire and meaningful for Kenyans. The colonial threads of First 
World War memory pulled at and tangled with the imperial threads, becoming knotted in a 
distinct, yet not detached, culture of commemoration in Kenya Colony.  
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4 – Settler Filaments I: Monuments to Empire, Memory of a Nation 
 
Figure 6. Memorial to Major Arthur John Byng Wavell, Winchester Cathedral.  
    Wikimedia Commons. 
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Major Arthur John Byng Wavell settled on the Kenyan Coast after fighting in the South 
African war. He was well-known in the settler community and owned a local sisal farm. The son 
of a Crimean War veteran, and cousin to the Second World War General Archibald Wavell, a 
friend described Wavell as a man of “fighting stock.”1 Wavell made a pilgrimage to Mecca in 
disguise, acquiring fluent Arabic and a knowledge of Arabic customs, which came in use on the 
East Coast of Africa, ever-connected to Arab business and trade.2 Wavell converted to Islam and 
in 1914 raised a local force in Mombasa called the Arab Rifles.3 As a devoted student of foreign 
cultures and the Empire, a warrior, and a settler-farmer, Wavell’s legacy lived on in Kenya’s 
First World War lore. 
Unable to return to England to join his Welch Regiment, Wavell recruited the Arab Rifles 
to defend the Coast as one of several privately-developed units in East Africa. Stationed just 
south of Mombasa, near the border with German East Africa, Wavell and his soldiers defended 
the coast from von Lettow-Vorbeck’s raids into Kenya, the hub of its connection with railroads 
to the interior and the Indian Ocean economy. Wavell was injured in action twice, once with a 
debilitating arm injury, and later losing vision in one of his eyes.4 In January 1916, German 
askari and their white officers ambushed the Arab Rifles, killing Wavell.5 
Wavell’s memory stands at the intersection of IWGC commemoration and settler-driven 
memorialization of the First World War. The IWGC commemorated Wavell and the Arab Rifles 
at Mwele Ndogo cemetery, where, in accordance with the Commission’s practice, Wavell and 
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his soldiers lay closest to where they fell.6 The Commission commemorated Wavell and 
Lieutenant John Lachlan Mackintosh with a small cenotaph to mark their grave, while it 
recognized the rest of the Arab Rifles with a small memorial and plaque.7 But the iconological 
footprint of Wavell’s memory stands out not at Mwele Ndogo, but in Mombasa at the foot of 
Fort Jesus, within the Wavell Memorial Garden. There sits an impressive cenotaph and engraved 
memorial to Wavell, “the officers and men of the Arab Rifles who laid down their lives in 
defence of Mombasa and this coast during the Great War.”8 
The IWGC’s work seemed inadequate for some. The Commission responded to a query 
about how Wavell was to be remembered “[that the Commission] fully sympathises with the 
natural desire for private and personal memorials to the dead, but it holds that the most fitting 
place for these is at home, where they would be remembrances for all time to the descendants of 
the fallen and visible witness to the great cause for which this generation was content to die.”9 
Why, then, did the settlers of Mombasa finance the Wavell monument at Fort Jesus? What made 
Wavell an individual worthy of exceptional commemoration? 
Wavell’s memorial is but one of several settler monuments and memorials that still 
occupy public spaces. Settler memorials and monuments, and the rituals of remembrance that 
took place at them, were as much political statements as they were lasting testimonies to Kenya’s 
war dead. Three interlocking crises – the Northey Forced Labour Crisis, the so-called Indian 
Question, and the prospect of African rebellion as formulated by Harry Thuku – help 
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contextualize the stakes of memorialization in public spaces between 1920 and 1924. It would be 
too much to claim that the settlers thought commemoration a powerful tool in advocating for 
responsible self-government, but those political considerations were consistently in mind. 
Striving to be a white man’s country, settlers identified with both the motherland and with the 
colony; a distinct brand of Empire nationalism emerged in post-war Kenya wherein the settler 
thread of memory entangled with the imperial thread, weaving a colonial culture of 
commemoration unique to Kenya Colony. The memory of the First World War, at the collective 
level, mimicked the post-war battles for control between settlers and the Colonial Office, 
arbitrated by/within the colonial state.  
At least three elements of Kenyan politics manifested in monuments, memorials, and 
rituals. In response to growing Indian demands for official representation and increased influence 
within the colony, the Indian community in East Africa were peripheral to settler 
memorialization and ritual, subject to disciplinary observation in the latter. Duder, in his 
pioneering study of the Soldier Settlement Scheme, deemed it “a pledge” often to the 
“denigration of the Indian par in World War I.”10 This extended beyond the Scheme into the 
commemoration of the War as well. Further, Kenyans were either commemorated in separate 
spaces with a utilitarian purpose or displayed with high visibility to enforce the difference 
between the loyal ‘native’ and the traitorous. Finally, settlers also commemorated their own in 
ways that singled out the distinctiveness of the settler in Kenya, uniquely capable of carrying out 
the imperial mission on the continent. In all cases, the memorialization of the Great War was a 
reflection of the prevailing political dynamics of the colony. 
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As the Colonial Office reasserted itself in the politics of Kenya Colony by 1923,11 the 
tenor of commemorative rituals and, in some cases, the biographies of monuments, changed 
accordingly. Throughout, however, what Brett Shadle terms “a single chain mail of [white] 
prestige”12 prevailed. Indians and Kenyans were included in ritualistic remembrance and 
memorialization like in the case of the IWGC, but to specific socio-political ends. Nonetheless, 
in the first years post-Armistice, settler ascendency directed the commemorative culture in 
Kenya Colony, even if, like their aspirations of responsible self-government, it was fleeting.  
 
Settler Paramountcy through Three Crises: The Context of Commemoration 
The political row over settler self-government boiled down to a decision over whether the 
colonial administration would develop policies facilitating settler production to extreme ends, or 
whether Kenya Colony should abide by the principles of trusteeship. In either case, Kenyan 
labour needed to be directed towards the open market but the debate over what type of state 
support would undergird ‘peasant’ production threatened to restrict the flow of Kenyan labour to 
settler farms. The strongly pro-settler wartime ordinances13came under increased scrutiny during 
the early 1920s,14 and yet for settlers they did not go far enough in ensuring the ongoing success 
of the settler economy. The First World War and the subsequent Soldier Settlement Scheme 
proffered, in James Belich’s terms, “settler booms,”15 but the prolongation of the Kenya Colony 
boom depended upon the degree to which London was willing to prop it up. A politically 
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powerful group of settlers with Hugh Cholmondeley, better known as Lord Delamere, their 
presumptive leader,16 brought tensions with the Colonial Office to a head by 1923.  
 As we have seen, the settlers’ political and economic influence actually grew from 1914-
1918 owing to “cheap and available labour, insatiable markets and a pre-occupied colonial 
state.”17 Belfield’s wartime governorship may have suggested a move to settler primacy but, 
following Robert Maxon, “the arrival of Sir Edward Northey to take the governorship of the EAP 
began a rapid push towards settler primacy.”18 Northey quickly moved to address the “shortage 
of labor occasioned by forced labor recruitment for the Carrier Corps during the war and 
increased demands for labor from European settlers coinciding with famine and disease.”19 
Facing the challenge of Soldier Settlement, which nearly doubled the settler population in Kenya 
Colony, the flow of labour off of reserves and the success of both old and new settler farms was 
Northey’s primary preoccupation. 
 On 23 October 1919, Northey issued his now notorious circular on labour in Kenya, 
stating that “all government officials in charge of native areas must exercise every possible 
lawful influence to induce able-bodied male natives to go into the labour field.”20 Northey 
apparently issued the circular without consulting the Colonial Office, although the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Lord Milner, turned a blind eye to the extension of what was tantamount 
to labour compulsion beyond wartime exigencies.21 Driven by the view that Africans “will never 
catch up the European either in intellect or in strength of character […and that] as a race, the 
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white race has received a superior intellectual and mental endowment,”22 Milner saw settler 
dominance as crucial to his idea of stronger imperial union.23 The Northey Circular, with the 
Colonial Office tacitly in support, gestured towards the development of Kenya Colony as a 
nation, destined to develop along the same lines as the Union of South Africa or Southern 
Rhodesia.  
  Protests from abroad, especially from the International Labour Organization, the 
Aborigines’ Protection Society, the Anti-Slavery Society, and the British Labour Party,24 
threatened Northey’s policies. With the ever watchful eyes of the ‘conscience of colonialism’ 
Norman Leys and William McGregor Ross,25 alongside many of the missions in Kenya Colony, 
the political establishment in Britain debated Northey’s strongly pro-settler policies and support 
for compulsion, largely to the Governor’s, and the colony’s, embarrassment.26 Milner, Northey’s 
staunchest defender, left the cabinet in 1921, replaced by Winston Churchill, and later the Duke 
of Devonshire, who first removed Northey in 1922 and then issued the fatal blow to settler 
paramountcy in the inter-war years.27 
 The Devonshire Declaration of 1923, in tandem with the Dual Policy of Development, 
followed from the post-war discussions of the role of Empire in the world, and specifically in 
Africa. Tutelage and trusteeship were the watchwords, with an increased regard for the 
responsibilities Empires had to engage subject peoples in an increasingly interconnected modern 
 
22 As quoted in Margery Perham, “The Round Table and sub-Saharan Africa,” The Round Table 60 (240) 
(1970): 546. 
23 See Chapter 3. 
24 Anthony Clayton and Donald Savage, Government and Labour in Kenya. 1895-1963 (London: Frank 
Cass, 1974), 114-115. 
25 Diana Wylie, “Norman Leys and McGregor Ross: A case study in the conscience of African empire, 
1900-39,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History5 (3) (1977): 294-309. 
26 Clayton and Savage, Government and Labour in Kenya, 115-116.   
27 Ibid., 117.  
 126 
world.28 Britons, perhaps, had not listened to W.E.B. Du Bois when he launched his scathing 
critique of imperialism’s role in the First World War, arguing that “the Balkans are convenient 
for occasions, but the ownership of materials and me in the darker world is the real prize that is 
setting the nations of Europe at each other’s throats to-day.”29 The Paris Peace Conference made 
clear the influence of Wilsonian overtures, however, and that the stability of Empire in Africa 
required an ostensibly kinder version, more beholden to the development of Africans.  
The Devonshire Declaration represented the culmination of what Robert Maxon deemed 
the reassertion of Colonial Office control.30 With a new governor, Sir Robert Coryndon, at the 
helm, Devonshire declared that “in the administration of Kenya His Majesty’s Government 
regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population, and they are unable 
to delegate or share this trust, the object of which may be defined as the protection and 
advancement of the native races.”31 Although beneficial to Kenyans in some respects, the 
Declaration had far deeper roots which had much more to do with tempering settler aspirations 
than it did the welfare of Kenyans. Indeed, settler’s demands for labour was only one facet of the 
Devonshire Declaration. 
The connections between India and Africa are now well understood, even if territorially-
bound historiographies fail to engage the Indian Ocean as an analytical tool.32 An increasingly 
strident Indian political lobby in Kenya Colony, buttressed by the India Office’s advocacy, 
challenged settler restrictions on Indian immigration, ownership of land in the White Highlands, 
the usage of the Indian Rupee as the dominant currency in Kenya Colony, and political 
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representation on the Legislative Council. Indian settlers outnumbered white settlers at a 2:1 
ratio, but political power did not follow. Attempts at reproach, culminating in a roundtable in 
1921, produced little of substance for either community.33 It was clear that the Colonial Office 
needed to step in, both to satiate the demands of the Indian community, and to temper settler 
antagonism.34 The same changes at the Colonial Office that produced action on labour also 
brought an ostensible end to the Indian Question. 
This was the real motivation for the Devonshire Declaration. Indeed, settler responses to 
the prospect of Indian representation on the Legislative Council, let alone equal representation, 
threatened to turn violent. Specifically, “the settlers had organized a Vigilance Committee and 
made little effort to hid their preparations for an armed uprising to take over the colony if the 
resulting settlement was not to their liking.”35 This itself was an appeal to First World War 
service, calling on the British government to make good on its ‘pledge’ to ex-servicemen trying 
to make their homes and livelihoods abroad.36 Ultimately, the Devonshire Declaration was a 
compromise that sided with settlers, as “it was not the charter for racial equality that Indian 
leaders had hoped for and although the White Paper had pronounced against white self-
government in Kenya the European settlers in the colony retained existing political rights.”37 
Though the Declaration was the death knell for settler self-government, on issues that threatened 
the white community as a whole settlers were largely united.  
One final angle to the Devonshire Declaration speaks to the stakes of First World War 
commemoration in inter-war Kenya. In 1922, Harry Thuku mounted a protest against the 
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colonial government for “increased taxes, failing wages, and the kipande [registration discs].”38 
Thuku’s organized demonstrations resulted in his arrest, alongside the deaths of 25 African 
protestors. The connection between Indian demands and Kenyan protests was essential; settlers 
couched their rejection of requests from the Indian community in the language of protecting 
Kenyan rights, thus Indians moved to a general race equality rather than equality for Indians 
alone.39 Galvanized by Gandhi’s protests across the Indian Ocean, Thuku and his Young Kikuyu 
Organization allied themselves with Kenya’s Indian community in their calls for equality and 
respect.40 In this context, the colonial administration was able to fashion Thuku’s movement as a 
cooption of Kenyan politics by the Indian community, buttressed by some anti-Thuku African 
voices as well.41 Having hemmed itself into a colonial predicament, the Colonial Office needed 
to respond in a way that both foregrounded trusteeship and allowed conciliatory policy-making 
for the white settlers. 
Thuku’s protests launched a decade of political organizing, not only amongst young 
Gikuyu but in Kenyan communities throughout the territory. The Devonshire Declaration 
intervened by allowing for some representation in the legislative council for Indians and 
Kenyans (and Arabs), while allowing settlers to maintain control of the colony’s politics. It was a 
policy framework that was more about appearances than it was substantive. In the early 1920s, 
the settler community effectively governed the colony, albeit subject to Colonial Office 
oversight, through what Bruce Berman terms ‘Government by Agreement.’42 This “informal 
cooption of ‘Government by Agreement’ enabled the state authorities to concede to the settlers a 
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real influence on policy without openly giving them greater formal access to the state.”43 
Nonetheless, the need to keep up appearances in the Colonial Office, maintaining the state as the 
seat of power in Kenya Colony, tempered the extreme elements of the settler community by 
invoking African paramountcy.  
The outcome of these three crises is of little significance to the settler thread of First 
World War memory in Kenya, especially in terms of monuments and memorials. Nonetheless, 
the longer-term history of settler paramountcy in question highlights the process through which 
settler identification as a distinct community within the Empire coalesced in the early-1920s. 
Settlers had internal reference points for their distinctness, among which were its tributes to their 
war dead. Empire was an essential element of their commemorations, but settler monuments and 
memorials stood out from IWGC sites of memory. Whether in public spaces, or in exclusive 
country clubs, monuments and memorials were generative sites of memory, reflecting the 
increased sense of settler identity in post-war Kenya. Forged in a context of consistent threats 
from Kenyans and Indians within Kenya Colony, as well as advocates from the metropole, 
settlers weaved their own commemorative tapestry, pulling at the threads of Empire-wide 
commemoration in the process.  
Through this process settlers participated in the colonial discourse on death, singling out 
exceptional settlers as a model for an understanding of what the Kenyan settler was made. 
Further, public spaces within the main locales of settler settlement – Nairobi and Mombasa – 
were confirmed as white spaces through the installation of First World War monuments and 
memorials. These were celebrations of their role as the bastion of Empire in Africa. This served 




Kenyan memorialization in ‘native areas’ of those cities. As I show in a later chapter, this had 
direct effects upon the rituals of remembrance that emerged in the 1920s. Above all, these were 
counter-monuments to the IWGC’s cemeteries and monuments, which, while still respected as 
sites of memory, were inadequate in speaking to settler collective identification. Thus, was borne 
a colonial, as opposed to an imperial, thread of memory in post-war Kenya, however entwined 
they might have been.   
I trace the emergence of a settler thread of memory through several important sites of 
memory, predominantly in Nairobi and Mombasa. In each case, I situate the monuments and 
memorials within the broader landscape of those cities, and the implications for the exclusion, or 
selective inclusion, of Kenyan and Indian communities. As an extension of their actual location, 
I explore the implications of centring white memory, keeping in mind the correlating political 
battles of the early 1920s. At times, this included the invocation of Kenyan memorial sites. 
However, in those cases memorialization responded to the political exigencies of Kenyan 
Paramountcy or, alternatively, the demographic changes to Nairobi and Mombasa wrought by 
transient Kenyan labour as a result of land alienation and labour policy. Settlers erected their 
monuments and memorials mostly between 1920-1924, setting the stage for an evolving culture 
of commemoration from the middle to the end of the decade.  
 
Remembering Settlers: The Wavell Memorial and the Selous Memorial 
 When the Duke of York, the future King George VI, and the Duchess of York visited 
East Africa in 1924, their tour included many visits to sites of memory in Kenya.44 One of those 
stops, immediately upon their arrival at the Port of Mombasa, was at the Wavell Memorial on 23  
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Figure 7. The Wavell and Arab Rifles Memorial, Mombasa.45 
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December 1924. The couple spent only one day in Mombasa, taking the time to unveil the 
memorial officially, two years after the town erected it inside the Wavell Memorial Gardens.46 
Notably, the Wavell Memorial is the only settler monument in memory of the First World War in 
Mombasa, although the IWGC Mbaraki Cemetery is also located on the island. According to 
James Willson, the townspeople of Mombasa funded the Gardens and the Memorial through 
individual subscription.47 
 Very little evidence remains at the Kenyan National Archives of the Wavell Memorial, 
but a great deal can be gleaned about its importance by its location in the city of Mombasa. Fort 
Jesus, a 16th Century Portuguese military fort, is the backdrop for the memorial, adjacent to 
historic Old Town, an area where the Arab community in Mombasa resides.48 The Memorial thus 
responded to both the long-term historicity of the city of Mombasa, as well as being well 
positioned to be accessible to the Arab communities from which Wavell drew his recruits. It was 
a distinct British imposition on a seaside landscape that underwent significant change, from its 
earliest settlements, through Portuguese and Arab rule. 
 As Denis Linehan and Joao Sarmento remind us, however, colonists imprint their self-
images upon the landscapes they encounter, often reshaping the telling of history itself.49 The 
Wavell Memorial placed a settler at the centre of attention, reinforcing the civilizing force that 
was British colonial rule. In the process, the Arab role in protecting the city during the First 
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World War was only accessible through the work of a settler. Further, the role of Indians in 
coastal warfare was all but forgotten in the settler memorial landscape. Settlers resigned the role 
of carriers, askari, and other Africans, to their own parts of town, contributing little to the 
IWGC’s work. Unlike the War Graves Commission then, bound by its constitution to 
commemorate all who fought in some form or another, settler memory of the First World War in 
Mombasa focused upon settler contributions, strategically placing the site of that memory in a 
space associated with external rule. Ali Mazrui argues, for example, that selective memory often 
leads to the elimination of other memories, or a historical amnesia that long outlives imperial 
rule.50 
 Within footsteps of Fort Jesus and the Wavell Memorial is the Mombasa Club, the hub of 
elite settler activity in the city from the last decade of the 19th Century.51 Though a direct 
connection between the Club and the Memorial cannot be made with certainty, it is clear that the 
“colonial set” who frequented the Club had considerable pull in redefining the Fort Jesus area as 
a place worthy of renewal along settler lines.52 It is not surprising that when the colonial state 
issued its findings on the “Ancient Monuments Preservation Bill” that the Wavell Memorial fell 
under its purview.53 Wavell was one of those “celebrated individuals,” that the state should 
ensure remained in the memory of Kenya Colony.54  
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 It was not just the celebration of Wavell that singled out the appropriation of Mombasa’s 
landscape, but in the form of the Memorial as well. The familiar cenotaph, a revival of ancient 
commemorative form, created a direct link to British memorialization throughout the Empire.55 
Further, despite being a memorial to both Wavell and the Arab Rifles, the inscription on the 
Memorial is entirely in English, highlighting that it was primarily for settler consumption. The 
settler imaginary56 formed not only through relational reference to Kenyans, Arabs, and Indians, 
but through a projection of the self as such. Settlers affirmed their ascendency through a relation 
to place and time,57 setting themselves as the current iteration in a long line of external rulers 
through the environs of Fort Jesus. Unlike the IWGC and the colonial state, the settler 
community was not obliged to recognize the memory of any other community. As such, settlers 
commemorated their war dead in ways that resemble Connerton’s conceptualization of forgetting 
to assert a new identity. There was not an explicit colonial discourse identifying an inferior other, 
but only tacit othering through exclusion and self-reference. 
 More speculatively, the connection might also be made to the Indian Question and the 
growing malcontent and threat of rebellion in the settler community. Wavell raised his force to 
defend Mombasa by personal initiative just as the settler community organized its Vigilance 
Committee to ensure, in the words of Governor Coryndon, that “safeguards [remain]…against 
eventual Indian domination of a country which is (and Churchill promised it would remain ) a 
characteristically and distinctively English colony.”58 Mombasa, however, was far more tolerant 
of Indian influence than the rest of the colony, and the Wavell Memorial’s conceptualization 
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57 Ibid., 27.  
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must have occurred far before 1922, when the Indian Crisis was reaching its apex. Nonetheless, 
the Wavell Memorial was a powerful iconographic referent for the intrepid spirit of the settler 
community, with a distinctly British texture.   
 Wavell’s Memorial was not the only personalized settler monument in Kenya Colony. 
The Muthaiga Club in the outskirts of Nairobi, which Caroline Elkins depicts as a space where 
settlers “drank champagne and pink gin for breakfast, played cards, danced through the night, 
and generally woke up with someone else’s spouse in the morning,”59 features a memorial to 
settler war dead, while at the Nairobi Club another commemorates the fallen Frederick Selous. 
By the nature of their locales, each memorial is exclusive, insular, and reflective of a particular 
subset of the settler demographic in Kenya Colony. Dominated by predominantly Conservative, 
estate-owning “founders” of the Kenya settler community, the Muthaiga Club and Nairobi Club 
are ideal settings for understanding the thickness of the settler thread of First World War 
memory.  
 Like Wavell, though nearly double his age, infamous colonial adventurer and game 
hunter Frederick Selous was one of the founding figures of the settler regiment known as The 
Frontiersman.60 At the age of 63, Selous was shot in the head by a sniper in 1916, prompting a 
friend to say: “to think too a man of his value has been out of the world by a dirty n*****.”61 
Respecting his formidable claim as one of the greatest game hunters in East Africa, the Nairobi 
Club erected a memorial in the design of a buffalo, which would eventually become the insignia 
of the Kenya Regiment.62 Selous represented a particular self-image of Kenyan settlers as 
 
59 Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry 
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uniquely able to create a white man’s country in an inhospitable and hostile African 
environment. While some heroic imperialists might appear as the “pathfinders propagating the 
ideals of Christian service and sacrifice, progress, Republican Universalism, [and] patriotism,” 
Selous represented “its more acute forms, jingoism or chauvinism.”63 Selous was an essentialized 
representation of what the settler in Kenya Colony needed to be in order to maintain and build 
upon the Colony as a white man’s country (even if he was not a settler in Kenya himself).64  
  Selous’ standing as one of the greatest big game hunters cannot be overlooked.65 The 
image of Kenya as a space of adventure and an untamed wilderness primed for European 
consumption is an essential element of Kenya’s history and present.66 Selous lived and died 
performing colonial masculinity to its extreme,67 which could be defined against the idle and 
childish Kenyan, or the effeminate and traitorous Indian.68 The freedom of private space 
provided settlers the opportunity to define themselves through war commemoration, embracing a 
different form of memorial with the explicit purpose of celebration and projection into the 
Colony’s future. In order to project into the future, however, the Selous memorial drew upon 
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tropes of settler exceptionality – the environment and manliness – as a means of telling a history 
that centred on the rugged, white male.69 
 The opposing images of Selous and Wavell exemplify the differences between 
commemoration in public and private spaces. Wavell’s Memorial was reflective and thankful, 
while Selous’ was celebratory and future-oriented. Wavell exemplified the timelessness of 
external rule, and the sacrifice and endurance of British settlers in the continuance of Mombasa’s 
status as an important outpost of British power. Selous, meanwhile, was the epitome of what the 
settler ought to be; the memorial was a physical reminder of what was yet to be achieved. One 
man protected colonialism, while the other extended it. Selous’ memorial was more reflective of 
an Empire nationalism, whereas the connections to Britain – through form and spatial orientation 
– were predominant in remembering Wavell. The importance of public and private space in 
defining the form and meaning of settler memorials is essential to analyzing the other known 
memorials in Kenya, but throughout the exclusion of Indian and Kenyan iconography is striking. 
Whether jingoistic and nationalist, or reflective and reminiscent of commemoration in Britain, 
settler memorials and monuments were decidedly exclusive and insular, even if they projected an 
image of the settler that depended upon the other.   
 Both of the monuments, as well as other settler conceived projects, were what Duncan 
Bell describes as “counter-hegemonic site[s] of resistance, [spaces] of political opposition.”70 
Commemoration of particular settlers lay outside the state because London ostensibly governed 
the territory; the nation, comprised of settlers seeking self-government, needed more than the 
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IWGC sites that constituted state-level remembrance. IWGC sites may have done some of the 
work of memory in Kenya Colony, but lacking a spatial dimension “rooted in particular 
constructions of an often-idealized bounded territory,”71 the settler thread of memory, entangled 
as it was with imperial memory, was heavier and anchored in colonial spaces. But the settler 
thread of memory was itself made of different filaments, responding to the needs of particular 
communities. As Mark Connelly explains in the case of East London – itself more populous than 
the settler community of Kenya – public memorials were often quite conservative, echoing state 
memorialization. Yet in private facilities – workplaces, schools, and clubs – there was a different 
type of identification at work.72 It was not the work of grief and mourning, but “the definition of 
the values an institution held dear.”73  
 Hanna Smyth’s conception of colonial and imperial identities as “nested layers” is helpful 
here. Specifically, “‘National’ and ‘imperial’ identities were not mutually exclusive…they co-
existed.”74 In Kenya, settler sites of memory might mimic forms of commemoration throughout 
the Empire, yet they were tied specifically to place and responded to the needs of a community in 
question. Settler sites of memory established remembrance within the context of the political 
dynamics of the colony, which did not disavow imperial forms of memory, but refashioned the 
narrative to fit their needs in particular political contexts. Yet beyond the tenuous ‘imperial’-
‘settler’ divide, inward-facing extreme representations of settler identity coexisted with outward-
facing conservative elements. This was a discourse on Great War memory, negotiated in a 
particular colonial context. 
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Competing Memorials in Nairobi: The Muthaiga Club and Memorial Hall 
 Defining the colonial discourse as essential to a framework for analyzing war memorials 
in Kenya suggests a deeper conversation between two monuments in Nairobi’s commemorative 
landscape. The combined memorial/monument at the heart of Nairobi’s city centre – the 
Memorial Hall and the First World War Obelisk – align with the public space framework of 
Mombasa. The Muthaiga Country Club memorial, however, evokes a similar Empire nationalism 
to that of Selous’ Memorial at the Nairobi Club. The memorials suggest a hybrid settler 
identification, with the tangled threads of a burgeoning proto-nationalist identity and an imperial 
identity defined by shared British heritage.  
 
 
Figure 8. Memorial Hall and the Memorial Obelisk, Nairobi.75  
 
75 “Before World War II,” Old East Africa Postcards, https://www.oldeastafricapostcards.com/wp-
content/gallery/nairobi-buildings-admin/na05a2.jpg 
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 In 1923, after seven years of lobbying and fundraising by the East African War Memorial 
Fund,76 Nairobi’s War Memorial Committee decided upon the eventual location of the War 
Memorial Obelisk. The memorial drew its inspiration from the memorial in Kampala, Uganda 
that J.A. Stevenson had designed and constructed.77 Ultimately, the Committee determined that 
the Obelisk was more appropriate than the Uganda-style cenotaph,78 perhaps because it sits on a 
median between two lanes of Delamere Avenue.  A tall and thin structure was all that could fit.79 
Nonetheless, it is clear that Governor Coryndon wished the monument to emulate the aura of 
Whitehall in London,80 which dictated the final location of memorial and thus the obelisk form. 
 The War Memorial complemented the new Memorial Hall, which would serve as the 
chamber for meetings of the Legislative Council, Local Committees, and local settler groups 
throughout the 1920s.81 While this was ostensibly a seat of power to be shared by settlers and the 
colonial state, the land upon which the Memorial Hall was built was called the Colonists’ Plot, a 
space marked out for the exclusive use of the settler community.82 Further, settlers had 
increasing control over not only the Legislative Council, but in the Municipal Council, and other 
official committees,83 indicating that their influence was as, if not more, important than the 
Governor’s views. When Nairobi completed the Memorial Hall, a portrait of Lord Delamere 
became an essential element of the tribute to the settler community and their war dead.84 But the 
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original plan called for a portrait to Sir Charles Eliot, Commissioner of British East Africa from 
1900-1904,85 not Lord Delamere.  
 Laragh Larsen’s study of Nairobi’s memorial landscape indicates that the Memorial and 
Memorial Hall’s “unveiling as part of the triple ceremony…underline how the obelisk was 
ultimately a monument to the European colonists of Kenya.”86 Larsen’s work remains 
exceptional and I was unable to unearth documents that shed any further light on the Nairobi 
Memorial. Larsen, however, argues that the obelisk suggests “its form, its function as a 
cenotaph…highlight the connection to Britain.”87 While the connection is essential, putting the 
Nairobi Memorial into the context of Empire-wide commemoration propounds a different 
interpretation. Like Wavell’s Memorial, elements of the Nairobi Memorial remained tethered to 
British commemorative form, but its spatial orientation in the city of Nairobi took on a distinct 
colonial texture. As Larsen argues, this was an attempt to highlight settler ascendency and white 
supremacy, however, as I argue in the next chapters, the colonial state was obliged to maintain a 
different public-facing image, pressured from inside and outside the colony. As a project that 
required Governor Coryndon’s assent, the Nairobi Memorial needed to maintain an air of 
ambiguity and remain conservative, maintaining the Empire – as the state – as the object that 
made the war dead worthy of commemoration, rather than the emerging settler community. The 
Memorial was a gathering place for grief and mourning, rather than the celebration of Kenya 
Colony itself.  
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Figure 9. Muthaiga Club First World War Memorial.88 
 




There was no such ambiguity or conservativeness at the Muthaiga Club’s Memorial. The 
Memorial maintains the obelisk form, with the addition of a bench on either side of it. It lists the 
fallen from the Country Club by name, inscribed on the front of the Memorial. Unlike the 
Nairobi Memorial, which simply states “to the Memory of our Glorious Dead,” the Muthaiga 
Club Obelisk includes both a reverential passage – “Let those who come after see to it that their 
names be not forgotten” – and the phrase “Pro Patria,” indicating that the Memorial was likely 
erected before the publishing of Wilfred Owen’s 1920 poem “Dulce et Decorum Est,” which 
singled out the Horace phrase as “the old lie.” 89 Unlike the Nairobi Memorial, which does not 
even reference King and Country, the Muthaiga Obelisk conveys an extreme patriotism through 
the phrase. But to what country did the memorial reference? 
Here, the location and a brief history of the Muthaiga Club is essential to understanding 
the symbolism of the monument. The Club’s founder, Reginald Berkeley Cole, was one of the 
first settlers elected to the Legislative Council in 1920, alongside his brother-in-law Lord 
Delamere.90 The connections to the political elite, and some of the most vociferous pro-settler 
voices in Kenya Colony, undergirded the popularity of the Muthaiga Club. It was thus the home-
base for the Conservative elite of the colony who disdained the Colonial Office, felt threatened 
by the colonial state, and drove the aspiration for responsible self-government. The Club was the 
epitome of Kenya Colony’s Empire Nationalism, at once virulent imperialists, but also aspiring 
nationalists. It was this entangled settler identification that produced a memorial that is at once 
explicitly tied to colonial space, but reminiscent of British forms of commemoration. As Deirdre 
Gilfedder reminds us, however, terms like ‘pro patria’ and ‘for King and Country,’ are confused 
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by “the looseness of the terms Country, Nation and even Empire in the early 20th Century.”91 The 
vagaries of belonging to a grander British ‘nation,’ while being identified with a particular space 
within the Anglo-Empire, created multiple forms of identification. 
For this reason and within the context of settler paramountcy in question, the Muthaiga 
Memorial’s statement of Pro Patria should be interpreted within the framework of ‘nested 
layers’ of identification. The Muthaiga Club’s founding members, many of whom had fought in 
the South African War, were clearly adherents to a form of Britishness that asserted its 
superiority and unique ability to spread civilization to the African continent. Like Selous, 
however, these were men who could afford and were encouraged to pursue the manly 
adventurism so representative of the settler spirt. Giving their lives in the course of warfare was 
the ultimate sacrifice to Empire, but also an example to those who followed of what the ideal 
settler should be. By no means was the Muthaiga Club’s membership representative of the entire 
settler community, but their political influence and providence as the ‘founders’ of Kenya 
Colony afforded them the opportunity to remember the war dead in ways that reflected their self-
image.  
Without needing the approval of the colonial state, the Muthaiga Club Memorial 
commemorated the most vigilant proto-nationalist sentiment in the colony. The private nature of 
the memorial allowed for complete authority to design and commemorate in ways that responded 
to the aspirations of the Club’s membership and the interpretation of sacrifice that best served 
those desires. If the Nairobi Memorial Obelisk can only be interpreted as exclusive to the settler 
community due to its spatial orientation – owing to its ambiguity – the Muthaiga Obelisk is 
explicitly insular. Far removed from any Kenyans or Indians, and middle-class settlers for that 
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matter,92 save the domestic workers at the Club, it was one of the filaments that made up the 
settler thread of memory that conveyed the self-image of the settlers who have come to represent 
its colonial history in the popular retelling of the territory. The ambiguity of the Nairobi 
Memorial exemplifies the entanglement of imperial and colonial Great War memory and settler 
identification through its relation to the Nairobi landscape, but the Muthaiga Memorial itself is 
the embodiment of that entanglement.  
 
Empire Nationalism, Kenyan Settlers, and the Colonial State: An Empire-wide Assessment 
 Thus far, we have seen how analyzing Empire-wide commemorative practices without 
attending to the political context of the places where they were deployed risks oversimplifying 
the motivations for, and creation of, particular sites of memory. Likewise, I have argued in this 
chapter that understanding colonial sites of memory without attending to the complexity of 
settler identification elides the considerations of the groups who conceived, designed, and 
erected those sites. Colonial sites of memory were not just impositions of Britishness and 
imperial power, but assertions of a particular kind of Britishness and imperial power unique to, 
in this case, Kenya Colony and particular subsets of it. In other words, “the social institutions 
and political circumstances of different societies could affect the making and interpretation of 
symbols.”93 This played out differently in privately funded and publicly funded memorials. 
Whereas in public, the political leanings of the most influential cadre of settler society needed to 
temper their image in the face of the colonial state, in private their views were on full display. 
Admittedly, this only tells us about one subset of settlers in Kenya, but it is indicative of the 
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ways that those sites of memory, as opposed to IWGC memorials, have failed to sustain their 
meaning in the post-colonial era. Specifically, settler memorials were not open to inscription by 
Kenyans, whereas certain IWGC site were.  
 Though on a much smaller scale in Kenya, the examples of commemoration in South 
Africa and Australia provide instructive, if inadequate, analogs. Stephen Garton argues that, in 
the Australian case, the assertion of a strong national identity stemmed from its ability to “[turn] 
towards strengthening rather than undermining an emerging national ethos and political 
consensus,” because it did not collapse under the pressure of war.94 In Kenya Colony, as we have 
seen, the settler community was actually strengthened during the war, achieving ostensible 
paramountcy until at least 1923. The context of the Kenya settler communities’ status, struggling 
to assert its control over Kenya, Indian, and other non-white populations, however, added a level 
of duress to post-war commemoration. As such, the stakes of memorialization were in 
solidifying the gains of the settler community in the First World War. IWGC sites in Kenya did 
the work of commemorating the soldiers of Empire uniformly, yet curiously local memorials 
turned back to the past, singling out elite members of the settler community for 
commemoration.95 Unlike in Australia, where the state was also invested in ANZAC 
mythology,96 it was up to settlers in Kenya to make the connection locally, giving colonial 
texture to an otherwise imperial endeavour. 
 The context in Australia was much different. As I detailed in a previous discussion, the 
focus upon the elimination of Indigenous peoples in the absence of trusteeship assured settler 
ascendency, especially as it moved towards Dominion status. Likewise, its population was in the 
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majority, rather than being a minority amongst minorities as was the case in Kenya Colony. 
What sets Kenya’s settler thread of memory apart from Australia’s is that the added political 
context of duress in the face of outside control and internal protest meant that the stakes of 
memorialization were much higher, even if on a smaller scale. Jeremy Foster’s conceptualization 
of national identity as framed by “how the national community is linked to the land” and “”how 
the national community is delimited in relation to other groups” is essential here.97 In both 
Australia and Kenya, “national identity could not be understood separately from the larger-scale 
British imperial identity,”98 yet specific internal relationships with the land ownership and the 
populations who inhabited those lands, meant that identification was responsive to local 
sociopolitical dynamics, which were in stark contrast in the two colonies.   
 South Africa, on the face of it, provides a much better comparison for Kenya. Yet there 
as well the particularity of political dynamics overshadows the similarities in demographic make-
up. John Lambert describes how English-speaking South Africans were forced to define 
themselves against not only non-white subjects, but other whites as well.99 In the process, they 
“kept alive the memories of only a segment of a nation, in the process making it difficult for 
English-speakers to assimilate their identity into a wider South African identity.”100 In Kenya, 
however, the Soldier Settlement Scheme transformed the Colony from a patchwork of South 
African, Canadian, British, and other European settlers, into a distinctly British and aristocratic 
society.101 Similarly, the settlers who gained control of the territory’s politics were 
predominantly British or Anglo-Irish in origin, meaning the internal competition for memory 
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creation was comparatively muted in Kenya Colony. This is not to paint with too broad brush-
strokes,102 but to acknowledge that settler power came from the predominantly British upper-
class inhabitants.103 While South African identification within the confines of the land and the 
peoples who inhabited it may have been similar to Kenya Colony, the connections to the rest of 
the Empire were contested at different levels. Whereas in South Africa it was Afrikaner 
Republicanism that challenged English-speaking national identity,104 in Kenya it was the 
Colonial Office and the colonial state contesting settler nationalism from the outside.  
  The location of pressure upon settler identification affected their associations within the 
‘British World’ and in relation to the Empire in crucial ways. In South Africa, Empire was a 
supportive element of a burgeoning national identity in the English-speaking community. South 
Africans who fought in the First World War were the loyal subjects who had come to the 
Empire’s defence. This was equally true in Kenya, as the Colony sacrificed proportionally more 
men than any other British territory, but the explicit support for their independence was actually 
stymied by their imperial connection. For the “two great ‘Ascendencies’ of Anglo-Ireland and 
Anglo-India,”105 this was a familiar feeling, having settled in Kenya as “a refuge from the rising 
tide of nationalism.”106 Being set aside under the auspices of African paramountcy would have 
been a double blow. Thus, memorials and monuments in Kenya needed to redefine the colonial 
landscape not just as the site of imperial power and Britishness, but of settlers more specifically. 
The work of erecting monuments was as much about defining settler political power in the face 
of imperial oversight as it was a vindication of the British Empire as a whole. This was a vision 
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of Kenya that the Colonial Office and the seat of the Governor needed to temper, even if its 
policies continued to benefit settlers.   
 150 
5 – Settler Filaments II: Community Service and Missionary Trusteeship as Great War 
Memory 
 
The East African Women’s League was founded in 1917…[when] the first World War 
was at its height and some of the first problems confronting the newly formed League 
were the provision of cloth for wounded soldiers in hospital in Nairobi, and, later, the 
threat of famine in some of the native areas through drought.  
- A Short History of the East Africa Women’s League1 
 
Carrier Corps Camp: Colonel Ainsworth [is] asking [that] the Municipal Committee 
should take over the Carrier Corps site and erections thereon and run them as a Native 
Location. 
- Works Committee, April 15th, 19192 
 
 As the East African campaign reached its height in 1917, settler society mobilized to aid 
the effort. While settler men joined military ranks, tended to farms, and took on greater 
responsibility for Kenya Colony’s politics, groups at the margins of settler society, specifically 
women and missionaries, also attempted to do their part. The East African Women’s League 
(EAWL) formed the backbone of Red Cross work in East Africa, while missionaries advocated 
for Kenyan interests, especially through direct relief from the effects of the fighting. Just as in 
Britain and the Dominions, Kenya’s First World War was total, even if its mobilization was on a 
smaller scale. By 1918, it was clear that the post-war recovery would follow along similar lines, 
with settler men addressing economic recovery, political responses, and colonial defence, while 
women and missionaries tended to society through education, family care, and healing the 
wounds of war, both physically and psychologically. The commemorative work of the EAWL 
and missionaries exemplifies the diverse interpretations of the meaning of the First World War in 
Kenya Colony. Women and missionaries envisioned the First World War as meaningful for the 
trajectory of their organizations, but continued to exclude, or selectively include, the Kenyan role 
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in the First World War. In the process, the First World War was fashioned in white terms, rather 
than embracing the sacrifices of its black inhabitants.   
 Though the outcome of the EAWL and missionary-driven commemoration was similar to 
that of the IWGC, the settler political elite, and colonial officials, the means through which their 
commemorative programs came into being was altogether different. Two individuals who had 
ambivalent relationships with the settler elite, John Ainsworth and Isabel McGregor Ross, 
created two of the dominant organizations responsible for missionary and settler women’s work 
in Kenya Colony: the EAWL and the War Relief Fund for Africans. Each organization continued 
their wartime work of caring for Kenya Colony’s society. The EAWL predominantly served 
Indian and Kenyan families, while the War Relief Fund for Africans administered funds raised 
from 1914-1918 to memorialize the Kenyan sacrifice for the British cause. In the process, both 
the EAWL and the War Relief Fund for Africans provided pillars of support for settler society; 
the EAWL, after 1922, did so explicitly through political support for their male compatriots, just 
as missionaries supported the general thrust of European influence in East Africa even if they 
questioned the settlers’ tact. 
 John Ainsworth was not a missionary. He was “the most pro-African of all senior 
administrators,”3 according to historian Robert Maxon. Ainsworth, on retirement leave from his 
post in Kenya, remained active in politics during the Northey years, with his advice remaining 
instrumental to curbing settler paramountcy.4 Ainsworth framed his vision for the War Relief 
Fund for Africans within the context of his first-hand observations of the effects of the First 
World War on Kenyan communities.5 Upon his retirement, however, the Municipal Council 
 
3 Maxon, Struggle for Kenya, 195. 
4 Maxon, Struggle for Kenya, chapters 6 and 7.  
5 KNA, RN/4/55, “Works Committee Minutes,” April 15th, 1919, 58. 
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assigned relief and memorial duties to Canon Burns and Father Macnamara, who had been active 
lobbyists for a Memorial Hall for Africans in the new ‘Native Location’ of Pumwani in Nairobi 
since the early 1920s.6 Thus it was not settlers but the ecclesiastical pillar of what Robert Tignor 
calls the ‘three societies’ in Kenya Colony7 who the Municipal Council tasked with 
memorializing the Kenyan role in the Great War in Nairobi’s landscape (complimenting the 
IWGC’s work).  
 While I have downplayed the significance of missionaries in Kenya Colony’s postwar 
history thus far, their role is integral to understanding the dynamic political atmosphere in the 
1920s. The white men of means who have been the focus of this study were responsive to 
religious organizations and humanitarian lobbies who were essential to the socio-cultural “single 
chain mail”8 of whiteness, but also issued clear challenges to labour and land-focused policy 
friendly to settler interests.9 Missionaries played the roles of educators, what we might call 
human rights advocates today, and, from the settler perspective, spread “the germ of 
discontent”10 through educational programs (although this was laid firmly at the feet of Catholic 
rather than Protestant missions 11). Missionaries made early attempts to work with settlers and 
administrators in their ‘civilizing mission,’ but settlers remained wary of the missions “not 
producing faithful servants, and for lobbying British public opinion in defence of native 
interests.” 12  Despite settlers’ concerns, “missionaries consider[ed] their work as beneficial to the 
 
6 See KNA, RN/4/55, “Report of Native Affairs Committee,” August 30th, 1926, 175; KNA, AP/1/1106. 
7 Robert Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 355. 
8 Shadle, The Souls of White Folk, 59.  
9 See for example Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya, especially chapters 6 and 9; Maxon, The 
Struggle for Kenya. 
10 Kennedy, Islands of White, 162.  
11 Ibid., note 59, 239.  
12 Renison M. Githige, “The Mission State Relationship in Colonial Kenya: A Summary,” Journal of 
Religion in Africa 13 (2) (1982): 112. See also John E. Anderson, The Struggle for the School: The Interaction of 
Missionary, Colonial Government and Nationalist Enterprise in the Development of Formal Education in Kenya 
(London: Longman, 1970).  
 153 
settlers in that missions trained their labourers.”13 Ultimately, missionaries remained part of the 
dominant racial order in Kenya, but their role must be considered separate from that of settlers, 
particularly those on large estates and in exclusive social groups. Missionaries, for their part, 
worked in the Kenyan areas where settlers rarely ventured. 
 The leading figure within the missionary cadres in Nairobi was Canon Burns, the 
appointed advocate of Kenyan interests in the colony after the Devonshire White Paper.14 Burns’ 
work tried to interpret the effects of colonial policy on Kenyans and the efficacy of settler policy 
in achieving the ‘civilizing mission.’ Missionaries spoke for Kenyans on most issues, even after 
the creation of Local Native Councils in 1924.15 Trusted chiefs and headmen were integral parts 
in the administrative machinery in Kenya colony, but missionaries never relinquished their role 
as the primary ‘civilizing’ arm of colonialism in Kenya. Even if the role was largely artificial in 
the face of settler political power, missionaries provided substantive checks upon settler 
movements for self-government, ensuring that “settlers were essentially supplicants at the 
Imperial table.”16 Concerned with the prospects of their own work in Kenyan communities, 
however, missionaries like Canon Burns needed to tread lightly when it came to challenging 
settler advances. 
 Like missionaries, women occupied a liminal role in settler society, at once essential to 
reproducing British society abroad but without formal power in the political sphere. Lady Isabel 
McGregor Ross, the founder of EAWL, helped define settler women’s’ niche as the maternalistic 
force in Kenya’s settler society. Isabel was the wife of William McGregor Ross and the couple 
 
13 Githige, “The Mission State Relationship in Colonial Kenya,” 112. 
14 CJD Duder, “An Army of One’s Own: The Politics of the Kenya Defence Force,” Canadian Journal of 
African Studies 25 (2) (1991): 210.  
15 R.M. Mambo, “Local Native Councils and Education in Kenya: the Case of the Coast Province, 1925-
1930,” Transafrican Journal of History 10 (1981): 61-86. See also Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya. 
16 Duder, “An Army of One’s Own,” 210.  
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were two of the eminent critics of settler policy in Kenya. William served as the Director of 
Public Works until 1922, offering continuous opposition to settler policy, especially in Nairobi.17 
Meanwhile, under Isabel’s leadership, the EAWL concerned itself mostly with the care of 
Kenyan women and children, while linking settler women in the larger urban centres to their 
sisters not only in the rural areas of Kenya Colony but across the British Empire more generally. 
The EAWL was not an overtly political group, but its members shaped the contours of social life 
in Kenya Colony and, from time to time, weighed in on political issues where a particular policy 
fell under the traditional domain of women or required a women’s perspective.18 The EAWL was 
by no means the only women’s organization in Kenya Colony, but it was a dominant force in 
Kenya’s civil society.  
 The earliest work of the League focused on direct war relief in tandem with the Red 
Cross. Capitalizing on movements throughout the British Empire, and McGregor Ross’ status as 
a leading suffragette, the EAWL also led the campaign for the women’s franchise in Kenya 
Colony, which they achieved in 1918. 19 Thus the EAWL was part of an Empire-wide 
renegotiation of women’s role in the building of nations, the maintenance and extension of 
Empire, and, crucially for the auspices of this study, healing the wounds of war in the interwar 
era.20 The founders of the League thus responded to the great outpouring of need in the wake of 
the First World War, finding a role for settler women in the rebuilding of society after 1918.  
 
17 Diana Wylie, “Confrontation over Kenya: The Colonial Office and Its Critics, 1918-1940,” The Jorunal 
of African History 18 (3) (1977): 428.  
18 Van Tol, “The Women of Kenya Speak.”  
19 Ibid. East Africa Women’s League, “Formation of the EAWL,” History of the EAWL, last updated 2015, 
www.eawl.org/formation. 
20 The literature on gender, war, and commemoration is significant, as is the growing attention to women at 
war. See, for example: Joy Damousi, The Labour of Loss: Mourning, Memory and Bereavement in Australia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jane Potter, Boys in Khaki, Girls in Print: Women’s Literary 
Responses to the Great War 1914-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Nicoletta F. Gullace, “The Blood 
of Our Sons”: Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship During the Great War (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2002); Erika Kuhlman, Reconstructing Patriarchy after the Great War: Women, Gender, and 
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 The evolution of the EAWL is itself a fascinating, yet underappreciated, aspect of 
Kenya’s colonial history. McGregor Ross’ early presidency gave way to Lady MacMillan’s 
presidency by 1923, with the organization under financial duress, which signaled a change in 
direction in the EAWL’s work.21 Lady McMillan, the wife of American millionaire Northrup 
McMillan – who renounced his American citizenship to fight in the First World War with the 
Frontiersmen22 - was a close friend and political ally of Lord Delamere.23 The McMillans  
mingled within a social group that gave them access to political power and elite social status. 
Unlike Isabel McGregor Ross, Lady McMillan was a firm ally of the ‘big men’ (and women) in 
Kenya Colony, with the McMillan Memorial Library still standing in Nairobi as a testament to 
their political clout. 
 McMillan’s presidency moved the organization from a mandate that sought to relieve 
suffering in Kenyan communities to concrete interventions in ‘native areas’ to overhaul existing 
household practices. In short, the EAWL began lobbying for policies that curbed ‘uncivilized 
behaviour.’24 Despite poor documentation in the KNA for the EAWL’s early history, the 
reputation of Isabel and her husband William suggest a marked shift after their departure towards 
cultural reform in Indian and Kenyan households with McMillan at the helm. After 1925, where 
documentation provides a clearer definition of the organization and its principles, the EAWL 
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moved in lockstep with the settler political elite. The EAWL is therefore an illustrative group 
through which historians can glean a fuller understanding of settler society, specifically the ways 
in which women influenced colonial culture.  
 Ultimately, through their commemorative programs the EAWL and missionaries 
established threads of non-state memory-making in the 1920s. Missionaries and women 
exemplify how settler, state, and supra or sub state threads of memory knotted together in the 
context of colonial politics. In the process, Kenyan memory of the First World War beyond the 
community level became locked within the knots. With settler society, the state, missionaries, 
and the IWGC all unable to straighten out the threads of memory in Kenya Colony, they only 
pulled the knot tighter. Kenyan memory and meaning-making rarely made it into official 
commemorations. The state and civil society appropriated Kenyan sacrifices and supposed they 
could speak for Kenyan communities. Whether it was a trans-imperial organization like the 
IWGC, the settler political elite, Governors and administrators, or liminal members of settler 
society like women and missionaries, Kenyan sacrifices were deployed to achieve particular 
political agendas when they were not suppressed outright. Meanwhile, the ostensible trustees of 
Kenya Colony offered few opportunities for healing, mourning, grieving, and building 
communities around the memory of the Great War.  
 
The ‘Native’ War Memorial Hall: Segregation, Town Planning, and the Politics of 
Trusteeship 
 If there was a sector of Kenya Colony’s civil society that was most likely to provide 
outlets for a Kenyan memory of the First World War, it was missionaries. Borne partially of self-
interest, but driven largely by genuine efforts to bring Africans into line with Christian notions of 
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‘civility,’ missionaries took on the quotidian work of colonialism within Kenyan communities. 
Their work was largely resigned to spaces outside large urban centres because urban settings 
were reserved mostly for settler uses. Nonetheless, Kenyans still outnumbered Britons in cities 
like Nairobi, which created a role for missionaries in the capital. As the settler population grew 
in the years immediately following the Great War, the pressures of Black, Indian, and white 
bodies coming into contact in the capital stimulated a series of policy-making decisions meant to 
alleviate conflict between the groups. 
 In 1924, Nairobi was in the middle of scheme to overhaul its city layout. On the one 
hand, the Municipal Council wished to have a capital worthy of other capitals of the Empire, but 
on the other its redevelopment plan was a remedy for the presence of Indian and Kenyan bodies 
in white-coded Nairobi.25 It was the first of several Town Planning schemes in the 1920s, 
overshadowed only by the plans for 1927-1928. The key to both plans was the creation of ‘native 
locations’ that would segregate the city. The Town Planning Committee established Pumwani in 
1923 and Kariokor in 1929 as the two main designated areas for Kenyans in Nairobi.26 As 
Ainsworth envisioned it, Kariokor became a ‘native location’ in the same area that served as the 
Carrier Corps depot during the First World War. Stemming from concerns over the poor 
conditions of Kenyan housing, the health of labourers in Nairobi, and the segregation of the 
races, the Town Planning Schemes clearly demarcated the boundaries of white, Kenyan, and 
Indian spaces, despite the inability to enforce boundaries over the long-term.27 As early as 1919, 
it was clear that memorialization and segregation could go hand-in-hand. 
 
25 KNA, RN/6/45, “Meeting Concerning the City Square Scheme,” n.d., 1. See also Luise White, Comforts 
of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), especially chapter 3; 
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Urban History 34 (3) (2007): 504-540.  
26 White, Comforts of Home, 51. On the history of Kariokor see redevelopment plans from 1962: KNA, 
ACW/31/73. 
27 Hay and Harris, “The colonial regime of urban housing in Kenya.” 
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 While the connection to the First World War is obvious for the Kariokor district, 
Pumwani also had a commemorative purpose. After years of advocacy, the Committee decided 
on Pumwani as the site of a Memorial Hall for utilitarian uses. It was to be managed by the 
missionaries responsible for the programs and services in ‘native locations.’28 The 
commemorative project achieved two related goals, namely transferring the responsibility for 
providing services to Nairobi’s Kenyan population to non-state entities, and dispensing of funds 
from the East Africa War Relief Fund for Africans, which had been on the books since the end of 
the war. Thus, the Town Planning Committee carefully fitted the plans for the ‘Native’ Memorial 
Hall into its existing plan for segregating the city and streamlining its administration as a 
colonial capital. The Hall was not a testament to Kenyan sacrifices from 1914-1918, but a part of 
achieving the Town Planning Scheme’s objectives.  
The ‘Native’ Memorial Hall, however, was clearly not a priority for the Town Planning 
Committee. The plans for the redeployment of funds from the East Africa War Relief Fund for 
Africans began in 1919, but Governor Robert Coryndon only laid the first cornerstone for the 
‘Native’ Memorial Hall in 1924, at a ceremony for which scant evidence remains.29 Further, the 
Pumwani housing scheme did not begin in earnest until 1925, leading to considerable delays in 
erecting the Memorial Hall.30 The transfer of the program for the Hall to the missions in the area 
highlight the division of responsibilities within Kenya Colony when it came to administering  
services for Kenyan populations. Specifically, the state and settlers were concerned more with 
making the ‘idle’ Kenyan work and farm, while the missions took up educational and social 
 
28 KNA, AP/1/1106, “Minutes of a Meeting Held at Mr. Ainsworth’s House,” October 10th, 1919, 1-2.  
29 KNA, “Ukamba Annual Report, 1924,” subsection on Native Affairs in non-Native Areas, 18. 
Government Archives, Reel 1.  
30 “Public Health,” Kenya Colony Annual Report, 1924 (New York: Andronicus), 6-7. All annual reports 
are available at the University of Syracuse Bird Library.  
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tasks. The division of responsibilities thus defined the framework for Kenyan memorialization in 
Nairobi, leading to the considerable delay in the Hall’s construction.  
After the transfer of responsibilities to the missions, Canon Burns asked for a plot of land 
to be set aside for the Memorial Hall in close proximity to the IWGC monument.31 In November 
1925, with the Memorial Hall apparently built, the Native Affairs Committee proposed an 
official opening for 12 December 1925,32 but this was delayed until at least 20 March 1926.33 
The missionaries, settlers, and the administration were still debating the actual use of the 
Memorial Hall throughout 1926, with the Native Council “unanimously in favour of the Native 
Memorial Hall being used as a school.”34 The debate over the uses of the East Africa Memorial 
Fund and any potential memorial project also date to 1919 and the advocacy of J.W. Arthur, 
another prominent missionary in Kenya Colony. Arthur was an ardent advocate for training 
schools and education under the direction of missionaries.35 The Hall, however, was eventually 
used for dances and other entertainment, falling into disrepair by the 1930s.36 Nonetheless, the 
missionary responsibility for schooling and civilizing prompted the proposal for a utilitarian 
function of the ‘Native’ Memorial Hall. 
First World War memory also had clear benefits for missionary work in Kenya Colony. 
Advancing educational policy was key to spreading religious teachings in an effort to civilize 
and extend Church power throughout the British, and indeed European, Empire(s). Especially in 
the planning stages of the Memorial Hall between 1919-1923, the missionaries responsible for 
the development collaborated with the Municipal Council in ways that provided for the 
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segregation of the city.37 The contradictions of at once desiring the settler community to be a 
good influence upon Kenyans and “on the other hand, the European community [being] not 
ready to share services with Africans, [resulted in] segregated services in Nairobi, administered 
by the same missionaries.”38 The commemoration of the First World War for Kenyans thus 
supported ongoing policies of distancing Kenyan populations from the white community, in turn 
subsuming their memorialization to colonial control. Borne of good intentions – the 
improvement of Kenyan areas of Nairobi through social services – the Municipal Council 
constrained missionary efforts to achieve their ‘civilizing mission.’  
The irony is thick when considering the demographics of Nairobi and the impetus for 
segregation. The First World War made Nairobi a hub for Carrier deployment, thus increasing 
the Kenyan population in the city. Furthermore, the Soldier Settlement Scheme increased the 
settler population of the city and put pressure upon the existing infrastructure. Pumwani itself 
was part of a scheme to eliminate two other Kenyan locations – Kilelwesha and Pangani – 
concentrating the non-white areas to free up “valuable” land for settler uses.39 Thus a fund 
developed for relief from the conditions of warfare morphed into a program to commemorate 
Kenyan sacrifices, which in turn helped consolidate the segregation of the city and a shrinking of 
available area for Kenyan uses. The result was a far cry from what Ainsworth had envisioned 
when he helped create the War Relief Fund. The plans for Pumwani and the ‘Native’ Memorial 
Hall drove settler control of Nairobi rather than providing real relief for and remembrance of the 
Kenyan part in the Great War.  
 
37 KNA, RN/4/55, especially after 61.  
38 Githige, “The Mission State Relationship,” 112.  
39 KNA, RN/4/67. 
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Shamsul Alam’s discussion of colonial hegemony is instructive here. Following leading 
theorists of colonial hegemony, Alam delineates the specificity required to understand the 
hegemonic relationship between colonizer and colonized in the context of “mature” 
imperialism.40 In particular, the dynamic interplay of persuasion and coercion constitute the dual 
pillars of colonial rule. Persuasion “constitutes the apparently benevolent mission of colonial 
modernity, like the introduction of Western education, health care, penal systems, or railways,” 
while coercion is the use of direct force and violence.41 Coercion and persuasion were key 
elements of achieving “the domination of physical space, the transformation of natives’ minds, 
and the integration of the local economy into the Western capitalist system.”42 
The location of the Hall was replete with the symbolism of colonial hegemony. Close to 
the IWGC monument, the Hall was under the watchful gaze of the loyal Kenyans who came to 
the defence of the Empire and the Colony. As if that was not sufficient, the Native 
Commissioner’s office sat at the junction just outside of the monument and close to the Hall. The 
monument defined the ideal Kenyan subject – loyal, sacrificial, obedient – while the Native 
Commissioner served as the unseen eyes of the colonial state in the panopticon of Nairobi. All 
the while, the intended uses of the Hall were about civilizing Kenyan society. The settler 
dominance of local politics pulled the missionary-driven commemoration of the First World War 
in the Kenyan section of Nairobi into the knotted political context of colonial control. In an 
attempt to turn the sacrifice for Empire into better living conditions and social lives for Kenyans 
inhabiting Nairobi – itself an aspect of colonial hegemony – commemoration was meaningful 
only insofar as it remained responsive to settler imperatives.  
 
40 S.M Shamsul Alam, Rethinking Mau Mau in Colonial Kenya (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1-
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Fundamental to understanding the development of a commemorative culture in Kenya 
Colony is that there was both broad commonality within the white community of Kenya but also 
contestation as well. Missionaries and the colonial state, supported by metropolitan interests, 
attempted to soften the edges of colonial projects. Nonetheless, the necessity of the settler 
community for the successful subjugation and development of the territory opened those systems 
up to cooption, with varying levels of success. In what was deemed a “non-Native” area like 
Nairobi, the successful cooption of commemorative programs is unsurprising. The missionary 
response and impulse to ‘civilize’ fit well with plans to re-shape Nairobi’s urban dynamics, 
meshing with an evolving system of urban segregation. 
 
The EAWL, Maternal Trusteeship, and Great War Memory 
 The history of urban segregation, the concentration of ‘native areas,’ and the 
development of Pumwani and Kariokor through the 1920s has important connections with the 
history of the EAWL as well. Until 1922, Isabel and William McGregor Ross were key figures in 
Kenya Colony, with the latter serving as the Director of Public Works for 17 years. The Rosses’ 
personal views on settlement flowed from “puritan ethics as a practical guide for the behaviour 
even of government.”43 As a proud Scotsman who “disapproved of the English class system,”44 
William McGregor stood in stark opposition to the political elite in the settler community. Isabel 
was a prominent suffragette in Britain, bringing the cause to Kenya in 1919.45 According to Marc 
Matera, she was “staunchly independent in her views[,]…an ardent feminist and committed 
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activist.”46 Above all, the couple was part of a growing movement, both amongst administrators 
and in the metropole, who objected to settler behaviour and desired a more humanitarian 
approach to Empire. 
 In some ways, the stories of the Rosses and Fabian Ware bear resemblance. They shared 
a common disdain for a class system that upheld inequality and recognized that the elite in 
society did not necessarily earn their roles. The egalitarian visions of the Rosses and Ware drove 
their work within the Empire, with Ware insisting upon equal treatment, while William 
McGregor Ross emphasized the importance of Kenyan development and the sharing of the fruits 
of the Colony’s labour. Ware certainly did not oversee a program that adhered to his vision, in 
many ways a product of existing circumstances caused by the politics in Kenya and competing 
views and practices within the IWGC. Likewise, Ross operated predominantly under settler-
friendly conditions, which in turn constrained his ability to lobby for his particular vision of 
Empire. In many ways, both Ware and the Rosses embodied the competing visions under the 
common banner of the British Empire. The contestation of what Empire meant played out 
through the practice of colonialism and Kenya was caught in between self-governing territory 
and trading colony statuses. 
The Rosses left Kenya when their calls for adherence to the tenets of trusteeship grew too 
loud for prominent settlers who had long rejected William’s role in Kenya. The Public Works 
Department thus moved from a period of overwhelming government action on the file, to 
domination by private enterprises.47Meanwhile, the EAWL shifted its leadership and focus. The 
 
46 Marx Matera, Black London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 226. See also Susan Pedersen, “National Bodies, Unspeakable 
Acts: The Sexual Politics of Colonial Policy Making,” in Beyond the Body Proper: Reading the Anthropology of 
Material Life, Margaret M. Lock and Judith Farquhar eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 337.  
47 Wylie, “Norman Leys and McGregor Ross,” 303-304.  
 164 
departure of the Ross’ is thus essential to the trajectory of commemoration in Kenya for multiple 
reasons. First, it should be noted that the Nairobi War Memorial Hall and Obelisk were erected 
through private enterprises rather than the government, as was the ‘Native’ Memorial Hall in 
Pumwani.48 This correlated with the marked shift towards settler dominance of Municipal 
Affairs in Nairobi, and settler suspicions of government officials like McGregor Ross. Further, 
Ross’ departure as Director of Public Work hints at the extent of settler power in the early 1920s, 
especially as their control over infrastructure, development, and land allocation delimited the 
extent to which non-state actors, and even the state itself, could act on behalf of Kenyan 
populations. Missionaries, political lobbies, and liberal-minded officials either functioned within 
the framework of settler ascendency or met the same fate as Ross. Finally, for the EAWL, the 
change in leadership precipitated by Ross’s leave to England meant it was freed up for a more 
settler-friendly occupants.49 Those crucial six years between 1918-1924, and especially between 
1922-1924, represented the period when Kenya Colony devised the majority of infrastructural 
commemorative work, and when a growth in population and political power stimulated a more 
aristocratic socio-political culture.  
The EAWL, however, was not simply a carbon copy of male settler society. The 
organization, especially after Ross’s departure, specialized in projects that sought to bring 
Kenyan domestic life to European standards, including curtailing practices deemed barbaric, 
such as female circumcision in Gikuyu culture.50 The EAWL, in reference to the campaign 
against female circumcision, differed greatly from Isabel Ross, as the latter supported Kenyan 
 
48 See Chapter 3 for Memorial Hall and the Obelisk. For ‘Native’ Memorial Hall see KNA, RN/4/55. 
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rights to practice cultural traditions.51 The differences between Ross and the EAWL on the 
circumcision issue emphasizes the organizations’ move from the politics of maternal 
imperialism52 to maternal settler colonialism.53 Settler women were just as instrumental to the 
subjugation of Kenyan communities as their male compatriots.  
The two frameworks for understanding women’s role in Empire – maternal imperialism 
and maternal settler colonialism – shared a common purpose, however. Settlers still thought 
themselves “inhabitants of a country they deemed to be the most progressive and civilised nation 
of the world,”54 but “[those] emigrant women in settler societies did not necessarily act in 
accordance with the objectives and approaches prescribed by campaigners in Britain.”55 While 
much of the EAWL’s work might be understood through the lens of an Empire-wide deployment 
of racial difference as a means to extoll the superior qualities of whiteness,56 I argue here that 
several programs connected to the First World War spoke exclusively to the settler community. 
One of those programs, the Poppy Drive, remained largely unchanged from 1922 through 
to the end of the 1920s. The EAWL orchestrated yearly Poppy Drives and Legion Balls as social 
events that were exclusive to the white settler communities. The organization’s annual reports 
indicate that these social gatherings were some of the League’s only programs directed at the 
care of the white settler community as opposed to their work in the domestic lives of Kenyans 
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and Indians. Its commemorative work framed the First World War as a white experience, playing 
a constitutive role in postwar schemes to ensure settlers cared for their veterans and remembered 
their dead. Given the EAWL’s maternal role in Kenya Colony’s civil society, it is no surprise 
that the League championed veterans’ care. But considering the immense toll the Great War 
exacted upon Kenyan communities, especially women and children left without husbands and 
fathers, it is curious that the EAWL’s commemorative projects did not also include remedies for 
Kenyan communities.  
The administration of Poppy Drives and the organization of Legion Balls prior to 1928, 
when the British Legion’s East African Branch came into being, were staples of social cohesion 
in the interwar years. The EAWL called upon the settler community to contribute to the care of 
white veterans through the Poppy Drive, while it brought settler communities together through 
Legion Balls. Notably, these were two of the only programs that did not concern the welfare and 
reform of Kenyan domestic life.57 As the history of the organization described, “the family 
system of the Indians in the Colony, and the tribal customs of Africans, have covered the major 
problems that come under the heading of the welfare of women and children.”58 The poppy drive 
and the Legion Balls thus contributed to the racialized colonial discourse of Kenya Colony, but 
through action in white communities rather than settler work in Kenyan communities. The 
EAWL viewed the First World War as the history of white settlers, crucial to the meaning of the 
conflict for white communities, rather than acknowledging the broad-based mobilization of 
Kenyan society. 
 
57 The extent of the EAWL’s programs can be found in their yearly annual reports. See, for example, KNA, 
AZG1/7/24, “Report of the Annual Meeting of the EAWL Council and The President’s Annual Report, 1930,” 14.  
58 EAWL, “A Short History of the EAWL,” KNA AZG1/7/24, 216. See also the larger literature on the 
‘Black Peril’ and the regulation of Kenyan bodies as a means of extending white prestige as part of a broader 
colonial discourse, for example, Shadle, The Souls of White Folk, 85-88; Kennedy, Islands of White, 128-147.  
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The EAWL’s commemorative work in the inter-war years is fascinating because the 
colonial discourse at work was not necessarily that of ‘othering’ Kenyans, but of fastening the 
bonds of the white community through the memory of the First World War. Inevitably, the act of 
reproducing social events and norms from the metropole set the white settler community apart 
from the subjects over whom they ruled; however, the type of identification in which the EAWL 
engaged through commemoration was not as explicit as the ‘civilizing’ and domestic reform 
narratives that marked the EAWL’s other programs.  The EAWL had a vested interest in setting 
themselves out as settlers, as opposed to British citizens, because their livelihoods were equally 
in question as their male counterparts, if not more so due to their liminal role in settler society.  
As E.A.T. Dutton put it to Ailsa Turner, the League’s President from 1925, it was 
essential that the EAWL “disabuse people…of the apparently prevalent idea that women in East 
Africa do absolutely nothing for the natives…. The whole of the debate is an example of the kind 
of thing which is being said about the country and apparently allowed to pass by default.”59 
Deanne van Tol argues, for example, that in the debate over Closer Union with Uganda and 
Tanganyika, “empowered white women in Kenya…involved [themselves] in a colonial politics 
that sought to disempower African men and women.”60 In order to do so the EAWL needed to 
create strong bonds of white settler identity, to feel at home in Kenya, and unite themselves “to 
do everything we possibly can to assist our fellow countrymen to obtain a solution of the 
question of the future of this Colony.”61 The Poppy Drives, Legion Balls, and commemorative 
work served such a purpose, highlighting the distinct ways that women intervened in colonial 
practice.  
 
59 KNA, AZG1/7/24, “E.A.T. Dutton to Mrs. R.B. Turner,” November 10th, 1929, 2.  
60 Van Tol, “The Women of Kenya Speak,” 437. 




Figure 10. Poppy Day advertisement from the East African Standard, November 11th,  
      1925.62 
 
 
62 EAS, “Poppy Day Advertisement,” November 11th, 1925, 5. All references to the East African Standard 
were collected at the Bird Library at the University of Syracuse.  
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The EAWL administered its program from the heart of Nairobi’s city centre, occupying 
space in the Memorial Hall. Just as the male settler politicians used a commemorative building to 
symbolize their opposition to metropolitan policy, women inhabited a memorial building that 
served as a consistent reminder that the First World War was a foundational event for the British, 
and particularly settler, presence in Kenya. The centrality of Memorial Hall in the political and 
social life of the Colony are testaments to the meaning of war memory in inter-war Kenya 
Colony. The physical presence of a First World War memorial in the capital facilitated the 
organization and practice of official political and voluntary service in Kenya; living memorials 
provided spaces of memory where the sacrifices of 1914-1918 were meant to shape daily life. 
Because settlers went about their daily lives in these spaces, meanings shifted with socio-
political contexts. For settlers, this meant that Memorial Hall bound them to one another as 
Kenyan settlers rather than as British citizens in a far-off outpost of Empire. Sacrifice entailed 
both imperial unity and settler independence.  
The EAWL’s Poppy Drive, however, pre-dated the Memorial Hall. Although Annual 
Reports for the EAWL are not available prior to 1930, their history suggests that the program 
goes back to 1922 – coincidentally the same year that Isabel McGregor Ross left the colony.63 
The British Legion’s appeal in England pre-dated the EAWL’s organized drive in Kenya Colony 
by only one year.64 It was one of the EAWL’s oldest campaigns, which in tandem with its 
collaborators from its First World War work, the British Red Cross and the British Legion, 
remained a staple of the EAWL’s work until decolonization. Entailing the care of veterans and 
 
63 KNA, AZG1/7/24, “Annual Report for 1930,” 32. 
64 Gregory, The Silence of Memory, 99. 
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healing from the wounds of war, this was an appropriate outlet for settler women65 to make their 
mark in inter-war Kenya, fitting with its more general purpose of domestic reform.  
As was the case with many of its programs, the EAWL delegated responsibilities out to 
District-level EAWL branches, or in cases where there was no branch, prominent settlers or 
administrators. Nonetheless, the central branch at Nairobi executed much of the work, with Ailsa 
Turner and colleagues in Nairobi sending letters across the colony to prominent community 
leaders and district administrators facilitating the dissemination of poppies, which were made in 
Nairobi but distributed through depots set up by EAWL members in their respective outposts.66 
The EAWL sent monies raised for the Haig’s Poppy Fund back to London for distribution, 
though over the course of the 1920s funds raised within Kenya Colony could be distributed to 
support veterans locally first based upon need.67 
Much of the documentation surrounding the Poppy Drives is procedural correspondence, 
but it is clear that the campaign consumed much of the organization’s time and effort each 
year.68 Most of the sales of individual poppies and wreaths were from the settler community, but 
in Mombasa the Arab and Indian communities also purchased  wreaths each year.69 The laying of 
wreaths was a crucial aspect of Armistice Day ceremonies, reflecting key political dynamics in 
Kenya Colony, a topic to which I return in the next chapter. The EAWL’s role in making, 
distributing, and administering funds associated with the Poppy campaign served as connective 
tissue for the settler community, but also linked the colony to the metropole and other nodes of 
Empire through collective commemoration. Nonetheless, the EAWL’s political activity cannot 
 
65 Ibid., 101.  
66 KNA, AZG1/7/24, “Annual Report for 1930,” 32.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Armistice Day files are available for most provinces and districts. From 1925-1930, Ailsa Turner’s name 
features prominently in these files, writing letters to gain support for Poppy and wreath sales in the lead-up to each 
November’s events. See Chapter 7.  
69 See KNA, PC/COAST/1/3/161. 
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be separated from its work in First World War commemoration. Women settlers, Patricia Lorcin 
argues, found voice in growing urban centres. 
Where conflict between races seemed inevitable to metropolitan critics and colonial 
administrators, settlers battled against policies that sought to “forestall…protests and violence 
that the racial inequality would ultimately engender.”70 The bonds of the settler community thus 
took precedence over the EAWL’s broader mission of connecting women across the Empire and 
improving conditions for all women, regardless of race.71 The same politics of duress, arising in 
the context of a community in question, shaped the commemorative acts of women settlers as it 
did for the male political elite.  
Legion Balls complemented the Poppy appeal. Again in concert with the British Legion, 
the EAWL organized Legion Balls across the colony throughout the 1920s, which were 
exclusive events to honour officers and soldiers who fought both in Europe and in Africa from 
1914-1918. The Legion Ball followed from the tradition of dances as social gatherings in Kenya 
with the first “Armistice Night Fancy Dress Dance at the Railway Institute” on 11 November 
1921.72 This was not organized by the EAWL, though it appears that the Legion Ball overtook 
any other social gatherings as the place to be in Nairobi (and other outposts) after 1923.73  
The reason for this might have been reviews of the Fancy Dress Ball in the East African 
Standard in 1922. One observer noted that “the Armistice Day Ball, where the public of the 
Capital threw off resolutely the sad memories which had been engendered by the impressive 
ceremony of the morning…went to the other extreme in frivolity and nonsense.”74 This was not 
 
70 Particia M.E. Lorcin, Historicizing Colonial Nostalgia: European Women’s Narratives of Algeria and 
Kenya (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 108.  
71 Ibid., 68-71. 
72 East African Standard, “Armistice Day: Arrangements for Celebration,” November 11th, 1921, 4.  
73 See Ibid., from 1922-1936. 
74 East African Standard, “Fancy Dress Ball,” November 13th, 1922, 6. 
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something that the commentator lamented, but “the most wonderful the town has seen since the 
dark days of deep depression.”75 In later years, as the EAWL’s program moved towards 
temperance, uplift, and moral behaviour, the annual dances took on more elite sensibilities.  
In 1923, a concerned East African Standard reader addressed the issue that the Civil 
Service Association, who organized the Armistice Ball, “should have chosen Armistice Eve to 
promote a dance to benefit their own funds when it was possible to promote a dance to benefit a 
charity on behalf of some of the poor lads, who, through the war, are unable to play football.”76 
The reader conveyed “considerable disgust expressed that the financial results…are to be 
devoted to augment the funds of an Athletic Association and not, as many people thought, to 
benefit a war charity.”77 The annual celebration clearly disturbed some onlookers, and the East 
African Standard noted a move towards a more reverent rather than celebratory Armistice. “The 
moment of joy,” it wrote, “has been succeeded during the past five years by many periods of 
sadness.”78 
It appears as though the general populace agreed, transferring responsibilities in 1924 and 
1925 to the St. Dunstan’s Anglican Church, whose outposts delivered programs for disabled 
veterans across the Empire. The admissions fees remained the same as in previous years, though 
presumably the funds went to supplementing their existing programs. The St. Dunstan’s Ball 
remained a prominent event in Nairobi, whereas the EAWL-organized Legion Balls performed a 
similar role outside the capital.79 Thus the EAWL and missionaries, with decidedly less political 
 
75 Ibid. 
76 East African Standard, “Armistice Eve Dance,” November 13th, 1923, 5. 
77 Ibid.  
78 East African Standard, “Armistice Day,” November 10th, 1923, 4. See also for the example in Britain, 
East African Standard, “Hotels Gala Night,” November 14th, 1925, 1. “Armistice Night was marked by reverence 
instead of revelry, as heretofore at the Albert Hall.” 
79 For the procedural correspondence regarding the Legion Balls see, for example, KNA, 
PC/COAST/2/13/7; PC/COAST/2/13/21; KNA, PC/NZA/3/4/25; DC/KJD/3/8/2. Most files concerning Armistice 
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power than the settler political elite, intervened in Kenya Colony’s commemorative practices in a 
similar fashion to one another, albeit with divergent – yet not altogether different – agendas. 
As Adrian Gregory argues, this was not just a matter of accounting for the dead of 
Empire but a more general acknowledgement of sacrifice that extended to those living with 
service-related disabilities and impairments.80 By supporting charitable remembrance drives, the 
East African Standard noted, “we are giving practical assistance to those in need of it we are 
contributing to the welfare and happiness of men and women who are still called upon to suffer 
anxiety, hardship, and misery as a consequence of the great fight which they or those dear to 
them did so much to win.”81 Indeed, the very basis of the Haig Poppy Campaign was tending to 
veterans’ needs by employing them to produce poppies and wreaths and dedicating funds raised 
to their care. That the EAWL took part in both of the programs speaks to their vision of what 
settler society ought to be. Missionaries, like women, took on both the roles of spiritual leaders 
through death and loss, as well as the main caretakers of those unable to care for themselves. 
 Though much of the EAWL’s documentary evidence in the KNA is procedural 
correspondence, it appears that the Legion Balls were an extension of its Poppy Day programs.82 
Duder notes that soldier settlers had a difficult time organizing associations and organization in 
the immediate aftermath of the war, with the East African section of the British Legion not 
established until 1929.83 Nonetheless, the Haig Campaign in Kenya foregrounded the British 
Legion instead of the EAWL after 1927, hinting at the growth of soldier settler groups in the late 
1920s.84 By the 1930s, the Haig Fund in Kenya no longer went straight back to Britain but was 
 
Day preparations, especially after 1925, contain EAWL requests for prominent community members to attend the 
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80 Gregory, The Silence of Memory, 103-104.  
81 East African Standard, “Remembrance Day,” November 11th, 1925, 5.  
82 East African Standard, “Earl Haig Fund: Kabete,” November 9th, 1927, 13.  
83 Duder, “Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919,” 591.  
84 Ibid., 725-726.  
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administered by the Combined Benevolent Committee, dominated by British Legion members, 
but with the President of the EAWL present as well.85 This reflected both the growth of the 
British Legion as a powerful charity in the lead up to the Second World War, as well as the 
delegation of duties within society based on gendered conceptions of appropriate work. The 
EAWL remained behind-the-scenes throughout the entirety of the Haig Fund appeals, yet British 
Legion members administered funds and public uses of the monies.  
These Poppy Drives and Legion Balls were socially exclusive.86 They bounded a settler 
elite to Empire through commemoration, but also highlighted their Britishness and community 
dynamics in a particular context. The EAWL’s legitimacy to speak for women settlers stemmed 
from their work not only to improve domestic conditions in Kenyan communities, but in binding 
their white communities together. Thus, their role often defended white prestige, not only in 
reference to Kenyans and Indians but to the behaviours of their own as well. This is an essential 
filament of the settler thread of memory, especially considered within the context of the EAWL’s 
political advocacy in the later-1920s and early-1930s.  
 
85 KNA, AZG1/7/24, “EAWL Annual Report 1935/1936,” 131. 
86 See Footnote 79. 
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Figure 11. East African Standard Advertisement for Haig’s Poppy Fund, 1927.87 
 
The EAWL, Commemoration, and Creating ‘Home’ in Kenya Colony  
 When Lady Eleanor Cole accompanied Lord Delamere to London to tell the settler story 
in the debate over Closer Union with other East African territories, her expressed goal was to 
 
87 East African Standard, “Remembrance,” November 11th, 1927, 1.  
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emphasize that women settlers “are making permanent homes in Kenya, they are bringing up 
their children in the country with the idea that they too should make Kenya their home.”88 
Throughout the 1920s settlers struggled to define their home as Kenya, not just as trustees, but as 
permanent inhabitants. From their perspective they had earned this status by fighting for the 
Empire in East Africa, developing the Colony through agriculture and infrastructure, and 
directing the development of a Kenyan labour force. The First World War, both in its direct 
effects and its commemoration, was central to this claim to political independence and the 
necessity of support from the metropole.  
 Part of making their home in Kenya Colony was the curbing of white and black 
behaviours that threatened the social balance by undermining white prestige. As one concerned 
EAWL member wrote to Ailsa Turner, “The ‘Happy Valley’ or ‘Hot Stuff Corner’…was a 
disgrace to any country, and the behaviour of the residents was not of the kind to add to the 
prestige of the white man, or to cause the native to have any respect for white women.”89 While 
working in Kenyan communities intended to secure credibility in London, events like the Poppy 
Appeal and the Legion Balls extolled the virtues of a settler community in Africa. This gave the 
EAWL the internal credibility to speak on behalf of women’s issues in the settler political causes 
in the metropole.  
 Much has been made of women’s role in grieving, mourning, and rebuilding in the wake 
of the First World War.90 In the colonial context, women harnessed those energies towards their 
political empowerment. Commemoration served a political purpose alongside healing from the 
wounds of war through the care of veterans. This was especially so when the thin-white-line in 
 
88 Eleanor Cole, “Memorandum,” March 18th 1931, as quoted in Van Tol, “The Women of Kenya Speak,” 
437.  
89 KNA GH/24/7, Isabel Murray to Ailsa Turner, February 13th, 1930, 14-15. 
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Kenya Colony was in a state of duress. As Will Jackson and Chris Youé argue, this state of 
perpetual defence of settler legitimacy only increased as the prospect of self-governance and 
settler paramountcy waned.91 Women were not the political elite and therefore pulled on the 
imperial threads of commemoration in ways that highlighted their importance to the future of 
settler colonialism in Kenya. They shared the views of the settler political elite, driven by settler 
communities in question, but are differentiated by their liminal position in Empire. 
 
Liminality, Colonialism, and Commemoration: Missionaries and Women Remember 
 Women and missionaries feature as peripheral players in the historiography of Kenya 
Colony. Defined by their liminality – not quite full settlers, despite their whiteness – both groups 
took an active part in commemorative practice in inter-war Kenya. Marxist and politico-
economic histories have dominated analyses of settler colonialism in East Africa. Similarly, 
much of the work on Kenya’s female settlers has fallen under the heading of literary studies,92 
which often fails to look at the political implications of their views, actions, and relationships 
with their male counterparts. Even cultural histories of women in Kenya that tend to focus on 
men’s concerns over women’s bodies presume Kenyan aggressive sexuality and the prospect of 
miscegenation.93 The work of the EAWL and associated groups within the confines of a male-
dominated political elite are essential to broadening our understanding of the foundations of 
white settler society.   
 
91 Jackson, “Settler Colonialism in Kenya, 1880-1963,” 238-239; Youé, “Settler Colonies or Colonies with 
Settlers?,” especially in his review of Shadle’s Souls of White Folk. 
92 See, for example, Susan H. Aitken, Isak Dinesen and the Engendering of Narrative (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1990); Derrek R. Peterson, Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping, and the World of 
Imagination in Colonial Kenya (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2004); Tabitha M. Kanogo, African Womanhood in 
Colonial Kenya, 1900-1950 (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 2005); Lorcin, Historicizing Colonial Nostalgia. 
93 See literature on the ‘Black Peril’ in Kenya. For representative work see Kennedy, Islands of White, 
especially Chapter 7, and Brett Shadle, The Souls of White Folk, especially Chapter 4. 
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 Necessarily subordinate to the male members of the settler community, women found 
spaces that reflected appropriate work, and thus did not fall exclusively under the purview of 
either the colonial state or the ‘native authorities.’ Women, by the gendered nature of their work, 
transgressed what Mahmood Mamdani has called the ‘bifurcated’ colonial state, split between 
direct rule and indirect rule.94 Settler women were labourers, though not in the same way as 
Kenyan women,95 supporting the colonial state both through the solidification of the white settler 
community (direct rule), and the reform of Kenyan domestic life (indirect rule). The EAWL’s 
work that I have studied here augmented women’s standing and political authority in both 
realms. 
 Missionaries, likewise, supported neo-traditional authority in ‘native areas’ through 
education and religious indoctrination, while collaborating with state and settler authorities 
through what Lorenzo Veracini, channelling what Alan Atkinson calls “settler colonial 
geographical imagination.”96 Keeping their global vision of ecclesiastical spread, missionaries in 
Kenya were forced to act within a settler colonial imaginary that figured Kenya as the primary 
space of reference. That is, the global purview of missionary work was subsumed under the 
pressure of settler dominance, especially in segregated urban areas. Claire McLisky’s 
observations on 19th Century missionaries in Australia are equally applicable to the Kenyan case 
in the 1920s: “settler colonial missionaries actively endorsed and benefited from colonial policies 
of segregations, which…gave them almost complete control over their ‘charges.’”97 Even as 
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prominent critics of settler vices and the exploitation of Kenyan communities, missionaries’ 
liminal position granted them both power in Kenya Colony, but also required collaboration and 
concession. 
 The missionary and settler women’s roles in commemoration are examples of the ways 
that the Empire-wide memory of the war was also fixed in place. Settlers acknowledged and 
appreciated imperial forms of First World War memory but defining their place within that fabric 
was essential for their claims to difference, rooted in geographical coordinates. The centring of 
Kenya in commemorative traditions, and specifically the white settler experience, was common 
across the white political elite in the colony. Women and missionaries pulled at the threads 
differently, defining their own experience based on their liminal socio-political standing. 
Missionaries may have been responsible for an African Memorial Hall, but they centred their 
goals in its design and implementation within the confines of settler policy on urban public 
spaces. Likewise, women configured First World War memory within maternal notions of caring 
for society, again attempting to redefine the settler thread of memory as partially their 
responsibility. Just as missionaries drew upon their global mission, women adopted frameworks 
and strategies of remembrance from Britain and the Empire, but their programs spoke to the 
ever-evolving role of women in Kenya’s public sphere. Ultimately, an imperial framework for 
memory was insufficient for the political context of Kenya Colony, producing another colonial 
thread of remembrance. 
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6 – State Tethers I: Great War Memory Between Empire and Nation 
Every great civilization has left its memorial in buildings of some sort, even those 
ones in Mesopotamia which had little material to build with but wattle, clay and 
thatch. Not that our human forbearers built to impress posterity; they built to 
express themselves and to make a dignified setting for the life of the people and 
the State. 
Sir Edward Grigg, Governor of Kenya Colony (1925-1930)1 
 
When Sir Edward Grigg arrived in Kenya Colony in October 1925, he was no stranger to the 
continent. As one of Lord Alfred Milner’s kindergarten students, he had spent considerable time 
administering education policy in South Africa. Grigg was instrumental in the founding of the 
Round Table movement, serving as an editor of its journal from 1913 which espoused ideas of 
imperial federation.2 The appointment was beneficial to settlers, to whom both Grigg and 
Secretary of State Leo Amery were sympathetic,3 and a boon to their ongoing struggle to attain 
responsible self-government. Grigg was immersed to British politics, having served in 
Parliament as a Liberal representative for Oldham. Politicians at home, he surmised, consistently 
opposed Amery, Grigg, and the settlers’ strong conviction that white supremacy and trusteeship 
could coexist.4 Grigg, recovering from long untreated low-grade Yellow Fever, lamented to his 
friend Neville Chamberlain in 1930 that “this maniacal insistence upon native rights and interests 
to the exclusion of all other rights and interests is producing a temper between the races, and 
particularly amongst our own people here, which is simply disastrous.”5 The expatriate lives and 
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livelihoods of fellow countrymen in Kenya, Grigg presumed, were consistently under threat from 
British politicians and humanitarians, as well as those advocating for Indian interests from India.  
As Bruce Berman notes, “settler efforts to gain control of the state constituted a threat to the 
very existence of the Kenya Administration and to the ultimate control exercised by the 
metropole.”6 Thus, Coryndon and Grigg, presiding over the administration through the critical 
years of debate over settler and ‘native’ paramountcy, had vested interests in maintaining the 
legitimacy of the Governor’s office as the seat of power in East Africa,7 even if their goal was 
eventual settler control.8 Grigg advocated for a union between the territories of Tanganyika, 
Uganda, and Kenya as a means to secure majority white rule in East Africa, but Amery warned 
Grigg against moving too fast, lest he subvert the principles of the Mandate system at work in 
Tanganyika.9 Whether Coryndon or Grigg personally agreed with the principle that “imperial 
‘trusteeship’ could not be delegated or shared,”10 the concept remained a crucial impediment to 
the latter’s vision of Closer Union and settler self-governance. Critically, Grigg’s Closer Union 
required a massive demographic shift away from the aristocratic constitution of Kenya’s settler 
society who dominated its political cadres.11 Consequently, Grigg envisioned an enlarged role for 
the state, stimulating settler ‘responsibility’ and self-sufficiency.12 Thus, while the “single chain 
mail” of whiteness needed protection, the means through which settlers, the state, and the 
Colonial Office sought to do so differed. 
Coinciding with these years (1923-1928) was the major thrust in commemorative landscape 
development in Kenya. Coryndon unveiled the Memorial Obelisk and Memorial Hall, while 
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Grigg, alongside Acting Governor E.B. Denham, presided over the ceremonies at the relocation 
and unveiling of the IWGC’s African Memorial in Nairobi (1927), as well as its sister monument 
in Mombasa (1926). The way each of the governors spoke about the monuments, and how some 
settlers responded, accentuates the careful language necessary in every act of public discourse. 
Balancing elite settler opinion, Colonial Office dictates, and their own aspirations for Kenya 
Colony, both Grigg and Coryndon remained tethered to imperial narratives of ‘trusteeship,’ the 
Dual Policy, and a measured approach to settler dominance. These moments knotted together the 
imperial fibres, settler filaments, and state tethers of memory more tightly. With Kenyan memory 
locked within the knot, the entangled nature of Kenya Colony’s politics squeezed it even tighter. 
Remembrance and acknowledgement of their sacrifice were rarely spoken outside the context of 
the colonial state’s control over their affairs.  
Under Grigg the key tenets of imperial union were the backdrop for speaking about the First 
World War. Three policies help contextualize the ways Grigg spoke about the Great War: the 
Dual Policy and the ongoing negotiation of its meaning, increased settlement of small-scale 
farmers, and the Defence Force Ordinance. Each of the policies had roots that went deeper than 
Grigg’s governorship, however, his interpretation of how they ought to be implemented was 
distinct. Commemoration departed significantly from its settler-focused iconography in the 
early-1920s, centring Kenyan iconography as means to define an alternative trajectory for Kenya 
Colony. As we shall see in the next chapter, rituals of remembrance in inter-war Kenya 
continued to foreground a white memory of the First World War, meaning the colonial state had 




Sir Edward Grigg, Closer Union, and the Settlers of Kenya Colony 
 The idea of Closer Union between Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika pre-dated Grigg’s 
arrival in Kenya by only a year. The Labour Government created an East Africa Commission to 
assess the feasibility of administrative and economic cooperation in East Africa. Headed by 
William Ormsby-Gore, the Commission reiterated the terms of the Devonshire Declaration, 
especially ‘Native Paramountcy’ and the responsibilities of the colonial state for safeguarding 
and promoting African interests.13 The Commission’s report did not move the needle on Closer 
Union, deeming it premature.14 Instead, it brought a more moderate tone to discussions of 
Kenya’s settler community in Britain, with Lord Delamere doing much of the legwork in 
showing the members of the Commission hospitality during their stay in East Africa.15 
When the Labour Government fell in 1924, succeeded by the Conservatives, the idea of 
Closer Union gained new advocates in positions of power. Amery wanted a more strident 
advocate for the governorship of Kenya, Lord Lloyd, who turned down the position when Amery 
could not meet his condition of immediate union.16 Grigg accepted the position, and while he 
was an enthusiastic supporter of the idea, he apparently heeded the advice of colonial officials 
who were more suspect of the plan, taking the initiative on piece by piece. Nonetheless, he 
quelled much settler agitation over the idea that the metropole and the Colonial Office were 
consistently disregarding their needs in favour of taking on the responsibilities of ‘trusteeship,’ 
by advocating for a settler-led union in East Africa.17 Overall, Grigg held onto the idea of settler 
self-governance as a means to protect international security, British power, and the advancement 
 
13 Michael D. Callahan, “The failure of ‘Closer Union’ in British East Africa, 1929-1931,” The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 25 (2) (1997): 268-269. 
14 Gorman, “Organic Union or Aggressive Altruism,” 262. 
15 Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, 183-184.  
16 Gorman, “Organic Union or Aggressive Altruism,” 262.  
17 Ibid., 263. 
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of Western civilization. His perspective was not grounded in Kenya but in London as the centre 
of a newly constituted British Empire in line with the Milnerite school.18 
Flowing from Ormsby-Gore’s report, Grigg took on the Dual Policy as a necessary element 
of settler ascendency. As previously elucidated, the Dual Policy never judged Kenyan and settler 
production equally in practice but, from a purely ornamental perspective, Kenyan production on 
reserves needed to be promoted. It was a means of showing a genuine commitment to shared 
responsibility in trusteeship19 and, more pressingly for Closer Union, the ability of small-to-mid 
scale settlers to provide a solid base for settlement.20 Despite the usage of the term Dual Policy, 
which Grigg accredited to Coryndon, “Grigg’s emphasis was on the political aspects of 
complementary development … and even this theory of governance was little more than a 
convenient circumvention of Devonshire’s African paramountcy since it gave recognition to 
settler participation in administration.”21 Essentially, Grigg wanted to keep up appearances of 
engaging Kenyan production, but only as it served the interests of settler farmers through the 
flow of labour. 
Grigg’s interpretation of the Dual Policy correlated to another of his initiatives, namely 
increased state support for British immigration to Kenya Colony in the form of small-scale 
farmers. The new crop of settlers, Grigg argued, would put less of a demand upon Kenyan labour 
at times of harvest, thus undergirding self-sufficient settler production.22 Though the policy 
eventually failed, vetoed by the Colonial Office in 1928,23 Grigg’s commitment to creating a 
stronger settler base for eventual self-government was the hallmark of his administration. This 
 
18 Ibid. See also John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830-
1970 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 445. 
19 Callahan, “The Failure of Closer Union,” 268. 
20 Kennedy, Islands of White, 73-74. 
21 Youé, Proconsular Imperialism, 178. 
22 Kennedy, Islands of White, 74. 
23 Ibid. See also Berman, Crisis and Control, 167. 
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required a fundamental overhaul of the settler community, specifically the dominance of ‘big 
men’ in agriculture and politics, and the dependence upon the colonial state to ensure the supply 
of Kenyan labour and capital.24 
The final element of Grigg’s vision of Closer Union also relates to settler self-sufficiency. 
The Defence Force, which sought to conscript settlers, was the military arm of Grigg’s 
“ambitions for a self-governing and European-dominated Kenya.”25 The Defence Force was 
initially proposed in 1921, emanating from longstanding worries about the security of the colony, 
dependent upon Indian Expeditionary Forces at the outset of the First World War, and the King’s 
African Rifles thereafter. During the deliberation of the Indian Question, settlers feared that their 
plans for a defence force might be coopted, as “its members would be subject to the Army Act, 
and hence liable to court martial for disobedience of an order….hardly an appealing prospect 
when the Colonial Office was considering a policy of granting equal rights.”26 But after the 
Devonshire Declaration, when the Indian Question seemed settled, settlers pushed for the 
Defence Force again. The Labour Government rebuked the proposal on pacifist grounds, 
recalling threats of settler rebellion, and the prospect of sanctioned violence upon Kenyans.27  
The change in leadership in both London and Nairobi in 1925 created a sympathetic 
environment for the revival of the Defence Force. Grigg appealed to the examples of South 
Africa, Australia, and New Zealand as the models of “European communities in the Empire 
which are far removed from great centres of European population and which enjoy responsible 
government [who] have found it wise for many years to adopt the principle of compulsion for 
 
24 Berman, Crisis and Control, 143. 
25 Duder, ‘The Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919,” 708. 
26 Duder, “An Army of One’s Own,” 212.  
27 Ibid.,  
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self-defence.”28 By the time the Bill reached maturity in 1926, however, small-scale settlers, to 
whom Grigg aligned, opposed the Defence Force if it meant compulsion and interruption of their 
livelihoods. In Duder’s estimation, this signaled opposition to the settler elite from within Kenya 
Colony, which hindered “another step…to making Kenya a white man’s country.”29 Nonetheless, 
until the Hilton Young Commission of 1929, the settler elite continued to support the Defence 
Force if it meant eventual self-governance. 
Each of these proposals was part of Grigg’s overriding commitment to Closer Union and a 
white settler dominion in East Africa. Settler politicians, the elite cadre of settler society, 
supported Grigg’s proposals on Closer Union and the Defence Force as means of securing self-
government, while protests against the latter Bill unearthed cleavages long-existent between the 
‘small men’ and ‘big men’ in Kenya Colony. In the process, the Kenyan and Indian roles in the 
development of the economy were either proclaimed, as politics of appearances, or disregarded 
altogether. The language through which Grigg fashioned Kenyan sacrifices in the First World 
War promoted increased settler responsibility, thus redefining the defence of the Colony in 
settler terms. In the process, Grigg tied settler’s nationalist aims to imperial vitality in the form of 
self-defence. He summoned the memory of 1914-1918 as a reminder that defending Kenya 
Colony “is impossible unless Europeans, as well as Africans, are organized to provide the King’s 
Government with the necessary safeguards for good order at home.”30 Where settlers deemed 
that they had already earned self-governance in their military service during the Great War, 
Grigg emphasized the need for continued white self-sufficiency. 
 
 
28 CO533/364, “His Excellency’s Speech, Legislative Council,” December 17th, 1926, 169. 
29 Duder, “An Army of One’s Own,” 214-218. 
30 “His Excellency’s Speech,” 169. 
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Speaking Through the Built Environment: Memorials and Political Discourse 
  The degree to which Grigg used memorial unveilings and invoked the First World War 
in political policy to advance his particular vision of Closer Union is set into relief against 
Coryndon’s role in a similar event. Coryndon, at the unveiling of the Memorial Obelisk in 1924, 
framed the memorial as a testament to the growing national character of Kenya’s settlers. He 
declared that “this memorial to Our Glorious Dead [is] to friends who had shared the trials and 
difficulties of a great work in a young country, and who willingly sacrificed all they had in its 
defence…so that the country may attain that position they had anticipated and worked for but 
were never destined to see.”31 Not yet having attained “that position,” the settlers who died “did 
not die in vain if their memory leaves us with a nobler conception of duty to our King, to our 
Colony, and to ourselves.”32 Coryndon’s address reiterated the Empire nationalism emerging in 
Kenya Colony, nesting the nascent national identification of the settler community within their 
identification with the broader Empire.  
 In the context of Nairobi’s racial segregation, Coryndon necessarily directed his address 
towards the settler community. Commemoration of Kenyan sacrifices at the ‘Native’ Memorial 
Hall, and the IWGC’s African Memorial, did different work in Kenyan areas of the city. 
Coryndon thus spoke through the built environment, instantiating the Dual Policy he put into 
practice in Kenya through the memorial landscape. Kenyan and European areas were separate 
and ostensibly equal in their importance. Fittingly, the African Memorial was not unveiled 
formally during Coryndon’s time as governor, a reminder that the colonial state 
disproportionately supported European development, and by extension, their memorial spaces. 
 




There was no conflict when C.K Archer, the President of the Convention of Associations, 
presumed he was presenting the portrait of a man, Lord Delamere, who would someday become 
“the Colony’s first Prime Minister,” at the unveiling of the Memorial Hall that same day.33 In 
1924, the memory of the First World War was firmly rooted in the context of settler ascendency; 
it was a pre-ordained trajectory foretold by settler sacrifices from 1914-1918. 
 This is not to say, as Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper aptly observe, that national 
aspirations necessarily drove participation in the First World War; ultimately, “it was not a war 
over colonies…but a war among empires as multiplex polities.”34 But settlers in Kenya 
envisioned themselves as different from Britons in the metropole, thus demanding the 
management of that difference in order to maintain an overriding imperial structure. The British 
Empire doled out rewards and shares of power in ways that allowed it to maintain a unified 
polity, if through decentralized governance.35 The inherent contradiction, however, of supporting 
settlers who shared little interest in Kenyan development on the one hand, while maintaining a 
commitment to Kenyan development through state intervention on the other, produced critical 
choices about how to “share power to exert power.”36 Though Coryndon made considerable 
efforts to stimulate Kenyan production, his administration still dispersed power to the settler elite 
with the knowledge that the state continued to enjoy control over Kenyan development. 
Managing difference meant reinforcing the idea of separate spheres of influence, which in reality 
could not be segregated.  
 
33 EAS, “C.K. Archer’s Address,” December 1st, 1924. As quoted n Larsen, “Shaping the Symbolic 
Landscape,” 286.  
34 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 371. 
35 Ibid., 2. 
36 Timothy H. Parsons, “The Unintended Consequences of Bureaucratic ‘Modernization’ in Post-World 
War II British Africa,” in Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth 
Century, Peter Crooks and Timothy H. Parsons eds (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 413. 
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 Thus nationalism in Kenya’s settler community was not tied to the shared linguistic and 
cultural origins of its adherents, but a particular geographic space instead. That is, shared cultural 
heritage and language justified a British presence in Africa, while ties to the Kenyan landscape 
and its development united a subset of those Britons into a nation. Their whiteness and 
Britishness provided a discourse of ‘civilizational’ superiority rooted in the British Empire, just 
as their collective experience within Kenya Colony shielded settlers from the colonial state and 
metropolitan critics who “seemed to favour their African subordinates over settlers.”37 Even if 
almost every policy benefitted settler production, the symbolism of trusteeship was the 
counterweight to outright settler self-governance. Thus the nested settler identity might dislodge 
itself from its imperial layer should that symbolic counterweight remain an impediment to 
complete settler control. 
By the time of Grigg’s administration, this created a climate wherein self-governance 
threatened to destabilize London’s ability to control Kenya’s development, even if the 
administration shared faith in a settler-dominated future. Thus, Grigg attempted to redefine the 
terms of settler identification beyond the borders of Kenya, establishing a broader East African 
context for settler ascendency linked more explicitly to London, yet independent in its control 
over its domain. Brett Shadle describes colonial discourse in Kenya as stage play, where daily 
interactions “required all actors to inhabit their roles.”38 To continue this metaphor, Grigg cast 
settlers not as strong supporting actors, but as the lead protagonists on Kenya’s stage. To play the 
role properly, however, settlers needed to adopt new characteristics befitting the status. Grigg, as 
the director, attempted to mold settler society to fit his grander narrative of imperial 
reconfiguration through Closer Union. 
 
37 Shadle, The Souls of White Folk, 59. 
38 Ibid., 60. 
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Grigg’s arrival coincided with the acceleration of Nairobi’s Town Planning, which dated 
back to the end of the First World War.39 The development of the city centre, and the city square 
specifically, featured “the idea that was that the future Square containing the principal 
Government offices, the Law Courts, the Municipal Offices and any public monument which 
might be erected should form the focus of the town in the same way as Church Square and 
Market Square are the centres of city life in Pretoria and Johannesburg respectively.”40 The City 
Square location was one block to the southeast of Memorial Hall, constituting an extension of the 
city’s administrative and commercial headquarters.41 This also built upon the segregation of the 
city, increasingly defining the city centre as a white space.42 For matters of convenience and 
access to the colonial administration, settlers strongly favoured this approach.43 
At the edge of the proposed City Square Scheme lay the African Memorial erected in 
1924. As previously discussed, the African Memorial was one of the IWGC’s main contributions 
to Kenya’s commemorative landscape, responding to their conception of duty to commemorate 
and a particular interpretation of Equality of Treatment.44 Nonetheless, the Memorial fit into 
Nairobi’s segregated urban space in 1924, near to the new ‘native’ location of Pumwani and 
close to an area designated for Kenyan use. With industrial development and urban 
transformation, however, the administration moved the monument in April 1928.45 The 
 
39 See KNA, RN/6/45, Notes of the Nairobi Town Planning Committee, 1924-1930. 
40 KNA, RN/6/45, “Proposed Surrender of Lands by the Uganda Railway,” 1925, 2. 
41 See Figure 9 for reference. See also David M. Anderson, “Corruption at City Hall: African Housing and 
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42 See Bill Freund, The African City: A History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 89. 
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44 See Chapter 3. 
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monument, the East African Standard complained, had long been neglected by the colonial 
administration, covered in cloth during the Armistice Day ceremony in 1927.46 
Grigg apparently had the last word on the monument’s new location, which stood directly 
opposite the Memorial Obelisk on Sixth Avenue.47 The occasion of the memorial’s unveiling on 
20 May 1928, provided an opportune moment for Grigg to etch his own signature on the 
meaning of the First World War in Kenya Colony. With Princess Marie Louise there to tether the 
ceremony back to the metropole, Grigg spoke clearly of the exigencies of the Defence Force Bill 
and the Dual Policy of development. In essence, it was not the Kenyans to whom the IWGC 
dedicated the monument that he addressed, but the settlers in attendance. The imperial fibres of 
commemoration remained, but these tangled with the Grigg’s political preoccupations.  
His speech highlighted this reality when he proclaimed that “there is one feature of the 
Memorial which is, I think an especially happy one. Dedicated in the first instance to the Native 
Africans who served the King, it was also dedicated to the memory of all men of whatever race 
who fell in the East African theatre.”48 This, of course, was false; the inscription on the 
monument, as well as the IWGC’s deliberations, confirm that the monument was “to the memory 
of the Native African troops who fought to the Carriers who were the feet and hands of the 
Army.” In fairness to Grigg, the inscription also mentioned “all other men who served and died 
for their King and Country,” but the iconography of the memorial and the existence of dedicated 
European memorials clearly defined the intent of the African Memorial. That Grigg chose to 
accentuate the service of all races in the defence of Empire signaled his political intent and the 
pulling of the imperial thread of memory into the context of colonial politics.  
 
46 East African Standard, “A Neglected Memorial,” November 14th, 1927, 4. 
47 See Red Star on Figure 9.  
48 EAS, “King’s Cousin Unveils the Native War Memorial,” May 21st, 1928, 1; 9. 
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Figure 12. Sketch of Nairobi City Centre,49 Edited to Show Locations of Memorials.50 
 
Indeed, Grigg argued that “without our help the Africans who fought for the King could 
not have held this, their own land.”51 Two aspects of Grigg’s political agenda seeped into his 
unveiling speech in one passage alone. In the first instance, the Governor reiterated the need for 
shared responsibility in imperial defence as a mechanism for the legitimation of self-governance. 
 
49 KNA, RN/6/27, “Sketch Plan of Suggested and Possible Road Alignments,” January 5th, 1928,  
50 Yellow = Memorial Obelisk, Red = African War Memorial (IWGC) c. 1928, Green = African War 
Memorial (IWGC) c. 1924.  
51 Ibid. 
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Grigg’s speech to the Legislative Council in 1926 regarding the Defence Force is remarkably 
similar to his speech at the unveiling of the African Memorial. Specifically,  
there is no danger of strained relations between the races here unless the European 
becomes too dependent upon African services and the African realises that he is so. We 
rely at present entirely upon African soldiers and African police. Splendidly they have 
served us. But they will serve us all the more loyally if they realise that at any moment 
when the King’s peace may be endangered, organised Europeans…will answer the King’s 
call.52 
 
Whereas settler memorialization was exclusive and segregated, Grigg brought the symbolism of 
the First World War into conversation with his vision of imperial union. This meant that the 
symbolism of the war could not be segregated, but that Kenyan service needed to be understood 
as reinforcing white military prowess. In the pre-Grigg memorialization of the First World War 
settlers envisioned a future of self-governance purely upon their merits, but under his 
administration and focus upon Closer Union, the means of achieving self-governance was 
tethered to imperial defence, thus changing the tenor of commemorative discourse.  
 This connected as well to the Dual Policy. As Grigg intimated at the unveiling “we must 
strive to understand each other’s needs, to respect each other’s rights, to help each other’s 
progress, if all races are to enjoy peace plenty and happiness in this, our common land….no race 
in Kenya can prosper long…by looking only to its own interests.”53 Again Grigg refashioned his 
consistent political dialogue to fit the occasion. As he argued at the Caledonian Dinner in 
November 1926,  
stability and security in this Colony can only be secured if, on the one hand, you have 
an independent settler community based on crops, which are practically free from the 
vagaries of African labour, and, on the other hand, at the opposite pole, Africans 
developing their own reserves and in no way compelled to labour for European 
employers unless they choose. If you have these two firm bases, there will be between 
them a very large common ground for cooperative development.54 
 
52 CO533/364, “His Excellency’s Speech, Legislative Council,” December 17th, 1926, 169. 
53 EAS, “King’s Cousin Unveils the Native War Memorial”, May 21st, 1928, 1; 9. 
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By unveiling the African Monument through the language of colonial politics, Grigg changed its 
meaning entirely. What the IWGC envisioned as a memorial that would fulfil its duty to provide 
symbols of sacrifice to Empire suitable for particular communities, now served a different 
function.  
 The motivation for Grigg to defend his policies in an otherwise non-political unveiling 
were clear. A concerned settler wrote to the East African Standard in 1926: “did not thousands – 
yea millions – join up during 1914 and the terrible years that followed believing that they were 
going to down militarism for ever? Did not recruiting posters advertise that this was one of the 
chief reasons why we went to war?”55 Meanwhile, the Anti-Conscription Committee, a 
metropolitan critic, asserted that “if it were true, as alleged, that the white settlers of this Colony 
could only safely face the unarmed tribes, which live in the reserves and among the settlers of 
Kenya, with rifles in their hand, then indeed they would brand themselves before the world as 
unfitted to share in the Trusteeship for these natives.”56 Two divergent communities, small-scale 
settlers and pacifists in Britain, threatened the very basis of the Defence Force Bill, and from 
Grigg’s perspective, the future of white settlement in Kenya. Joined with long-standing critics of 
Kenyan labour practices and the implementation of the Dual Policy, the future of Closer Union 
required consistent defence.  
 The significance of IWGC sites of memory, however, was not limited to the African 
Memorial at Nairobi. E.B. Denham, acting on behalf of Governor Grigg, unveiled the African 
Memorial in Mombasa one year earlier, on 28 May 1927. Unlike Nairobi, the Mombasa 
monument was only erected in 1926 due to a Town Planning Scheme in Mombasa.57 Denham, in 
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a much longer address to the crowd at Mwembe Tayari, lauded the service of Kenyans and Arabs 
in the defence of Empire, but again highlighted “our duties towards and our responsibilities for 
all those who serve the Empire and to whom we owe so much for loyal cooperation, - who on 
their part ow so much to those who rule and govern them for the preservation of the great peace, 
security and welfare of the Empire.”58 Tethered again to imperial defence, the need for a white 
military presence foregrounded the unveiling of a monument to African service.  
 In Mombasa, it appears as though the African Monument needed its own defence in the 
face of a lack of European commemoration in the coastal city. A settler wrote that  
the glorious deeds of the Mighty Dead of our own race are commemorated fittingly 
throughout the whole world on appropriate occasions, and the Silent Shrines at 
Westminster Abbey and at the Cenotaph alone are sufficiently impressive and far-
reaching enough to embrace every White soldier who Fell on the widely scattered 
battlefields of Armageddon.59 
 
That commemoration was the subject of competing memories60 of the First World War in public 
space speaks to the political nature of commemorative activities. Grigg and Denham iterated the 
complimentary nature of the memorials, however, the segregated nature of settler memorials 
brought the two interpretations into competition. Colonial forms of First World War memory, 
tied to the geographic boundaries of Kenya Colony, tangled with Empire-wide memorial 
programs. Through renegotiation in the context of colonial politics, that entanglement became a 
knot.    
 In Nairobi, the competition was not only discursive but embodied through the 
juxtaposition of the African Memorial and the Memorial Obelisk. In its new position, Kenyan 
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iconography butted up against the existing abstract form of the Obelisk. Grigg explained the 
move in practical terms, citing that in its previous “position it could not have been included in 
the great annual commemoration of those who fell in the War.”61 At a theoretical level, the 
monument’s new position also brought trusteeship, responsibility, and self-sufficiency to the city 
centre’s commemorative landscape. It reminded settlers that, in order to achieve their ultimate 
goal of self-governance, they needed to take on the characteristics of a protagonist that both the 
colonial administration could defend, and metropolitan critics could approve. This was an 
exploitative use of Kenyan service and sacrifice in the First World War, but in bringing Kenyan 
iconography to the fore, Grigg tied settler memory to a grander vision of imperial unity.  
 Laragh Larsen’s study of Nairobi’s “symbolic landscape” figures the African Memorial 
as an imposition of imperial dominance, emphasizing loyal Kenyans in a white space.62 The 
African Memorial “was used as a tool by the British to reaffirm the authority of Imperial rule.”63 
While at the broadest level of analysis this is certainly true, the layers of First World War 
memory and the process behind the memorial’s removal from its original place are essential to 
contextualizing commemoration at the level of colony. Imperial rule was not an homogenous 
force imposed upon Kenyan populations, but a manifold of different ideas about what Empire 
meant, how nationalism functioned within Empire, and what it meant to rule or be ruled in 
Kenya Colony.  
 Putting this chapter into conversation with development before Grigg’s governorship 
brings clarity to the political discourse at the heart of commemoration in Kenya Colony. Larsen 
argues that African and European memories were “concretised by the two memorials… 
 
61 EAS, “King’s Cousin Unveils the Native War Memorial”, May 21st, 1928, 1; 9.  
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heightened in the contrasting iconography of the two monuments.”64 But this misreads the 
historicity of the monuments, especially the African Memorial. The IWGC did not view the 
African Memorial and its other commemorative works as competitive, but complementary. It 
was only through the erection of European-specific memorials that separate spaces of 
commemoration emerged. Furthermore, Grigg’s reinterpretation of the African Memorial in 
1928 – the basis of Larsen’s analysis – decontextualizes the deeper history of segregationist town 
planning,65 competing visions of Empire, and nationalism within it. Thus, the commemorative 
monuments in Nairobi may have concretized a form of commemoration, but settlers, 
administrators, and the IWGC, all negotiated the meaning of those representations differently. 
Viewed in this framework and context, it is impossible to conclude that commemorative spaces 
and works in Kenya were simply the imposition of imperial power. The insufficiency of the 
imperial fabric of memory for the politics of Kenya Colony pulled at its dangling threads from 
all directions. 
 
Imperial Memory in a Colonial Space: The Changing Meaning of Commemoration 
 In trying to understand the remembrance of the First World War in interwar Kenya, I 
have focused on specificity and context as crucial factors in the interpretation of 
commemoration. Studies of commemoration in Kenya have generally sought out commonality 
with the rest of Empire as signifying the imposition of Imperial power on the Kenyan landscape, 
reiterating the racial boundaries of imperial logic through the built environment. 
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Commemoration, however, was not static or concrete. It is true that sites of memory are imperial 
signifiers and “discretely designed,” but they are also “contextualized by their surroundings.”66 
Settlers and administrators thus put memorials into the context of colonial politics, shifting their 
meaning, and changing the basis of the viewers’ identification with the objects. How, then, did 
settlers identify with the IWGC’s African memorials, and, how did governors attempt to shift 
that identification? 
 Patricia Lorcin delineates the differences between what she terms imperial nostalgia and 
colonial nostalgia. Though her analysis is in the context of an Empire already lost, the idea that 
there were multiple levels of identification is essential to understanding the memory work at play 
in interwar Kenya.67 The imperial ‘loss’ is articulated through feelings of “decline of national 
grandeur and the international power politics connected to economic and political hegemony.”68 
Colonial nostalgia is articulated through the feeling of loss of status, specifically the “colonial 
lifestyle.”69 In post-war Kenya, likewise, memory was both linked to the wider British Empire 
and fellow Britons through familiar forms of commemoration, emphasizing the permanence and 
necessity of imperial power, and yet concurrently there was a colonial context specific to Kenya 
which put those forms into dialogue with the framework of settler colonialism in cities like 
Nairobi. As scholars of the British World have argued, there was a distinct similarity in goals, 
practices, and identities in many of the outposts of Empire, even if there was internal variation.70 
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In other words, as Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds argue, “the imagined community of white 
men was transnational in reach…[but] nationalist in outcomes.”71 
 Grigg certainly grasped the stakes of commemoration and the meaning of the First World 
War in Kenya. He wrote on Armistice Day in 1928 that “the East African Campaign has never 
figured much in the post-War discussions of the war, but the consequences will probably be 
greater and more lasting than those of any other sideshow campaigns into which the Empire 
threw such strength as it could spare from the main Western Front.”72 The overriding settler goal 
of self-governance, and indeed Grigg’s conception of Closer Union, harnessed the memory of 
the Great War in order to define what the consequences might be. Proud Britons on the one hand, 
settlers required a language of commemoration that also protected their status within Kenya, 
ironically challenged by the same associations of Empire that initiated their presence in the first 
place. In Grigg they had an ally from the metropole, and the language of commemoration 
changed from a settler-exclusive discourse to one that spoke to the wider imperial project. 
 The conception of how self-governance ought to be conceived transformed, partially due 
to the symbolism of the Devonshire Declaration, but also in response to changing attitudes in 
London after 1924. With sympathetic officials in the Colonial Office and the Colonial 
Administration, a source of previous antagonism, settlers and the Colonial Administration 
worked in concert to mollify the remaining critics of settler society. Thus, the settler thread of 
memory that weighed down the imperial threads of memory between 1920 and 1924 stitched 
itself back into the imperial fabric between 1925 and 1928. In the process, the African 
iconography of the IWGC’s thread of imperial memory was trapped inside the knots, becoming 
 
71 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, The Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the 
International Challenge of Racial Equality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4. 
72 Edward Grigg, “East Africa: The Comradeship of Races,” The Times, Saturday, November 10th, 1928.  
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the symbolic fibres of Grigg’s administrative memory thread. Where the monument had once 
served as the imperially-imposed representation of African sacrifice, Grigg’s usage of the 
monument exploited Kenyan memorialization with the illusion of inclusion. 
 Ultimately, Grigg’s hopes for Closer Union and an eventual white dominion in East 
Africa evaporated in 1929. Amery’s own commission of inquiry on the topic, which he expected 
to rule in favour of Closer Union, determined that “the obligation of trusteeship for native 
interests [remain] in the hands of the imperial government.”73 White settlers in Kenya viewed the 
ruling “as a betrayal.”74 Concerns over the settlers’ interests and the status of Tanganyika as a 
League of Nations Mandate75 sapped Grigg’s ability to convince settlers that his policies were in 
their interest. In June 1929, Labour once again took control of Parliament in London, and Grigg 
gave way to Joseph Byrne as Governor, who reinvigorated the concept of ‘native’ paramountcy. 
The context for commemoration changed accordingly.  
 The transition from Coryndon to Grigg exemplifies the reasons why commemoration 
must be analyzed in the context of colonial politics. The politics of memory production 
responded to transnational imperial forms but could only be put into context within the 
constraints of Kenya’s socio-political atmosphere. This meant centring settler experiences, 
desires, and lived realities to the exclusion of all others. At times, this also meant highlighting 
Kenyan memorialization, but only as a means of furthering settler dominance.
 
73 Callahan, “The Failure of Closer Union,” 270.  
74 Ibid., 271. 
75 Ibid.  
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7 – State Tethers II: The Script and Unscript of Armistice Day in Kenya, 1920-1929 
 Ceremony lay at the heart of remembrance in Kenya Colony in the 1920s. From 1918, 
when peace celebrations united the Empire, the significance of Armistice Day was not lost on 
settlers. As the Mombasa Times reported in 1931, settlers responded “with that air of expectancy 
that always seems to overcome any crowd of Britishers when anything of a ceremonial nature is 
at hand.”1 The annual ceremony was a powerful social gathering where settlers and the colonial 
administration united to pay homage to the men and women who fell in service of Empire, not 
just in East Africa, but from across the globe. Mark Connelly argues that in East London the 
celebratory aspects of Armistice Day gave way, over the course of the 1920s, to sentiments of 
international reconciliation, albeit with a focus on exceptionality within that global community.2 
The same transition, from celebration to revelry, took place in Kenya Colony as well, but at the 
core of Armistice Day remained an appeal to the prestige of the British Empire and the white 
skin to which it attached itself. Armistice Day, unlike memorialization, was exclusively a state 
responsibility. Accordingly, the colonial administration wrote a script for ceremony that reflected 
its status as a “power-bearing institution” that could prescribe the ideological framework of 
commemoration.3 On the one hand, the script shared much in common with ceremonies 
elsewhere in the Empire – the two minutes silence, the laying of wreaths, and the singing of 
hymns – but on the other, it reflected a prevailing order of things in Kenya Colony, which 
specialized the careful inclusion of Kenyan actors, accentuated symbols of white prestige, and 
 
11 KNA, PC/COAST/2/13/21, Excerpt from the Mombasa Times, “Armistice Day,” November 12th, 1931, 
69. 
2 Connelly, The Great War, Memory, and Ritual, 170-175. See also King, Memorials of the Great War in 
Britain, 240-242; Gregory, The Silence of Memory, 36. 
3 King, Memorials of the Great War in Britain, 249.  
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disciplined non-white bodies. In Kenya, as elsewhere, the context of colonial rule came to bear 
on the transnational nature of remembrance. 
 At a deeper level, the colonial climate, the presence of non-white bodies, and the 
distinctive brand of Empire nationalism in the settler community constituted the ‘unscript’ of 
Armistice Day. The colonial state may have desired strict control over Armistice Day and its 
meaning, but the geographic particularity of Kenya, the context of ‘bodies in contact,’4 and local 
formations of settler identity contested that hegemony. If Armistice Day was another imperial 
fabric of memory, patched together with the IWGC’s memorialization, colonial remembrance 
practices and rituals, alongside environmental factors, pulled at its threads as well.  
 The emergence of Armistice Day as an annual occasion, which after 1924 played out on 
the commemorative landscape stage, suggests several overriding trends as well as some 
significant changes. I focus primarily on the top-down features of remembrance. Following Tom 
Lawson, use of predominantly state and elite media sources means “local ceremonies or 
monuments have only been considered when they reflected on a national community or 
identity... [which] only offers an account of the ideas and identities that surrounded ordinary 
men and women in the aftermath of the Great War, of the ways they were told to remember it, 
rather that [how it] was constructed by ordinary people themselves.”5 This was only one side of a 
multivocal negotiation taking place throughout the Empire that tried to determine how Britain 
related to the world, but which also negotiated how Kenya Colony (or other any other colony) 
related to Britain and the world at the local level.  
 
4 I borrow this term from Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, eds., Bodies in Contact: Rethinking 
Colonial Encounters in World History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).  
5 Tom Lawson, “‘The Free-Masonry of Sorrow’? English National Identities and the Memorialization of 
the Great War in Britain, 1919-1931,” History & Memory 20 (1) (Spring/Summer 2008): 92.  
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 Nonetheless, Armistice Day ceremonies in inter-war Kenya were determined by a state-
defined script which attempted to find some uniformity of practice across the colony. Kenyans 
featured in rituals as either the military guard or as headmen laying wreathes at the monuments. 
The Kenyans whom the state included in the ceremony reinforced the image of the loyal African 
in both its military and civilian forms, while Kenyans in the crowd were the subject of discourse 
and observation that reinforced the need for discipline and ‘civilized’ behaviour. Thus, the state 
pulled at the strings of ‘invented traditions’ in both the military and as a function of indirect rule 
to define the contours of Armistice Day, itself an ‘invented tradition.’ Indians were likewise 
treated as foils to mostly obedient and dignified white behaviours (and, when useful, Kenyans as 
well), although if settlers provided a poor example they were also chastised, especially in the 
media. Thus, Armistice Day was part of the repertoire of state power that it exerted primarily 
upon Kenyans, but also reflected and moulded settler society as well. The repertoire of power 
was thus responsive to both imperial forms of remembrance, and Kenya-specific exigencies.  
 Armistice Day was ultimately a brief ceremony where the state reproduced itself – its 
hierarchies, its power, and its connections to the metropole – in contrast to the ways that settlers 
performed remembrance. Acknowledging the peace meant respecting the administration’s 
responsibility for governance, and for maintaining peaceful relations between settlers, Kenyans, 
and Indians in Kenya Colony. There were avenues for settlers to participate in the events (for 
example, the EAWL’s Poppy Appeal), but their roles were complementary to those of officials, 
headmen, and the King’s African Rifles. Armistice Day was a reminder that Kenya Colony was a 
shared responsibility, rather than the domain of white settlers. United as white skinned folk 
might have been in public spectacle, the power politics of Kenya Colony lurked behind the 
façade. Threatening the whiteness of officials and settlers alike, however, was a hostile Kenyan 
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environment that broke any illusion of uniformity across the Empire. Kenya Colony’s Armistice 
Day ceremonies were but simulacra of the main show in London, exposing the tenuous British 
grip on the territory. 
 
Origins and Precedents: The Peace Celebrations, 1918-1919 
The spread with which Nairobi knew can be guessed, and before five o’clock the 
signs of it were evident. Motor cycles and rickshaws flew the Union Jack; 
Whitesway and Laidlaw blazed out with the flags of all the allies; from the 
uncompleted clock-tower of the new E.A. Standard buildings fluttered the Union 
Jack, and rockets were let off at intervals.6 
 
 With its typical flair and sense of dramatics, the East African Standard announced that 
the War in Europe was over. Foregrounding the news, however, was that while “Von Lettow’s 
Force [was] Beaten Again,” the “pursuit continues.”7 It would take another thirteen days for the 
German forces in East Africa to surrender, but that did not dampen the excitement in Nairobi on 
Tuesday, 12 November 1918. Indeed, “there was never such a day in the history of Nairobi as 
Peace Day on Tuesday, nor such a marvel of rapid organisation as the big noon meeting in the 
New Staley Hotel and the afternoon procession which it arranged.”8 It was a day full of 




6 EAS, “The News Received: Rockets Herald Peace in Nairobi,” November 12th, 1918.  
7 EAS, “K.A.R. in Action,” November 12th, 1918. 
8 EAS, “Armistice Day,” November 14th, 1918, 1.  
9 EAS, “Nairobi’s Effort,” November 14th, 1918, 1. 
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Figure 13. Announcement of the Armistice in the East African Standard.10 
 
 Following the initial celebrations, the city declared a public holiday extending through to 
17 November, with the K.A.R. Band providing the soundtrack for events in churches, on the 
streets, and in the theatres. The highlight of the holidays was the military “tatoo” and subsequent 
 
10 EAS, “Peace,” November 12th, 1918,  
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bonfire, where “Nairobi let itself go for once, and the joy of the public at the victorious 
conclusion of hostilities was amply demonstrated.”11 The people of Nairobi presented the Band’s 
headmaster with an engraved cigarette case to thank him for their service during the celebrations, 
while the band itself was welcomed into the Theatre Royale for a special showing.12 Joined 
together with the askari, Kenyan bodies were at the centre of the inaugural peace celebrations in 
Nairobi.  
 Thus not only was there the overriding confidence in the might of the British Empire – in 
its vitality and virility – but also of the “kind of African that is idealised, with a share in the 
colony’s future…those who participate in the colonial administration of the territory, rather than 
fight it.”13 Crucially, the celebrations occurred in the context of both a society emerging from 
four years of economic uncertainty, social anxiety, and existential threat, as well as a favourable 
political climate fomented by state concessions. With the state, and the Governor, firmly invested 
in the settler colonial project the celebrations were on imperial terms, celebrating the victory of 
Empire and the advancement of settler goals and aspirations. In Bart Ziino’s terms, settlers were 
“permitted widespread expression of their long trial.”14 There was a unity of purpose in the white 
community of Kenya, one that permitted the selective inclusion of Kenyans.  
The parading and inclusion of black bodies in commemorative events did not threaten 
settler control in the same ways it would after the Devonshire Declaration.15 The idealized 
African, in the context of commemoration, was the brave askari who came to the defence of the 
Colony and Empire. The KAR and Kenyan headmen featured in Armistice Day rituals 
 
11 EAS, “Military Tatoo,” November 18th, 1918, 6.  
12 EAS, “Afternoon Treat to the ‘Boys’,” November 21st, 1918, 4.  
13 Clive Gabay, Imagining Africa: Whiteness and the Western Gaze (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), 83. 
14 Bart Ziino, “The 1918 Armistice and the Civilian Experience of War,” in The Great War: Aftermath and 
Commmoration, eds., Carolyn Holbrook and Keir Reeves (Sydney: New South Publishing, 2019), 72. 
15 Shadle, The Souls of White Folk, 30-32. 
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throughout the colonial period, but the terms of their inclusion were predominantly 
contextualized by the battle over the responsibility of trusteeship between the settler community 
and the colonial state. Thus, the first celebrations of the Armistice represent an aberration as the 
thrust of exuberance and exaltation of victory gave way to the politics of ritual.  
Celebrations of the Armistice in Mombasa the next year included a similar call for 
inclusion. Provincial Commissioner C.W. Hobley instructed the Committee for the celebrations 
that it was “the wish of the Government that all races shall participate in celebrating the great 
peace.”16 Nonetheless, invitations to the celebrations went out to the consuls at the Portuguese 
and Belgian embassy’s before they went out to leaders in the Arab and Indian communities.17 
Moreover, the reverential aspects of Armistice were exclusively white events in Mombasa. The 
Mombasa Cathedral held a Thanksgiving for Peace gathering “at which all officers are requested 
to be present.”18 Thus the illusion of inclusivity in public spaces gave way to exclusivity as the 
public spectacle of celebration moved to the confessional space of the church. Recalling 
Connelly’s distinction between civic and institutional commemoration, the celebration of the 
Armistice supported the state-driven framework for colonialism – trusteeship and the multi-racial 
state – while the religious elements undergirded the civilizational differences attached to white 
skin that united the white community. As the “struggle for Kenya” continued between the 
Colonial Office and the settler political elite, the symbolism of black bodies in public 
commemorations took on a more overtly political tone. 
Indeed, the events in Mombasa in 1918 foreshadowed the political battle at the centre of 
commemoration. Hobley intimated to Brigadier General Llewellyn, the commandant of the 
 
16 KNA, PC/COAST/1/3/161, “CW Hobley to the Secretary, Chamber of Commerce,” July 5th, 1919, 20. 
17 KNA, PC/COAST/1/3/161, “Consul for Belgium to CW Hobley,” July 4th, 1919, 22.  
18 KNA, PC/COAST/1/3/161, “Provincial Commissioner’s Note on Thanksgiving for Peace,” n.d., 23.  
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KAR, that the costs of loaning the KAR Band for the Peace Celebrations in 1918 should be 
charged to the government account because “the function was one which had a very desireable 
[sic] political effect.”19 This indicates that the public gatherings in large urban centres were first 
and foremost opportunities for civic engagement to become part of the colonial state’s political 
agenda. Consolidating loyalty to the Crown and deference to white skin was essential at these 
public gatherings. The integration of select black bodies into the social relations of 
commemoration thus reiterated the “political and economic relationships, supporting the fiction 
that the inequalities structured into the relationships were the result of endogenous, probably 
genetic, inequalities between ‘races.’”20 But the state interpreted the roles and responsibilities in 
upholding those perceived ‘innate’ differences differently.  
The state’s dependence upon “indigenous hierarchies, and cultivating and supporting 
native rulers at the top of them,”21 was on full display at the 1918-1919 celebrations. The King’s 
African Rifles and their Band formed one part of the hierarchy, while segregated celebrations 
represented another. Non-white communities were left to organize their own celebrations, 
especially outside of Mombasa, with the state providing resources for a “big ngoma,” where 
“township regulations [were] being relaxed for the occasion.”22 Bruce Berman exposes the 
contradiction of colonial rule in Kenya, showing that “the British accumulated power as they 
multiplied their allies and forced down the price of African assistance,” and “structural change 
from coexistence to control meant that the ‘rewards of collaboration’ had to be given a civilian 
context and stabilized.”23 In 1918-1919, the imperative of rewarding Kenyan elites for having 
 
19 KNA, PC/COAST/1/3/161, “Hobley to Brigadier General Llewellyn,” June 5th, 1919, 11.  
20 Alfred J. Lopez, Postcolonial Whiteness: A Critical Reader on Race and Empire (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2005), 121. 
21 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, 138. 
22 KNA, PC/COAST/1/3/161, “District Commissioner, Voi, Notes to CW Hobley,” July 7th, 1919, 30-31. 
23 Berman, Crisis and Control, 53-54.  
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provided labour and military personnel took place in the reserves, while the KAR performed it in 
the cities. As Armistice Day became more ritualized in the mid-1920s, however, headmen joined 
the KAR in performing their allegiance, and the authority of the state, in public space.  
The celebrations of 1918-1919 quickly gave way in subsequent years to a more planned 
and state-driven commemorative project. The EAS complained in 1920 that the enthusiasm with 
which settlers celebrated the peace had not translated into the raising of funds for appropriate 
war memorials throughout the territory.24 In fact, the original plans for the War Memorial Fund 
were not a cenotaph and Memorial Hall, but instead an addition to the European hospital of a 
balcony befitting the sacrifices of the soldiers of Empire.25 It was “a matter of considerable regret 
that the Memorial scheme as originally contemplated has had to be considerably curtailed for 
want of funds.”26 Nairobi, however, did hold a ceremony in 1920 to observe two minutes silence, 
which focused upon a children’s service and the laying of wreaths.27 These were typical elements 
of Armistice Day programs in the 1920s, setting the stage for more organized and well-attended 
public spectacles (aided by official sanction of time off work, unlike the declaration that it was 
not a public holiday from 1918-1920). 
One particular piece of reporting stands out from the Armistice Day coverage. The EAS 
observed that “the few Europeans assembled [at the Railway Station] reverently bowed their 
heads and paid their homage to those in whose memory the silence was commanded by the 
sovereign.”28 It also highlighted that “the Indian babies appeared to have deliberately gone out of 
their way to make as much noise as possible, as also the African porters.”29 The commentator 
 
24 EAS, “An Unwon War,” November 11th, 1920, 4. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 EAS, “Armistice Day: Partial Success of Nairobi’s Two-minute Silence,” November 12th, 1920, 4.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid. 
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went on to recommend that future silence be better organized, that employers instruct Kenyans 
of its significance, and that Indians should remember their own dead properly by acknowledging 
the silence.30 The report set the precedent that Indian and Kenyan bodies were under strict 
observation at public spectacles, subject to the colonial discourse that attempted to discipline 
their behaviour according to their perceived civilizational status. Europeans could instruct 
Kenyans as to the significance of the two-minute silence, but Indians ought to have known 
better, reiterating their traitorous and subversive role in the Colony.  
 Though the celebrations of 1918-1919 were but a short burst of energy in the wake of the 
Great War, they set crucial precedents for the ritualization of Armistice Day in the 1920s. The 
selective inclusion of black bodies, the observation of Indians and Kenyans in attendance, and 
the establishment of rituals through which settlers observed and disciplined continued as main 
features of Armistice Day. The discourse on death that the IWGC negotiated related to this 
discourse of remembrance. The colonial administration circumscribed the available modes of 
publicly remembering for settlers, Kenyans, and Indians, in turn suppressing non-state threads of 
memory. Settlers, at first, joined in this discourse of domination, but as the ad-hoc celebrations 
turned to scripted commemorations, the state attempted to establish a hegemony over the 
commemorative discourse. The state remained tethered to the imperial fibres of memory, while 
settlers’ own rituals and commemorative practices, as we have seen, continued to pull those 




30 Ibid.  
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Ritual and Repetition: The Colonial Administration and the Script of Armistice Day 
 In 1921, the Colonial administration set out a script for Armistice Day that was much 
more programmatic than even 1920. On 2 November 1921, the official announcement explicitly 
alluded to the changing focus of Armistice Day from celebration to “reverent remembrance of 
the glorious dead who fell during the Great War.”31 The Kenya Gazette announced that all local 
authorities should arrange for a ceremony on the 11th, emulating the procession in Nairobi. A 
“flagstaff [was] erected at the junction Sixth Avenue and Government Road at the foot of which 
wreaths [were] laid before 11 a.m.”32 Apparently not heeding the advice of the East African 
Standard the previous year, a single siren sounded to signify one minute before the two-minute 
silence, followed by another siren blast at “11.02 a.m. to break the silence.”33 Observers were 
instructed to sing the Hymn “O God Our Help in Ages Past,” commonly sung across the Empire, 
with the Reveille ending the formal ceremony. “Representatives of all Religious Denominations 
[were] invited to be present.”34 
 By 9 November, the program underwent several alterations. While it is unclear who 
initiated the changes, the EAS’s criticism of the proceedings around the two-minute silence the 
previous year appear a likely impetus. Rather than one siren at 10.59 a.m., the program now 
included the firing of a gun at 11 a.m. to mark the beginning the silence. Further, in addition to 
the hymn, the program now included the KAR Band’s rendition of “God Save the King.”35 The 
original program also indicated that the Governor would lay his wreath and leave the procession, 
with other wreaths laid before the silence. Now, the revised outline indicated that all wreaths 
 





35 EAS, “Armistice Day: Revised Arrangements for Celebration,” November 9th, 1921, 4.  
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were to be presented with the Governor present after the two-minute silence.36 The small 
changes may appear insignificant, but the revised program de-centred the Governor as the 
primary actor at the ceremony. It also added an air of celebration with the singing of “God Save 
the King,” which also took away from the significance of the two-minute silence as an impetus 
for thoughtful reflection. In essence, the changes elevated the ceremony from a brief pause in the 
daily life of the Colony, to a more elaborate gathering.  
 Strangely, the EAS did not report on the events on 12 November, an omission made more 
striking by its reporting from 1918-1920 and in the years after 1921. Perhaps the looming Indian 
Question (and particularly forthcoming meetings of the Convention of Associations and lobbying 
in Britain)37 preoccupied the presses in the face of a small ceremony. On the other hand, perhaps 
it was what a concerned settler wrote in preparations for the 1922 ceremony that “what should 
have been an impressive ceremony was made more or less a farce.”38 Nonetheless, the 1921 
ceremony was a transitional moment for Kenya Colony’s commemorative rituals. The 
implanting of a flagstaff at the corner of Government Road and Sixth Avenue (the original 
proposed cite for the Obelisk), the expansion of Armistice Day ceremony beyond the two-minute 
silence, and the formalization of wreath laying all became standard aspects of Armistice Day in 
the 1920s.  
Importantly, ties to Empire were also essential features of 11 November. The 
foregrounding of the proceedings in London – in 1921, for example, a showing at the Theatre 
Royale in Nairobi of the unveiling of the London Cenotaph in 192039 – went alongside local 
events. Indeed, as the EAS editorialized, it was not the dead and veterans of East African 
 
36 Ibid. 
37 See EAS, November 12th – 14th, 1921.  
38 EAS, “‘Enquirer’ to the Editor,” November 6th, 1922, 6. 
39 EAS, “Armistice Day: Arrangements for Celebration,” November 11th, 1921, 4. 
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Campaign, but “[those] in England to-day…for whom death would still spell release”40 that 
needed care and attention. In 1921, there were elements of the local texture of Armistice Day – 
an organ recital at the All Saints Church and the Armistice Night Fancy Dress Dance – yet the 
program was tethered tightly to the metropole. It was only once the colonial administration fully 
ritualized Armistice Day, through repetition, that the Kenya-specific events entangled with 
Empire-wide commemorations, exposing the weaknesses of those tethers.  
The ceremony the next year built upon the expanded program of 1921. The Gazette 
detailed that the lengths of Government Road and Sixth Avenue would close for the ceremony.41 
The closing of the space added to the ritual, providing a designated area for the gathering, rather 
than the business of the town briefly pausing for the two-minute silence. The warning shot at just 
after 10:58 a.m. was replaced by a drumroll and the Last Post.42 The rest of the ceremony 
continued as usual, though the hymn changed to “All People that on Earth do dwell,” and the 
wreaths were escorted to the cemetery to be laid “at the foot of the Memorial Cross.”43 The 
KAR, as always, formed the guard of honour, but there was no official mention of headmen 
laying wreaths or participating in the ceremony. In all other aspects, however, Armistice Day 
reached its maturity in Kenya in 1922.  
In preparations for the day, however, the Colonial Secretary called on “all employers [to] 
impress upon their native employees the absolute necessity for a fitting silence and a reverent 
deportment during the ceremony.”44 The EAS underlined the importance of controlling the black 
bodies in attendance – especially those “vagrant and masterless” – saying  
 
40 EAS, “The Glorious Dead,” November 11th, 1921, 4.  
41 Kenya Gazette, “Government Notice No. 357: Armistice Day,” Vol. 24, No. 854, November 8th, 1922, 
683.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.  
44 EAS, “Reverence,” November 6th, 1922, 4.  
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we have no wish to debar their attendance. On the contrary we should be glad to think 
that they might possibly gain some inkling of the nobility and the high ideals of those 
whose memory we are endeavouring to perpetuate. But they should be controlled, and, 
we suggest that, if possible, they should be allowed ample spaces in one spot only, and 
that native arriving during the ceremony should be kept back from mixing with the 
general assemblage.45 
 
Ritual thus served a dual purpose in 1922: control and obedience, as well as a settler version of 
trusteeship by example. In the midst of town planning that sought to segregate the races, 
Armistice Day was another opportunity to clearly delineate white and black spaces, with 
Kenyans clearly at the margins. Similarly, it was white memory of the war – “the flower of our 
race”46 – that took centre stage. The EAS did not mention a word about Kenyan sacrifices from 
1914-1918, instead applying the words “‘in remembrance of me’…to those of our kin, or of our 
affectionate friendship, who fell, believing that the world would be better for their sacrifice.”47 
Black bodies were to be observed and disciplined, white bodies were to be remembered and 
celebrated.  
 Indeed, the successes of Armistice Day prompted a thorny editorial in the EAS three days 
later.  
The result of [Armistice Day] was the most conspicuous success, which reflects great 
credit on those responsible for what is generally termed the ‘stage management’ of the 
function…We wish now to see curbed [the native’s] propensity towards petty larceny, 
burglary, and thieving which, since the termination of the war has been so marked a 
feature of suburban life.48 
 
This was an example to the colonial administration that they had a significant role to play in 
cleansing Nairobi of what they deemed nefarious Kenyan elements.49 Settlers had clear ideas 
about how to limit Kenyan “naer-do-wells,” and the governor needed to step in to ensure that 
 
45 Ibid. 
46 EAS, “The Glorious Dead,” November 11th, 1921, 4. 
47 EAS, “Armistice Day,” November 11th, 1922, 4. 
48 EAS, “A Lesson,” November 14th, 1922, 4.  
49 Ibid. 
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“the native [is] properly handled.”50 One year before the Devonshire Declaration proclaimed that 
Kenya Colony was primarily an African territory, it seemed to the EAS that a well-handled 
ceremony portended a future where segregated spaces and properly policed urban areas might 
protect the white settler community. Armistice Day was no longer a celebration of Empire, nor 
just a memorial to the members of the British race, but a commentary on the local political 
climate. Kenya Colony could be a white man’s country, if only the colonial administration and 
the Colonial Office would throw their support behind the settler community and share the 
responsibility to govern Kenyans.  
 Between Armistice Day 1922 and 1923, the Devonshire Declaration set the white settler 
community on edge. The Armistice Day ceremony again grew in size, with thousands attending 
from all the communities of Kenya.51 The ceremony in 1923, building upon the scripted ritual in 
1922, mobilized white civil society in the remembrance of the Great War. Judges, the Executive 
Council, the Legislative Council, clergymen, Boy Scouts,52 and the governor were all expected 
to attend, situated within the space created by the Guard of Honour.53 Only the KAR represented 
Kenyans in the official program, the last year that this would be the case. 1923 thus established 
the repetitive nature of Armistice Day in Kenya, state-driven and controlled.  
As David Cannadine argues, repetition in ritual can often be intentional, “in a static age, 
unchanging ritual might be a genuine reflection of, and reinforcement to stability and consensus. 
But in a period of change, conflict or crisis, it might be deliberately unaltered so as to give an 
impression of continuity, community and comfort, despite overwhelming contextual evidence to 
 
50 Ibid. 
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the contrary.”54 The context of 1923, with the Devonshire Declaration predating Armistice Day 
by only four months, is difficult to surmise. On the one hand, the EAS hoped the ceremony 
would promote a “deeply seated desire to sink our differences in a mutual effort to discharge our 
duties one to the other for the general advancement of humanity, particularly those who are still 
suffering to-day from the effects of their sacrifices in the cause of Empire,”55 where “Kenya too, 
will join tomorrow in the Empire-wide tribute.”56 The sentiments indicate a genuine desire to 
take part in the remembrance of men from across the Empire who set the example of, in another 
repeated turn of phrase, “the flower of its manhood.”57 
In the next column on 10 November, on the other hand, the EAS congratulated the 
Legislative Council on deferring to the Convention of Associations, “the Peoples Parliament,” on 
agricultural issues. Speaking for the wider settler society the EAS lauded work, “since the 
appointment of Sir Edward Northey, [for] co-operation and mutual good feeling between the 
Government and the public…[encouraging] a deeper sense of responsibility.”58 A subtle nod 
towards self-governance, the juxtaposition of a ceremony common across the Empire, and a 
political movement exclusive to settlers, stimulates the question of whether or not this was 
simply the illusion of consensus in the face of a crisis within settler society. That is, while there 
was likely genuine feelings of brotherhood and sisterhood with the white folk of the Empire, 
political issues lingered just beneath the surface. It was not that the Empire and the Crown were 
unimportant, but that they were interpreted uniquely in Kenya Colony, gesturing towards the 
nested layers of identification amongst the settlers.  
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 The unscript of Armistice Day also crept into the events of 11 November 1923. The 
colonial climate struck the Boys Scouts, with an outbreak of whooping cough apparently limiting 
the number of scouts and troops in attendance for their pre-ceremony parade.59 Instilling the 
youth with a sense of duty and understanding of the Great War was an essential aspect of 
Armistice Day. Thus, the inhospitable Kenyan environment worked against this aspect of 
ceremony and ritual. Meanwhile, at Muthaiga, the townspeople adorned the memorial with 
wreaths of their own, making the private memorial the centrepiece of Armistice Day. Nairobi’s 
certainly was not the only ceremony in the colony, but the vast majority were still orchestrated 
through state apparatuses. Muthaiga marked itself out as a unique site of settler memory. Finally, 
the EAS’s column reporting the events of the Fancy Dress Ball was actually longer than its 
summary of the Armistice Day ceremony. Members of the colonial administration attended, but 
it is still noteworthy that a social event – albeit ostensibly to raise money for veterans60 – was the 
more newsworthy gathering. It was not in reverence and ritual that Armistice Day struck its 
strongest chord, but in the celebratory and community-building event of the evening.61 As the 
script for Armistice Day became more rigid and ritualized, so too did other, more localized 
traditions emerge. 
 Unfortunately, the 1924 Armistice Day ceremony is not on record either in the Kenyan 
National Archives or in the Syracuse University’s special collection.62 This lacuna is particularly 
unfortunate because 1924 was a monumental year in Nairobi. The commemorative culture in 
Kenya developed with the visit of the Duke and Duchess of York in February 192463 when he 
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paid a visit to the IWGC cemetery, laying a wreath at the foot of the Memorial Cross.64 
Representatives of the Crown often presided over the unveiling of monuments, and other 
commemorative activities in Kenya Colony, creating a crucial link between the memory of East 
African war dead and the monarchy. But this link was different than the public spectacles prior 
to 1924, wherein the colonial administration was the link to Empire, establishing its role as the 
seat of power and the ultimate trustee in Kenya. After 1923, the tethers to Empire and the 
explicit acknowledgement of Kenyans – other than the KAR – reinforced the colonial 
administrations’ vision for the Colony.  
 In 1925, for example, a crucial addition to the Armistice Day program set the year apart 
from both the earliest phases of celebration and the subsequent transition to a reverent and 
scripted Armistice Day ceremony. In addition to the twelve groups who had made up the 
procession inside the enclosed area the KAR guarded, “Headmen” constituted a new arrival.65 
The Memorial Obelisk and the Memorial Hall now featured in the ceremony, as the Armistice 
Day events moved from the junction of Government Road and Sixth Avenue to the new sites. 
The appearance of Kenyan elites in the wake of the Devonshire Declaration and Governor Grigg 
was not simply coincidence. Viewed by one official, Eric Dutton, as fascistic,66 Grigg 
understood the symbolism of having prominent Kenyans in public space as a representation of 
indirect rule. 
 
64 Ibid. This event was widely noted in the Press throughout the Empire. 
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Figure 14. Memorial Obelisk and Sir Edward Grigg Laying a Wreath.67 
 
The EAS’s report of the “Impressive Ceremony in Nairobi” the next day made no 
mention of the Kenyan presence at Armistice Day, other than the KAR.68 The commentaries of 
years passed were not present in 1925, and much like the ceremony itself were presented in a 
formulaic, ritualized fashion. Indeed, in 1926 and 1927, the program appears to have remained 
unchanged, noted in the archives by a singular circular communicating that “the arrangements 
for the observation of Armistice Day in Nairobi will be similar to the programme forwarded 
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under cover of my circular memorandum of 24th October, 1925.”69 Reports from Kyambu and 
Mombasa confirmed the ritualized, almost uniform ceremonies outside of Nairobi.70 Armistice 
Day was an administrative affair after 1925, and the chatter in the EAS about November 11th 
waned in the succeeding years. 
In 1927, the program as published in the EAS made explicit mention of the inability to 
observe the two-minute silence when Kenyans did not respect the tradition. “An earnest appeal is 
made to all to make the Two Minutes Silence as complete as possible and employers of Native 
labour can be especially helpful in this respect by instructing their employees in regard to the 
significance of the event,” it emphasized.71 The imperative to control black bodies was 
apparently more of an issue in Mombasa, where an EAS correspondent indicated that “one of the 
great difficulties is to get the natives to maintain both the silence and the proper pose consonant 
with the impressiveness and dignity of the occasion. For the most part, they are a noisy 
irresponsible crew whom it is hard to control and the clamour and dim outside of the immediate 
scene of the ceremony is usually frightful.”72 Partially the result of its invented-ness, but also the 
settler-exclusive spaces within which Armistice Day took place, the reporter framed the 
ceremony in exclusively European terms. Between 1922 and 1927, the colonial administration 
scripted the event in administrative terms thus alienating the memory of Kenyans, except the 
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A Search for Kenyan Memory? Armistice Day, 1927-1929 
 The EAS in 1927 seemed to challenge the administration’s script for Armistice Day from 
a rather peculiar angle. In the political context of another push for shared trusteeship, it is hard to 
discern whether the EAS genuinely believed that Kenyans needed a more prominent spot in the 
ceremony, or whether it was a self-serving play to advance the settlers’ political agenda. On 11 
November, the EAS’s main section on Armistice lamented “that it has again found impossible, 
for reasons which we have never understood, to associated in the recognition of Armistice Day 
the African peoples who played so distinctive and worthy a part in the East African campaign.”73 
The editorial targeted the IWGC’s African Memorial, now laying well beyond the centre of 
ceremony since 1925. The editorial criticized the lethargy of the administration in its intent “to 
remove that striking tribute to the African dead and re-erect it on a site opposite the present War 
Memorial in order that ceremonies such as that of Armistice Day might be carried out around 
symbols which signify and perpetuate the memory of dual sacrifice of white and black in a 
common cause.”74 The sacrifices of white settlers and Kenyans needed to complement each 
other, just as a shared responsibility for trusteeship would allow settlers to share again in a 
common cause. The issue was of such note that the EAS published a full column on the need to 
move the statue three days later.75 
 The editorials on the African Memorial do not name an author, but they are personal in 
tone. Rather than chastising either the government alone, or the settler community, “this ignored 
and neglected memorial at the moment is a constant reflection on the European community and a 
source of bewilderment to all ordinary right-minded people.”76 This specific instance of invoking 
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Kenyan memorialization should be interpreted as an intervention in the battle for control over the 
tutelage and trusteeship of Kenyans. The neglect of the monument, according to the author, was 
representative of the administration’s neglect of its duties. It was thus the settlers’ responsibility 
to “constantly and frequently [remind] it of its neglect, [less] the history of the past two years 
will be callously repeated.”77 As we have seen, by Empire Day 1928 the administration moved 
the monument in coordination with the IWGC. Whether the EAS author had any influence in the 
matter, the editorials seem a striking commentary on the state of Kenya Colony in 1927, before 
the Hilton Young Commission laid down the final blow to settler aspirations of self-governance.  
 With the memorial now opposite the Obelisk outside Memorial Hall, the 1928 ceremony 
represented a truly “united service.”78 The event was an auspicious one, with the Prince of Wales 
presiding over the ceremony on his visit from Britain to the East African Territories.79 It was the 
second great day of celebration throughout the Empire that featured a visit from a royal to 
Kenya, the first being the unveiling of the African Memorial on Empire Day that year.80 The 
event was “a striking episode.... In the Capital was the long procession of people of all 
communities, carrying wreaths which were principally of Flanders Poppies, then providing om 
the one gesture a tribute to the Memory of the dead.”81 The truly heartening event for the EAS 
came during the two-minute silence, when “the thousands of natives who participated in 
yesterday’s service in Nairobi appeared to realise something of the depth of meaning in the two 
minutes silence. Like those of other races. They remained motionless throughout, and this 
African tribute served to add considerably to the impressiveness of the ceremony.”82 The 
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question again arises as to whether this was a genuine shared experience or a show for a key 
representative of the Crown in Britain, who might advocate for the settler cause. In either event, 
the Kenyan body remained the centre of attention, collectively observed and spoken about 
through the discourse of civilization.  
 A clue as to the meaning of the increased presence of Kenyans at the 1928 ceremony 
comes from the headlining news of 12 November. It was not the Armistice Day ceremony, but 
the Prince of Wales’ luncheon with settlers that occupied a full three pages of the EAS that day. 
Lord Delamere chaired the event and the Prince delivered a lengthy speech lauding the 
development of the country.83 A potential boon to those desirous of self-governance and shared 
trusteeship, it was essential that the settlers put on a representative show for the Prince of Wales. 
Plucky as the settlers were, it was through exploiting Grigg’s “government by agreement” and 
investing in good relations with London, that settlers might achieve their ultimate success. The 
visit and the Prince’s speech, it seemed, proved that “the progress of local government will give 
a new impetus and anew sense of responsibility to the people.”84 With Grigg and Amery the 
buttresses of settler aspiration, it appeared as though – from the settler perspective – they had a 
new friend in tow.  
 In 1929 the ceremony reverted to its more ritualistic and repetitive qualities. It was rather 
the Ex-Servicemen Reunion, organized by the newly established Kenyan branch of the British 
Legion, that took centre stage. There, apparently undeterred by the Hilton Young Report, Grigg 
addressed the gathering with a message of “shared comradeship” in the face of revolutions 
abroad, seditious activities, and the great responsibility of trusteeship in Kenya.85 The EAS 
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foregrounded the gathering by saying it was a “unique gathering, the assembly of men and 
women who know the trials and test of a time which is beyond the knowledge of the younger 
generations.”86 C.J.D. Duder identifies fears of the youth losing their martial spirit and the 
waning significance of the First World War as a prime motivation for reviving the British Legion 
in Kenya as a soldier settler community. The 1926 Census indicated that almost a third of Kenya 
Colony’s white population was under the age of 26, but only “the smallest minority of this group 
would have served in the First World War. One of the reasons given for the establishment of 
both the Legion and the Defence Force was that these bodies would inculcate spirit and loyalty 
among the youth of Kenya, qualities which were apparently found to be both desirable and 
lacking.”87 The youth needed to understand the sacrifices of the men and women who made up 
the white community in Kenya, while the Defence Force stood in as the adult variation of shared 
responsibility for colonial defence. The ceremony, by contrast, served its purpose outside the 
realm of colonial politics, with the settler community clearly under threat from London. By 
1931, the EAS eschewed its yearly tribute to the meaning of Armistice Day on November 11th.88 
 The period from 1927-1929 is the most striking example of the ways that Armistice Day 
became entangled with colonial politics. Evolving from community exaltation in the wake of the 
Armistice, through to an administrative affair in the mid-1920s, by 1927 the desperation of the 
settler community in its quest for self-governance, alongside favourable powers in the Colonial 
Office and in Nairobi, the ceremony became a public ritual ripe for exploitation. Rather than 
fight back against the inclusion of Kenyans in the ceremony, the settler community – or at least 
the political elite – embraced the change, all the while building their own community up through 
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other events that were exclusively theirs. Settlers and the administration alike pulled at the 
strings of Empire-wide commemoration, making Armistice Day something unique, born of 
colonial culture and politics. Analyzed within the framework of the political struggles we have 
traced throughout this study, Armistice Day represented another battle for control over the 
colony, and the attendant need to control, discuss, and discipline Kenyan bodies.  
 If Armistice Day was a battle over political control, sometimes through divergent state 
and settler narratives but at other times through collaboration, the climate was a consistent threat 
to all those with white skin in Kenya. Dane Kennedy argues that the colonial environment was a 
constant threat in the everyday lives of settlers, with many coming to the conclusion that the 
climate precluded Kenya from being a white man’s country.89 The ceremony on November 11th, 
occurring just as the mid-day heat was taking effect, meant that performing the invented tradition 
exposed settler vulnerability in the territory. Disease, as in the example of the whooping cough 
amongst the Boy Scouts, also threatened settlers. Pitted as they were against politicians in 
London, it was perhaps a non-human agent, not the Hilton Young Report, that represented the 
settlers’ greatest enemy.  
 In 1935, for example, the EAS reported on “a remarkable feat of courage and endurance,” 
on Armistice Day.90 A man, whose car had broken down “in the heart of Masai lion country,” 
was finally able to reach Nairobi “after tramping for 18 hours, meeting herds of game with their 
attendant lion…in an exhausted and waterless condition.”91 The ordeal, the man told the 
Standard, reinforced to him that it was “good to be up against it physically, and keep on going, 
and after it’s over you can look back and appreciate it all.”92 But the reporter questioned, “how 
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many of the modern generation would appreciate his point of view”; “familiar sentiments,” Mr. 
Sinclair had apparently shared “about ‘modern youth’ which his old Masai guide had 
expressed.”93 It was a story of triumph, as a plucky old settler had braved the African terrain to 
participate in the tribute to the Empire’s glorious dead. 
 Sinclair’s story highlights the lengths to which settlers went to secure their dominance in 
a hostile territory, despite evidence that their constitution was not fit for East Africa. The 
Africanization of the East African campaign was a direct result of the environmental 
impediments to fielding a white army with animals. Black bodies withstood the East African 
terrain, the tsetse fly, and heat to a greater degree than European soldiers. Mr. Sinclair, however, 
offered evidence to the contrary. Just as the consistent presence of black skin was a reminder of 
the Kenyan role in Kenya Colony’s defence, both in the 1920s and during the Great War, the 
Kenyan environment also reminded participants in commemorative activities that the imperial 
script, refined in Nairobi, had clear limits. 
Part of enjoying the leisurely settler lifestyle meant confronting the reality that the 
Kenyan environment, outside of the Highlands and the Coast, was inherently hostile to white 
bodies. Indeed, the white civil uniform that settlers and administrators donned in Kenya 
responded to environmental realities. With the typical safari helmet, lightweight white button-up 
shirt, and either white trousers or shorts, the civil uniform was a familiar sight at any ceremony, 
celebration, or public spectacle in Kenya up until decolonization. This was a marker of white 
prestige that not only helped the settler deal with the Kenyan heat, but also stood in stark contrast 




 Accordingly, the white civil uniform was the desired attire for officers and officials alike 
at Armistice Day ceremonies, at least from the late 1920s. In the case that an ex-serviceman or 
officer was not entitled to wear the white civil uniform, only then would they attend Armistice 
Day in full military dress. An interesting note appears in the circular to Provincial and District 
Commissioners concerning Armistice Day, asking those wearing the civil uniform not to attend 
in shorts but in full trousers. Apparently, with the ceremony occurring in the mid-day sun, some 
attendees had opted for wearing shorts to combat the discomfort of standing in crowded areas 
without cover on Armistice Day. As a moment marking the white prestige and out of respect for 
the importance of the occasion, however, the colonial administration clearly wished that officials 
and officers would dress for the occasion accordingly. Perhaps a seemingly innocent 
transgression against the colonial administration’s script, the need to reiterate the expected norms 
of dress on 11 November served as a reminder that the colonial context consistently affected the 
ability of white settlers to participate in public life. 
 In one instance, a letter from a Provincial Commissioner to the head of a school from 
which young girls had participated in the official Armistice Day ceremony commented that while 
the participation of the girls had been exemplary, one girl had passed out due to the mid-day 
heat.94 In another example, an administrator apologized for being unable to attend the Armistice 
Day ceremony in Kakemega, owing to an illness that periodically recurred during his tenure in 
Kenya. “It is sheer funk,” he complained, but he “dare not risk doing anything funny during the 2 
minutes silence.”95 Recalling the appeal for non-white communities to understand and respect 
British tradition, it was not only sickness but the potential for interrupting a signpost of white 
prestige that spurred the writer to apologize. Ultimately, the hostile Kenyan environment had 
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made him “lose his guts,”96 and prevented his presence at the public spectacle. He deemed it 
absurd that he had just recently participated in a heated tennis match, a frustrating example of the 
volatility of the Kenyan environment, especially for white settlers.97 
 There are only traces of the threats that the Kenyan environment posed to the settler and 
administrator alike, though historians have noted the concerns with white viability in East 
Africa.98 Compounding the metropolitan insistence that Kenya was primarily an African 
territory, the environment also reiterated the facts on the ground. Nairobi and Mombasa, 
alongside the White Highlands, might have been relative retreats from the climatic threats, but 
disease and heat bore heavily upon the settler constitution throughout the Colony. Empire-wide 
uniformity was thus an illusion, as it was renegotiated to meet the needs, or deal with the 
consequences, of living in far off outposts.  
 
Armistice Day: The Politics of Public Spectacle in Kenya Colony, 1918-1929 
 Armistice Day represented the focal point of a range of activities in Kenya Colony each 
year. It tied together aspects of the IWGC’s fabric of memory, with the presence of its monument 
to African sacrifices, and the transporting of wreaths to its cemeteries, to settler events like the 
Armistice Ball, the Poppy Appeal, and theatre showings (which themselves drew upon trends 
and traditions abroad). The colonial administration, however, bound those threads together as the 
party responsible for scripting the event. The script itself was subject to negotiation, but 
consistently featured members of the government and, at times, the Crown as one manifestation 
of its responsibility to govern and administer the Colony according to metropolitan dictates. Its 
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role as stage master, especially after 1922, gave it the power to mould Armistice Day across the 
colony into a unifying event. 
 Yet throughout the 1920s, commemorative practices shifted alongside the whims of 
metropolitan governments, who had their own distinct visions of what Kenya Colony ought to 
be. Through the intense periods of debate on the issue, with the crucial signposts of the 
Devonshire Declaration and the deliberations of the Hilton Young Commission, settler buy-in to 
the ceremony changed as well. The ceremonies in 1927 and 1928, correlating with the Hilton 
Young Commission, represented the apex of civic mobilization in Kenya Colony, giving way, 
thereafter, to a highly ritualized, almost mundane ceremony thereafter. By 1929, the presence of 
ex-servicemen’s organizations and the long-standing settler traditions of Armistice Balls and 
social events dominated the headlines on 11 and 12 November.  
 Throughout the inter-war years, the observation and discourse surrounding black and 
Indian bodies was a consistent concern for settlers. It was part of a colonial discourse that 
cemented white prestige, reiterated the civilizing mission (and the settler role therein), and 
denigrated the participation of other races on Armistice Day, or otherwise, exploited their 
behaviour for self-congratulation. In combination with the invented-ness of Armistice Day 
traditions, the disciplinary nature of ceremony also locked Kenyan memory of the Great War 
into the knot that resulted from the negotiation of remembrance practices in inter-war Kenya 
Colony. Armistice Day, whether administrative or settler-driven, was a decidedly white 
endeavour, performed in white spaces. Kenyan iconography and inclusion was useful only 
insofar as it complemented administrative and settler narratives of colonial control.  
 Even though Armistice Day was performed in white spaces, getting there, or being able 
to attend, was a different matter altogether. Disease, climate, and transportation barriers – just as 
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they had in the East African campaign – eroded the artifice of the white man’s country. At the 
same time, it also precluded any understanding of the ceremony as a faithful copy of the 
metropolitan tradition. This was a colonial culture of remembrance that evolved according to the 
context of Kenya Colony. There were imperial fibres, settler filaments, and state tethers 
entangling, but they left few lasting threads onto which Kenyans might find meaning. The 
memory of the Great War was white-washed in public spaces, with seemingly little reason for 
Kenyans to vindicate an imperial war that only served their subjugation.
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Conclusion: A Culture of Commemoration: Kenya Colony and Remembrance in the 1920s 
Mau Mau, Uhuru, and Constructive Forgetting: White Supremacy as the Legacy of the 
First World War 
 On 15 October 1964, the newly independent Kenyan government sent out a circular 
proclaiming that “from this year…and all subsequent years Remembrance Day shall cease to be 
observed in Kenya.”762 Just short of 50 years since von Lettow-Vorbeck successfully defended 
German East Africa’s port city of Tanga in November 1914, Jomo Kenyatta relegated the 11 
November ceremony to the annals of settler history. In creating a new identity for the Kenyan 
Republic, regardless of its representativeness, it was clear that symbols of colonial rule ought not 
define the civic identity of Kenyans or its government. The ‘invented traditions’ that Europeans 
brought or negotiated in the colonial context were not appropriate for the type of cultural 
memory Kenyatta wished to foster. It did not mean that the First World War no longer had 
meaning in Kenyan communities, or even for the Kenyan state, but that imperial frameworks for 
publicly commemorating 1914-1918 had little purchase in the post-Independence era.  
 The colonial administration anticipated the antipathy towards symbols of its rule in the 
last year of transition towards Independence. Colonial politicians worried that Kenyans might 
vandalize colonial architecture, particularly statues of prominent settlers like Lord Delamere, but 
also sites commemorating royals like Queen Victoria and King George.763 F.A. Loyd advised the 
colonial office that it was in the government’s interest to consider removing some statues lest 
they “[become] a target for political spite which we must assume will inevitably be the case 
sooner or later since in the eyes of the African nationalist they represent the era of the colonial 
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oppressor.”764 The British assumed that some Kenyans, in building a new nation-state, would 
vent their frustrations by effacing any traces of settler society and colonial rule. 
 The discussions about the statues reveal an important distinction between memorials 
deemed artistic and impersonal, and those of a more personal nature. The officials tasked with 
investigating the issue labelled the Muthaiga War Memorial, which had come under the care of 
Nairobi City Council,765 as well as the East Africa War Memorial (the Obelisk), as “artistic 
work.”766 These works, alongside the busts of former royals, “were unlikely to give offence.”767 
The corresponding determination was that the statues were best left where they were, with only 
the Delamere statue provoking any level of consternation. Ultimately, the colonial officials 
believed that when it came to works of art and public amenities “the Government would 
probably not wish to arrange for removal.”768 The statues and gardens that lined the city streets 
were not readily identifiable as symbols of colonial rule.  
 As it turned out, Kenyans views on colonial statues, and specifically First World War 
memorials, were subject to wide variation, as in the case of the proposed Kimathi statue. It was 
not that the history of Kenya’s involvement in the First World War had been forgotten, even in 
1984, but that it was the subject of debate and negotiation in light of the transformations in 
Kenyan society since the Second World War. The new stage in Kenyan history, enacted through 
the liberated nation-state, put Kenyans in a new set of relationships with the past. Images of 
prominent settlers might be the subject of particular outrage, but colonial authorities rightly 
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judged commemorative statues as respected sites, though they did not anticipate the scale of 
reinterpretation that took place after Independence. 
 Defending the First World War monuments did not surface in post-Independence Kenya 
as an attempt to recover and analyze a tragic period in Kenya’s colonial past. It was a response to 
the potential erasure of Kenyan iconography, which stood in for the memory and history of the 
First World War. The unfortunate result of this reality, however, is that the askari, porters, 
carriers, and other Black military personnel are stuck in between a European-focused memory 
and history of the First World War in Britain, and a nationalist historiography in post-
Independence Kenya. The nationalist struggle, including Mau Mau and Uhuru, severed many of 
the ties to the socio-cultural life of the colonial era. Re-writing Kenyan history from a nationalist 
perspective, tribal perspectives, and Africanist perspectives left little room for the First World 
War to mean anything more than a period when settlers asserted their will through force and 
policy. This is not to dismiss Kenya’s constructive ‘forgetting’ as a flaw, as the process of 
reassembling Kenya’s history in the wake of British Imperialism required such omissions. 
Instead, I argue, this was an accurate portrayal of the First World War, and this study has been an 
exercise in understanding the ways that commemoration facilitated the extension of colonialism 
in Kenya, making the collective public memory of the conflict meaningful only insofar as it 
undergirded white supremacy.  
 Thus I do not question or challenge Kenyan historiography in the post-independence era, 
but instead I hope to re-focus studies of the First World War in ways that highlight its global 
reach, its role in bringing the world into closer contact, and its dire consequences for those on the 
wrong side of the “global colour line.” The First World War was an opportunity to re-shape the 
world in a more egalitarian mould; seeking out the ways that Western Europeans and their 
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offshoots squandered that opportunity, despite calls to do so, is an essential exercise in 
understanding the frameworks of oppression, neo-colonialism, and inequality that still shape 
global politics beyond “the end of history.”769 Exploring this reality, however, requires a deeper 
investigation of the different ways that settler society, the colonial state, and civil society in 
Kenya Colony negotiated their dominance. The commemoration of the First World War offers a 
particular instance of the tangled threads of Kenya’s colonial past, ever responsive to the 
political context of colonial control. 
 
White Anxiety, Empire Nationalism, and the Commemoration of the First World War 
 In many ways, the Centenary laid the groundwork for interrogating the mythos of the 
First World War by highlighting the diverse forces that made up continental armies,770 or 
emphasizing the global reach of the war.771 These were not new approaches, but challenging the 
Eurocentric conception of the war has been an uphill battle for historians of Africa, India, the 
Middle East, and Asia. Despite a renewed interest, especially in Britain, in the First World War 
from 2014-18, the Centenary remained overwhelmingly white, though laudably focused on the 
experiences and sacrifices of soldiers and home front contributors to the war effort. Black and 
Brown bodies made their way into the narrative, displacing the illusion that it was the plucky 
little island nation of Britain, and her loyal British peoples in the colonies, that resisted the 
German advance alone. Ultimately, however, the appetite for a wholesale reconceptualization of 
 
769 I reference Francis Fukuyama’s famous refrain on the spread and ultimate ascendency of Western liberal 
democracy here, because the argument that liberal democracies function without the baked-in history of imperialism 
undergirds the narrative of the “birth of the nation” in many of Britain’s former colonies and Dominions. The First 
World War was not, according to these cultural memories, the extension of Imperialism, but the re-birth of British 
peoples across the world in the new mould of the nation-state. Yet, as Burbank and Cooper argue, Empire remains 
the predominant organizational mode in human history, with its influence still tangible in the supposed era of the 
nation-state. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992).  
770 See Chapter 1.  
771 Ibid. 
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the conflict from the perspective of Africans, Indians, Arabs, and Asians, was already filled by 
the buffet of new and emotionally significant remembrances of the Western Front. Four years 
was simply not enough time to both rekindle the interest of the British public in First World War 
history, while also confronting the imperial dimensions of 1914-1918. 
Indeed, for historians like Gary Sheffield, building on the work of Daniel Todman, it was 
essential to reclaim the First World War as not only a just war, but a ‘forgotten victory.’772 
Sheffield re-released his book with this title (originally published in 2001) in 2014 to smash the 
public perception of the war as “a futile, pointless conflict that was fought about nothing and 
solved nothing,” and that “bone-headed British generals who, faced with trench deadlock, could 
think of nothing more imaginative than to hurl long lines of troops against German trenches and 
barbed wire, where time after time they were cut down in swathes.”773 When viewed from 
Britain, Sheffield makes a strong case that not only was the war primarily caused by Austria-
Hungary and Germany, but that it was also a just war, which the British public conceived of as 
worth fighting despite the losses.774 Likewise, as Aimee Fox demonstrates, the British Army 
evolved as the fighting raged, reacting as best as it could to limit casualties and expedite victory 
in Europe.775 The memory of the conflict, it seems, belied the evidence. 1914-1918, and the 
death and injury that accompanied it, needed to be reclaimed as a righteous sacrifice. 
As I indicated at the outset of this study, I was a late comer to the study of the First 
World War. Until 2015, I knew little of the conflict outside the myths and truncated public 
histories of the conflict in my home country of Canada. But as a historian of Africa, and 
 
772 Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities (London: Endeavour 
Press Ltd., 2014). iBooks. 
773 Ibid., 31-32.  
774 Ibid. 
775 Aimee Fox, Learning to Fight 
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specifically the influence of European-descended people on the continent, the locus of study – 
the Western Front – obstructed my understanding of the conflict, and especially the revisionist 
accounts that centred on redeeming the First World War as anything more than a brutal, 
protracted assault on humanity. Redeeming the First World War from this position meant also 
redeeming and sustaining the imperial context of white supremacy.  
As important as it is to understand the ways that the First World War redefined the 
balance of power in Europe, itself fraught with dire political ramifications,776 the fact remains 
that this was a multi-sided conflict consisting mainly of Empires who viewed power in global, 
rather than local, terms.777 While emerging nations like South Africa, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand recognized the opportunity to extend local control, the power to do so was couched 
in imperial discourse. As Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds put it, drawing on W.E.B. Du Bois, 
Britons across the globe drew on whiteness as a “mode of subjective identification that crossed 
national borders and shaped global politics.”778 Despite the complexities of the millions who 
came to the call of the British Empire, I am still unable to reconcile the abhorrent valuation of 
Black, Brown, and other racialized bodies that motivated many Britons, with the undeniable 
tragedy of death and injury from 1914-1918. It is not simply an appeal to revisionism and 
 
776 The literature on the peace process is extensive and detailed. Historians have examined how the 
reorganization of the Balkans and the Middle East, as well as French and German territorial boundaries, presaged 
later political and military conflicts. The mandates system in Africa has also featured in these studies, however, the 
volume of ink spared for the consequences of the First World War in Africa is relatively insignificant. In Michael 
Neiberg’s recent concise history, for example, Africa features only briefly. When a revered historian of the First 
World War makes critical choices about what to include in such a brief history, it tells us much about what not only 
academics, but the general public, understands as essential to the peace process. See Michael Neiberg, The Treaty of 
Versailles: A Concise History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
777 This general claim elides, to a certain extent, the European origins of the First World War. Whether it 
was Franco-Russian, Austro-Hungarian, or German belligerence that sparked the conflict, however, the ‘origins’ 
debate is inconsequential because the war did evolve into a global conflict. Should the conflict have been contained 
to a localized and ‘preventative’ war in Serbia, this may not have been the case, but the mass mobilizations of the 
French, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German forces in the first week of August, 1914, set an altogether different 
trajectory. It should be noted that the revisionist approaches to the origins of the First World War saw renewed 
interest from 2014-2018, again drawing First World War historians’ energy away from other theatres.  
778 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, 2.  
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anachronism; white supremacy might have been inevitable given the historical period, but the 
particularly virulent forms it took during the war and into the 1920s and 1930s certainly was not.  
According to Lake and Reynolds, it was not the inevitability and taken-for-grantedness of 
white supremacy that drove its entrenchment, but its contingency and contestedness.779 
Colonized peoples the world over clamoured for their place at the proverbial table, whether it 
was nationalists in the colonies, Pan-Africanists at Versailles, or more localized everyday 
resistances to colonial rule. Critics of colonialism at home and abroad, no less convinced of their 
present supremacy as white folk, also argued for the universality of human value, and the need 
for a gentler Empire. In other words, white supremacy was a choice, though necessarily 
constrained by prevailing scientific, ecclesiastical, and academic racial discourses. Thus, beyond 
the limited goal of checking German ambitions on the continent and maintaining the balance of 
power in Europe, the more general aim was to strengthen the British Empire’s power in global 
affairs, necessitating the defence of whiteness as the mark of civilization.  
It was not only the war itself that anchored the defence of whiteness, but the 
conceptualization and remembrance of the war in its immediate aftermath. In Europe, the 
devastation and feeling of loss gave emotional impetus to commemorative work, but as the 
history of the IWGC indicates, creating a stronger union between white Britons the world over 
remained a constitutive element of memorialization.780 Anxieties over the decline of the British 
Empire, the possibility of colonial loss, and the potential for colonized peoples’ liberation, lurked 
beneath the surface of an ostensible tribute to the Empire’s glorious dead. As Kent Fedorowich, 
Andrew Thompson, Bill Schwarz, and others demonstrate, processes and pacts unified the 
 
779 Ibid., 3. 
780John Lack and Bart Ziino, “Requiem for Empire: Fabian Ware and the Imperial War Graves 
Commission,” in Empires in World War I: Shifting Frontiers and Imperial Dynamics in a Global Conflict, Andrew 
T. Jarboe and Richard S. Fogarty eds. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 351-375; See also Chapter 3 of this study.  
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British World.781 Whiteness provided Europeans with the power to mobilize local institutions for 
their exclusive benefit, “a paradoxical politics, at once transnational in its inspiration and 
identifications but nationalist in its methods and goals.”782 The First World War accelerated both 
transnational racial identifications, and the discrete production of whiteness in particular locales.  
Just as Sheffield and Todman identify the myths of the First World War as scarcely 
representative of the evidence, the idea of a white man’s war also had to be produced by omitting 
much of the evidence of racialized communities’ contributions, and oppositions to the war effort. 
In the contact zone of the colonies, where Black and Indigenous bodies were part of the 
quotidian practice of colonialism, the reality of Black and Indigenous veterans, the physical 
evidence of the colonized dead, and narratives of their substantive role in the prosecution of the 
war, were direct threats to the power of white skin. It was thus far easier to find comradery and 
commonality with their former enemies who shared light complexion. Local political context 
required different responses, but the shared anxieties over the future of white supremacy guided 
post-war narratives of 1914-1918. 
 
Friend or Foe? Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck Comes to Dinner 
 In Kenya, while Britishness was essential to settler identification, racial solidarity was as 
important to justifying their existence. In 1929, the annual East African Forces Dinner invited 
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, their former foe in the East African Campaign, to share a meal with 
prominent settlers and expatriates in London.783 It was a sign of respect, perhaps reconciliation, 
 
781 See Bill Schwarz, White Man’s World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Kent Fedorowich 
and Andrew Thompson, Empire, migration and identity in the British World (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2013). 
782 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, 4.  
783 The New York Times, “British Entertain German War Chief,” December 3rd, 1929. 
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extended to a man who had been directly responsible for the prosecution of a campaign that took 
the lives of many settlers and inflicted injuries with which many veterans still lived. Lettow-
Vorbeck enjoyed close friendships with his former foes in the field, including Jan Smuts, proving 
that in colonial Africa white skin, and European blood, was thicker than water.  
The gathering spoke to what Edward Grigg elucidated on Armistice Day in 1929. He was 
“certain indeed that force is necessary in many parts of the world, and particularly in the 
backward parts, if civilisation is to be spread and if the civilisation is even to be maintained.”784 
That is, the backward and still resistant African could be subject to the use of force if the ends 
justified the means. When it came to white-on-white violence, however, “if war were ever to 
break out again between great civilised nations, then indeed, our civilisation would be 
condemned, and our material ruin would be complete.”785 The anxiety at the idea of civilizational 
decline, putting white prestige into question, was of utmost importance. It was clear that 
Germans, despite their direct role in killing Britons, were not the ultimate enemy of civilization. 
On the anniversary of Armistice Day in 1934, the East African Standard noted that “the 
sixteen years that have passed since the Armistice was signed have not brought forgetfulness, but 
rather that a new meaning in thought for the future is being associated with these 
anniversaries.”786 But Armistice Day had always been about creating meaning for the future, 
justifying the deaths of men and women across the Empire in ways that reinforced the legitimacy 
of the British role in the world. The meaning Britons created was representative only of those 
who remained loyal, who behaved according to their version of civilization, and who 
remembered the dead properly. It included African troops, and centred their bodies, but the 
 
784 EAS, “Inspiring Close to Armistice Day,” November 13th, 1929, 7.  
785 Ibid. 
786 EAS, “Armistice Celebrated in British Empire,” November 13th, 1934, 1.  
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necessity of obedience always meant that settlers reserved special indignation for the Africans 
that had little regard for the ‘invented traditions’ of 11 November. Even in the 1920s and 1930s, 
it was clear that many Kenyans did not find meaning in the Two Minutes Silence, requiring 
“steps [to be] taken to instruct natives in the meaning of the ceremony.”787 It was not evidence 
that Kenyans found meaning elsewhere, or ascribed a different significance to 1914-1918, but 
that the civilized white man was still a necessary force in East Africa.  
 
Kenya Colony and Commemoration: The Case For and Against Exceptionality 
The initial thrusts of the commemoration of the First World War aligned with a period in 
Kenya Colony’s history when settler self-governance seemed a real possibility. The Devonshire 
White Paper put into policy that settler independence was not the trajectory of the colony, yet it 
was the Great Depression that vanquished the hopes of settler ascendency for good. For this 
reason, the period between 1923-1930 represents a crucial timeframe when the power dynamics 
in Kenya Colony were at their most volatile. Struggling to maintain their status as the logical 
leaders of Kenya Colony, settlers made the First World War meaningful for their uses, only 
acknowledging the immense sacrifice and strain the war exacted upon Kenyan communities 
when it suited their needs. The IWGC, for its part, left a huge physical footprint, including 
Kenyan iconography, that remains at least somewhat meaningful for Kenyans, but the nationalist 
struggle, including Mau Mau and Uhuru, severed many of the ties to the socio-cultural life of the 
colonial era. Re-writing Kenyan history from a nationalist perspective, community perspectives, 
and Africanist perspectives left little room for the First World War to mean anything more than a 
period when settlers asserted their will through force and policy. 
 
787 EAS, “Sixteenth Anniversary of the Armistice: A Jarring Note,” November 12th, 1934, 1.  
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 Representations of the First World War in present-day Kenya remain relatively muted. 
During the Centenary the Kenyan government and its military forces organized official 
Remembrance Day ceremonies, though they took place largely for the consumption of military 
personnel and visiting Britons rather than for the general public.788 Ceremonies generally are 
held in CWGC cemeteries, though wreaths are often laid at the foot of the African Memorial as 
well. While a much different kind of research would be necessary to ascertain whether the 
memory of the First World War remains in the oral histories of Kenyan communities, it remains 
clear that civic engagement with the history of 1914-1918 is largely absent in Kenya. 
This study makes clear that the reasons for the lack of civic engagement with the First 
World War have roots in the public commemorations of the colonial era. Settlers centred their 
experiences, ambitions, and power in commemorative traditions during the 1920s, fashioning the 
First World War as a justification for the British Empire, and settler self-governance more 
specifically. When those experiences, ambitions, and power structures were no longer ascendant, 
the motivations for remembrance receded as well. That the commemoration of the First World 
War in Kenya was built on the foundations of white supremacy and British traditions meant that 
the Independent Kenyan government needed to eliminate public commemorations in order to 
strip white supremacy and British sensibilities from the Kenya’s civic fabric.  
The question remains whether Kenya represents an exceptional case borne of the unique 
political circumstances of Kenya Colony in the 1920s, or if Kenya’s commemorative history 
might provide fruitful comparisons for other former African colonies. I suggest that it is both. As 
First World War historians move beyond the Centenary, it will be essential to continue to 
 
788 See for example: ATC News, “Kenya Prepares to Commemorate the End of World War I,” September 
29th, 2018, https://atcnews.org/2018/09/26/kenya-prepares-to-commemorate-the-end-of-world-war-i/. 
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interrogate how the memory and remembrance of the conflict manifested quite differently 
depending on the socio-political context of the nation-state, or colony in question. Kenya 
Colony, for its part, stood out amongst British territories because of settlers’ struggles to gain a 
measure of independence from Britain, along the lines of southern Rhodesia and South Africa. 
Yet the framework of white supremacy, violence and dispossession, and struggle against colonial 
rule are essential aspects of colonialism in Africa more generally. Thus, the commemoration of 
the First World War, a seminal period in the solidification of colonialism south of the Sahara, 
provides a discrete field of study capable of finding the pulse of British rule.  
Consequently, the history of the IWGC in Africa is an important starting point for 
studying commemoration in British Africa. Its imperial fabric for commemoration, with all of its 
dangling threads, still provides a mass of commemorative work that served as the literal 
foundation of all subsequent commemoration on the continent. Even the study of the IWGC, 
heretofore undertaken almost exclusively by Michele Barrett, remains underdeveloped. Her work 
has allowed me to continue investigating the threads that settlers and administrators pulled away 
from the imperial fabric of commemoration, offering a more in-depth understanding of how 
remembrance went hand-in-glove with the everyday practice of colonialism in particular settings. 
Historians may have re-conceptualized the First World War as a global and imperial conflict, but 
it is now time to focus on how settlers, colonial administrators, and colonial subjects also 
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